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ABSTRACT 
 Five studies were conducted examining a pattern of interaction children use as a 
mechanism for learning from others. The three components of this interaction pattern 
consisted of children’s questions, adults’ explanations and children’s follow-up. I was 
interested in how individual differences might influence this interaction pattern. In Study 
1, I performed a secondary data analysis to explore the entire pattern of interaction.  
Analyses revealed that children across diverse socioeconomic groups asked a similar 
proportion of information seeking questions in daily conversations with caregivers. 
However, when looking at the responses children received, caregivers from low-SES 
families offered significantly fewer exemplary responses (those that include 
explanations) to causal questions than mid-SES caregivers. When exploring the quality of 
explanations that caregivers offered, low-SES caregivers provided more circular 
explanations while mid-SES caregivers provided more non-circular explanations. Finally, 
when exploring children’s follow-up to unsatisfactory responses, no differences were 
found when looking at fact-based questions. Indeed, children from low-SES and mid-SES 
families were most likely to re-ask their original question which indicates that children 
across diverse backgrounds purposely use their questions to acquire new knowledge. 
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Significant differences were found when looking at follow-up to unsatisfactory responses 
to causal questions. Mid-SES children were significantly more likely to provide their own 
explanations.  These findings extend previous work and suggest that this interaction 
pattern may not look the same across diverse backgrounds. 
Studies 2, 3 and 4 explored the first half of this interaction pattern: questions and 
adult explanations. Here I focused on 3- and 5-year-olds’ evaluation of non-circular and 
circular explanations, and their use of such explanations to determine informant 
credibility.  Whereas 5-year-olds demonstrated a selective preference for non-circular 
over circular explanations (Study 2: long explanations; Study 3: short explanations), 3-
year-olds only demonstrated a preference for the non-circular when the explanations were 
shortened (Study 3).  Children’s evaluation of the explanations extended to their 
inferences about the informants’ future credibility.  Both age groups demonstrated a 
selective preference for learning novel explanations from an informant who had 
previously provided non-circular explanations – although only 5-year-olds also preferred 
to learn novel labels from her. However, when looking at individual differences in these 
preferences by socioeconomic status (Study 4) children from low-SES families 
selectively preferred informants who provided circular explanations, whereas mid-SES 
children showed a preference for non-circular explanations.  
Study 5 explored the second half of the interaction pattern: adult explanations and 
children’s follow-up. Here I explored individual differences in epistemological beliefs 
and their impact on caregiver’s explanations and children’s subsequent learning. 
Epistemological stance predicted children’s learning. Children of caregivers who adopted 
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an evaluativist stance learned more than children of caregivers who used an absolutist 
stance. 
Taken together, these results have the potential to inform caregivers, daycare 
providers and classroom teachers about the importance of the responses they offer to 
children’s questions. These responses are integral to the question, explanation, follow-up 
pattern of interaction that children use when acquiring new knowledge from others. 
Understanding how individual differences impact this interaction pattern may help 
decrease cognitive disparities between children across sociocultural contexts before the 
onset of formal schooling.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Currently in the United States, 22% of all children live in families with incomes 
below the federal poverty level (NCCP, 2014). These children are less likely to have 
access to early educational opportunities (e.g., high-quality preschools) that are necessary 
for the development of the knowledge and skills needed for academic success (Nores & 
Barnett, 2014). Indeed, by the time children enter formal schooling, children from low-
socioeconomic status (SES) families are at a significant academic disadvantage, as 
compared to children from mid- and high-SES families (Hart & Risley, 1992; Hart & 
Risley, 1995). Given that vocabulary at kindergarten is a significant predictor of 
academic achievement in later grades (Cunningham & Stanovich, 1997), the majority of 
research to date examining SES differences has focused on language development and 
discrepancies in children’s vocabulary and comprehension (e.g., Halle et al., 2009; Hart 
& Risley, 1995; Fernald, Marchman & Weisleder, 2013; Lee & Burkam, 2002).  Recent 
research has found SES-based deficits in vocabulary by 18 months. These deficits 
increase during the preschool years, with a 6-month gap found by age 2 between low-
SES and mid-SES children, and as much as a 2-year gap in language by age 5 (Fernald, 
Marchman & Weisleder, 2013).   
In the following chapters, I argue that it is unlikely that vocabulary 
differences are the only cognitive disadvantage that children from low-SES families 
face when they enter formal schooling. Specifically, I suggest that there might be 
differences in children’s use of questions to solicit information, in the quality of their 
interlocutor’s explanation, and in children’s subsequent use of the explanation. These 
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differences may cause children to acquire less information about the world, potentially 
causing differences in children’s knowledge by the time they enter Kindergarten.  
When children enter formal schooling they are often confronted with ‘academic 
language’ and specific patterns of interaction that may not be synonymous with the 
patterns of interaction used for learning in the home (Snow & Uccelli, 2009). For 
example, schools often privilege a pattern of interaction whereby children are expected to 
ask questions and use the explanations provided by teachers for learning (e.g., inquiry-
based, query method, Socratic method etc.)  This question-explanation pattern of 
interaction may not be familiar to all children. Indeed, in a recent study, we found that 
mid-SES preschoolers show a preference for more complex explanations, whereas low-
SES preschoolers prefer less complex explanations (Corriveau & Kurkul, 2013), 
suggesting that children from mid-SES families may be exposed to more high-quality 
explanations. This may be linked to if and how children from diverse backgrounds use 
questions that elicit explanations for learning. This is potentially problematic, given that 
complex explanatory structures are found in the ‘academic language’ (Snow & Uccelli, 
2009) used in formal schooling and we have come to expect that by the time ALL 
children enter formal schooling they prefer to learn from complex explanations  
potentially making it difficult for children to negotiate the classroom setting and to 
interact appropriately with teachers.  
 An understanding of the variability in the early interaction patterns children use 
when learning from others is essential in creating high-quality learning environments that 
are accessible to all children. Indeed, President Obama emphasized the need for high-
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quality early education in his 2013 State of the Union address, in part as an attempt to 
reduce such large academic inequities even before the start of formal schooling. The goal 
of this dissertation is to examine individual differences in children’s questions, adult’s 
explanations, and the child’s follow-up to the adult’s explanations.  More broadly, I am 
interested in how this process is related to the child’s school readiness abilities in order to 
inform educational policy. 
Children’s early learning experiences are largely shaped by their interactions with 
the social world (Vygotsky, 1978).  Some of these learning experiences are around 
mundane problems, such as how to find a missing object, whereas others are more 
complex, such as understanding buoyancy (e.g., sink vs. float activities). Some of these 
problems can be solved using previous knowledge that the child already possesses, or 
through exploration and experiential learning, whereas others depend on the child’s 
ability to actively seek information from external sources. When children learn, they have 
access to two sources of information: their own, first-hand experience and the 
information provided by others. Although most research in developmental psychology 
and education focuses on first-hand exploration (e.g. Duckworth, 1972; Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1997; Piaget, 1929), solitary real-world exploration often does not provide full 
access to abstract concepts, absent or invisible referents, many scientific phenomena, or 
future events.  To fully learn about such concepts, children must rely on information 
provided by others (Bruner, 2009; Vygotsky, 1978; Nelson, 1996).  
Moreover, such information is not always spontaneously provided by others. 
Instead, children often use question-asking as a mechanism for acquiring new 
4	  
information that cannot be learned through first-hand experiences (Callanan & Oakes, 
1992; Hickling & Wellman, 2001). Indeed, by the time children enter preschool, they ask 
an average of 76 information-seeking questions per hour (Chouinard, 2007) and by the 
age of 5 they, they are able to formulate effective questions to acquire the knowledge 
they need to learn a new concept (Mills, Legare, Bills & Mejias, 2010).  Many of these 
questions require simple-one-word answers, while others require more complex 
explanations. (e.g., ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions). Arguably, both the content and the 
quality of these explanations play a critical role in shaping early learning. On the one 
hand, explanations can provide children with vocabulary rich interactions that contribute 
to school readiness (Hart & Risley, 1995). On the other hand, explanations provide 
critical information for understanding new concepts that cannot be acquired through first-
hand observations (Frazier, Welman & Gelman, 2009).   
Despite the critical role explanations play in providing young children with the 
necessary information to acquire new concepts, adults do not always provide high-quality 
explanations. Indeed, some caregivers simply do not have the necessary knowledge to 
offer an appropriate explanation to their child’s question or the time needed to formulate 
a high-quality explanation, and do not always feel it is necessary/appropriate to provide 
children with complex responses to their inquiries (Valle, 2009). This often leads 
caregivers to ignore a question or to offer an ineffective response such as “it is because it 
is.” In contrast, high-quality explanations are often elaborate and complex and avoid 
circular logic. Moreover, these types of explanations often provide children with more 
opportunities to ask questions. Many factors may contribute to differences in the quality 
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of explanations children are exposed to. Specifically, different patterns of talk such as 
children’s use of questions to elicit explanations from caregivers may differ across 
socioeconomic (SES) groups, providing more or less opportunities for high-quality 
explanations.  
These differences may be potentially problematic for formal schooling where a 
pattern of interaction whereby children are expected to ask questions and use the 
explanations provided by teachers for learning is often privileged (Schultz, 2009).  This 
question-explanation pattern of interaction may not be familiar to all children. Indeed, in 
a recent study, we found that mid-SES preschoolers show a preference for more complex 
explanations, whereas low-SES preschoolers prefer less complex explanations (Corriveau 
& Kurkul, in prep), suggesting that children from mid-SES families may be exposed to 
more high-quality explanations. This may be linked to if and how children from diverse 
backgrounds use questions that elicit explanations for learning. This is potentially 
problematic, given that complex explanatory structures are found in the ‘academic 
language’ (Snow & Uccelli, 2009) used in formal schooling and we have come to expect 
that by the time ALL children enter formal schooling they prefer to learn from complex 
explanations — potentially making it difficult for children to negotiate the classroom 
setting and to interact appropriately with teachers when this is not their preference.  
 To date, few studies have examined this question-explanation pattern of 
interaction and its relationship to children’s learning from others.  The goal of this 
dissertation is to investigate how preschoolers use their questions and critical evaluations 
of explanations from social others to learn about the world (See Figure 1.1).   
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Figure 1.1 This model serves as the foundation for this dissertation. Knowledge 
acquisition begins with the child’s question. Informants’ explanations either aid in this 
acquisition or hinder it. Depending on the response children receive, they may ask a 
follow up question or re-ask their original question if they are using their questions to 
acquire new knowledge.  
Through secondary data analyses and experimental methods in both preschool and 
museum settings, I explore children’s use of questions and epistemic cues (caregiver’s 
epistemological stance) when (1) learning from adult explanations, and when (2) 
interacting with a caregiver in an informal learning situation. I include key variables that 
may influence these social relationships, such as the child’s socioeconomic status (SES) 
and caregivers’ epistemological stances. This dissertation suggests that the patterns of 
interaction used for learning that are often privileged in formal schooling may not be 
synonymous with the patterns of interaction used by children from diverse backgrounds 
in their early learning experiences with caregivers. These findings have important 
implications for classroom teachers and how they teach diverse students.  
This dissertation is guided by three broad questions: 
1)   Are there differences in the types of explanations children hear in response to 
the questions they ask and their use of follow-up to acquire quality explanations 
based on SES? (Study 1, Chapter 2)   
 Child's Question  Adult Explanation Child's Follow-up 
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Despite the integral role formal schooling plays in children’s acquisition of knowledge, 
preschoolers spend the 
majority of their time with 
caregivers (including 
grandparents, aunts and 
uncles) and not in classroom settings that emphasize learning. This is especially true for 
children from low SES backgrounds (Graden, 1982; Johnson, 2005; Porter et al. 2010). 
Thus, the primary source for acquiring information that cannot be learned through first 
hand experiences is often the caregiver.  
Few studies have examined the question/explanation/follow-up pattern of 
interaction between children and their caregivers. Indeed, if this pattern of interaction is 
used for learning, it is likely that children will persist in question-asking if they receive an 
inadequate response. Some support for this hypothesis comes from Frazier, Gelman & 
Wellman (2009), who examined question-asking patterns between children and their 
caregivers, finding that when children do not receive an explanation in response to an 
explanatory question, they persist and ask follow up questions.   
Despite these results, it is unclear if the conversational strategy of using questions, 
evaluations of explanations and follow-up to learn about the world is universal. The 
Frazier et al. (2009) study examined children from white middle-class families, yet 
patterns of talk differ across ethnic and socioeconomic groups (e.g., Heath, 1983; Hoff, 
2006).  Children from diverse socioeconomic groups may have different strategies for 
acquiring new knowledge that do not include question asking, evaluations of explanations 
 Child's 
Question  
Adult 
Explanation 
Child's 
Follow-up 
Figure 1.2.  Research model. Study 1 explores the 
entire model. 
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and follow-up.  The study presented here aims to explore differences in responses offered 
by caregivers to children’s information-seeking questions and children’s reactions to 
these responses from economically diverse backgrounds.  
2) Do children use explanations to make judgments about an informant’s future 
credibility? (Studies, 2, 3 
& 4, Chapter 3)  The 
results from Study 1 
should elucidate the 
pattern of interaction amongst children  
and caregivers in a naturalistic setting.  In Chapter 3, across 3 Studies, I use experimental 
methods to explore children’s evaluation of an adult’s explanation, and the extent to 
which they view that adult as a credible source for future learning (selective trust).  In 
Chapter 3, I use the selective trust paradigm (e.g., Corriveau & Harris 2009a; Harris, 
2012; Koenig, 2012; Koenig & Woodward, 2010) to explore children’s use of 
explanation quality to evaluate an informant’s credibility across diverse backgrounds 
(low-SES vs. mid-SES).  I focus on one potential cue that children use when evaluating 
explanations: argument circularity.  I focus on argument circularity as a marker of 
explanatory coherence.  Circular explanations refer to statements that reiterate the 
information from the original question without adding new information. By contrast, non-
circular explanations provide more information than was provided in the original 
question.  I elaborate more on why I focus on argument circularity in Chapter 3. The 
 Child's 
Question  
Adult 
Explanation 
Child's 
Follow-up 
Figure 1.3. Research model. Chapter 3 looks at the 
first half of the model. 
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findings from this study highlight differences in how children use explanation quality to 
make inferences about an informant’s (e.g., teacher, caregiver) future credibility.  
3) How do children use questions and informant explanations for learning 
conceptual knowledge? 
(Study 5, Chapter 4) The 
studies related to questions 1 
and 2 explain individual 
differences in questions and explanations, and children’s use of those explanations to 
make inferences about an informant’s credibility.  In Study 5, I explore whether children 
actually learn from the explanations they hear. Here I examine caregivers’ explanations 
and children’s use of follow-up questions to acquire conceptual knowledge.  
Given that the previous two studies demonstrate that the question, explanation, 
follow-up pattern of interaction for learning might not be privileged by all children, here I 
focus on the one group in which this pattern of interaction is clearly privileged: mid- and 
high- SES families. Additionally, I am interested in the variability of this interaction 
pattern within this group and potential factors that might cause this variability, namely 
epistemological stance. The rationale for exploring epistemological stance is explained in 
more detail in Chapter 4. These findings are important for highlighting the potential that 
this interaction pattern might have for acquiring conceptual knowledge. 
In order to situate the aims and the possible contributions of the present set of 
studies, the following sections provide an overview of the literature. I begin by exploring 
the broad context of children’s learning from others before turning to children’s 
 Child's 
Question  
Adult 
Explanation 
Child's 
Follow-up 
Figure 1.4. Research Model. Chapter 4 looks at the 
second half of the model.  
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questions, adult explanations and two factors that potentially moderate adult 
explanations: socioeconomic background and epistemological stance.  
Context 
Children’s learning from others 
Is it the case that children blindly trust information provided by others, or, are 
they selective in whom they turn to in learning situations?  This has been a question of 
interest to developmental psychologists over the past few decades (for reviews see Harris, 
2012; Sobel & Kushnir, 2013; Gelman, 2009).  This research shows that by age 3, 
children are surprisingly selective in who they judge to be a trustworthy source.   
To determine the cues children use when learning from others, researchers have 
employed a novel paradigm called the selective trust paradigm. The paradigm consists of 
two phases: a familiarization phase and a test phase. During the familiarization phase, 
children are presented with information about the differential knowledge of two 
informants. In the subsequent test phase, children are introduced to an unfamiliar object 
or situation and given an opportunity to seek and accept information about it from one of 
the two informants. The extent to which children choose to selectively rely on one of the 
two informants is measured. Using this paradigm, researchers have found that even 
preschoolers rely on two broad heuristics (epistemic and social) –— acting like little 
statisticians and little social psychologists (e.g., Corriveau & Harris, 2009a, 2009b; 
Corriveau, Fusaro & Harris, 2009; Corriveau, Kinzler & Harris, 2013; Harris, 2012; 
Kinzler, Corriveau & Harris, 2011; Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Mascaro & Sperber, 
2009).   
11	  
Children’s use of epistemic cues. One broad heuristic children use when 
deciding from whom to learn is an informant’s previous accuracy in a particular domain. 
To determine an informant’s accuracy, children weigh what an informant says against 
their own past experiences with a given topic. If the informant’s statement is consistent 
with the child’s past experience (e.g., labeling a ball as a ball), the child can mark this 
informant as ‘accurate’ and are likely to choose to learn from this informant in future 
learning scenarios. In contrast, if the informant’s statement is not consistent with the 
child’s previous experiences (e.g., labeling a ball as a shoe), then the child can mark the 
informant as ‘inaccurate’ and are likely to avoid learning future information provided by 
the informant.  
In early selective learning studies, 3- and 4-year-old children were asked to judge 
two different informants – one who was accurate, and one who was inaccurate (Clément, 
Koenig & Harris, 2004; Koenig, Clément & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005).  In the 
familiarization phase, both informants labeled familiar objects with familiar labels. One 
informant provided consistently accurate labels (e.g., labeling a ball as a ball), while the 
other informant provided consistently inaccurate labels (e.g., labeling a ball as a shoe), 
thus demonstrating consistently accurate or inaccurate behavior.  Then, in the test phase, 
the informants labeled novel objects with conflicting novel labels.  Overall both 3- and 4-
year-olds prove to be remarkably good at monitoring, predicting and using accuracy 
when making future judgments about an informant’s future credibility.  This information 
is long-lasting – preschoolers preferred to learn from that informant up to one week after 
the initial accuracy information (Corriveau & Harris, 2009a).   
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Taken together, these results indicate that at relatively young ages, children 
evaluate what they hear to make judgments about an individual’s future credibility. This becomes 
important when considering how young children, especially during the preschool and 
early elementary years, evaluate their teachers. Indeed, young children frequently turn to 
their teachers, who they expect to be experts across multiple knowledge domains, when 
learning new information. This is potentially problematic given that educators note 
feeling less prepared in some knowledge domains than others (Brown, Westenskow & 
Moyer-Packenham, 2011). If educators indicate that they are less knowledgeable in a 
domain, either through verbal or non-verbal cues, children might attend to those cues and 
be less likely to consider the teacher a reliable source (and be less likely to acquire the to-
be-taught information).  
Weighting multiple cues. Although a specific focus on children’s relative 
weighting of social cues is beyond the scope of this dissertation, there are many social 
cues children weigh simultaneously with epistemic cues, when deciding from whom to 
learn. Indeed, in a classroom setting, children often have a rich history with their 
teacher, which may impact their evaluations of the teacher’s credibility. It is likely that 
children are simultaneously weighing their social history with their teacher with other 
epistemic cues such as the teacher’s history of being accurate. Several studies have 
examined how children navigate two competing strategies and found that children’s 
relative weighting of social and epistemic information changes with development. 
Three-year-old children weight social information more heavily than accuracy. For 
example, they are willing to turn to a familiar teacher, regardless of accuracy 
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(Corriveau & Harris, 2009b). By contrast, by age 4, accuracy trumps social cues: 
children selectively prefer to learn from an informant who had previously provided 
accurate information irrespective of social-group membership (Corriveau, Kinzler & 
Harris, 2013; Corriveau & Harris, 2009b; see Reyes-Jacquez & Echols, 2013). Taken 
together, these results suggest that at early ages a child’s social history with an 
informant might act as a buffer when deciding from whom to learn, however as 
children develop, children likely rely more on epistemic cues when weighing them 
against social cues.  
In summary, the work to date on children’s selective learning from informants 
indicates that children attend to many different epistemic cues, and despite their social 
history with an informant, as children develop they selectively learn from adults who 
have a history of accuracy. Although these findings provide an important first step for 
understanding how children learn from others, to date, most of this work has focused on 
children’s acquisition of relatively simple information–a novel object’s name or 
function (e.g. Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 2008; Koenig & Harris, 2005). In the next 
section, I turn to the questions children ask to acquire the explanations they use when 
learning from others. 
Children’s questions 
 It is well-established that young children ask a lot of questions. Some of these 
questions are used to gain attention or to ask for permission (e.g., ‘Can you open my 
sippy cup?’; Callanan & Oakes, 1992; Chouinard, 2007; Greif, Kemler-Nelson, Keil & 
Gutierrez, 2006), whereas others are used for the purpose of advancing understanding and 
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knowledge (e.g., ‘Why is the sky blue?’) (Chouinard, 2007; Kemler-Nelson, Egan & 
Holt, 2004); the latter types of questions often require more sophisticated responses. 
Initially, it was hypothesized that children use questions as a means of working through 
their mental schemas to construct their own knowledge and not as a means for acquiring 
information from a different source (Piaget, 1929).  However, current research suggests 
that children do in fact actively use questions to acquire new knowledge. When children 
use questions for the purpose of acquiring new knowledge and are not satisfied with the 
response they receive, they often repeat their question (Kemler-Nelson et al., 2004) or 
provide their own explanation (Frazier, Gelman, & Wellman, 2009), further suggesting 
that children use questions as a tool for learning from others and not simply to gain 
attention. Children often use the knowledge gained from their questions to override core 
principles, which leads to conceptual change — and the acquisition of conceptual 
knowledge (Carey & Spelke, 1994). Note, that although all children ask questions 
(Chouinard, 2007), there is significant variability in the amount and types of questions 
children ask. Factors such as children’s prior knowledge, encouragement from caregivers, 
and motivation have been linked to differences in children’s question-asking behaviors 
(Newman, 1990; Ryan & Pintrich, 1997). Indeed, recent research shows that children are 
most apt to seek out information about concepts they are learning about. For instance, 
around the time children make advances in false-belief tasks, children begin asking 
questions about theory of mind and other mental state phenomena (Chouinard & Imberi-
Olivares, 2012).  
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   Questions as a tool for learning.  As previously mentioned, many concepts 
cannot be learned through first-hand observations (e.g., ‘why is the sky blue’). In these 
instances, because children are unable to check second-hand information against their 
real-world experience, the new information must be provided by a knowledgeable 
informant. However, because adults do not always spontaneously provide the information 
children want, children must ask questions. 
 Using questions to learn from others involves a surprisingly complex set of 
cognitive processes (Landrum, Mills & Johnston, 2013; Mills, Legare, Grant & Landrum, 
2011; Mills & Landrum, 2014).  First, children must be able to recognize when they do 
not have the knowledge they need to solve a problem or answer a question. Somewhat 
surprisingly, research indicates that although children use questions as early as age 2 to 
acquire new information (Chouinard, 2007), they do not always recognize when they 
need to ask a question. For example, studies have found that when given the choice 
between answering questions themselves or seeking information from an informant about 
the contents of a box, 4- and 5-year-olds do not systematically seek out information from 
another source (even though they recognize which informant should know the 
information; Robinson, Butterfill, & Nurmsoo, 2011).  In a similar study, Aguiar, Stoess, 
& Taylor (2012) presented 4- 5- and 6-year-olds with 3 experts (a doctor, a firefighter 
and a farmer). Children were then presented with a set of questions and asked to select 
the expert (informant) they would assign each question to (e.g., ‘What color is a fire 
truck?’). All children successfully assigned the majority of questions to the appropriate 
informant, demonstrating their ability to categorize the domain of questions and to match 
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them to the corresponding experts. Despite this recognition, in a follow-up study, only 6-
year-olds were able to recognize when they did not know the answers to questions 
themselves and appropriately assigned them to an expert. In contrast, 4- and 5- year olds 
were far more likely to overestimate their own knowledge and attempt to answer 
questions on their own (Aguiar et al., 2012). The ability to recognize when to ask 
questions is an important first step in the question asking process. These results should 
not be taken to mean that children under the age of 6 do not use questions effectively. In 
fact, these results should prompt researchers to ask how and when children younger than 
6 use questions and what accounts for the variability in their use of questions (e.g., 
attributes of the caregiver, inherent traits of the child like curiosity and their prior 
knowledge of a topic). I address several of these questions in Studies 1 and 5 of this 
dissertation (Chapters 2 and 4).   
 Once children have recognized the need to ask questions, they must decide whom 
to ask. Somewhat surprisingly, recent studies indicate that children are no less likely to 
direct questions to strangers than they are to their parents (Chouinard & Imberi-Olivares, 
2012). This contradicts previous evidence (Tizard & Hughes, 1984), which suggested that 
children are less likely to ask questions of teachers than of parents. However, it should be 
noted that the data used to support these findings was collected in very different 
circumstances, with parents and children engaging in one-on-one conversations while 
children participating in large group discussions with their teachers. Children likely did 
not ask as many questions in this setting because they did not have the joint-attention of 
their teacher, therefore these results should be interpreted with caution. Although children 
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seemingly ask questions to a range of interlocutors, an open questions remains from these 
two studies: Do children direct their questions to anyone who can or will listen? Or, are 
they selective in whom they direct their questions to? 
Deciding whom to ask requires children to evaluate the credibility and expertise of 
informants. In everyday life, it is not always clear what information people know, making 
it difficult for children to decide whom to direct their questions to. Indeed, it is unlikely 
that children will be faced with the blatant inaccuracies like those used in studies to 
determine the cues children rely on when learning from others  (e.g., Corriveau & Harris, 
2009a, 2009b; Corriveau, Kinzler & Harris, 2013). Instead they will most likely use cues 
of expertise (Aguiar et al., 2012; Mills, Legare, Bills & Mejias, 2010; Landrum, Mills, & 
Johnston, 2013) and the explanations they hear in response to their questions to judge an 
informant’s credibility. To date, no study has systematically explored how children 
monitor explanations and use them to make judgments about an informant’s credibility. It 
is important to understand how children monitor explanations, as it is often the response 
they receive when they ask questions. Thus, in the third chapter of this dissertation 
(Studies 2, 3 & 4), I explore how children monitor explanations to make judgments about 
an informant’s credibility and how this might vary as a function of individual differences, 
namely socioeconomic status (SES).  
After children have determined who to ask, they must decide what to ask. Indeed, 
knowing what to ask is often determined by a child’s previous experience with a given 
topic. For example, if a child is presented with a novel toy, they may need time to explore 
the toy before being able to formulate appropriate questions about its function. Indeed, 
18	  
there is likely a great deal of variability in children’s prior knowledge and the opportunity 
for exploration (Hart & Risley, 1995), which likely informs the types of questions 
children ask. The types of questions children ask in turn contributes to the types and 
quality of explanations children receive. Indeed, it is likely that children will receive 
more elaborate explanations when they ask elaborate questions.  
 It is evident that children ask many different types of questions (e.g., how, why, 
what, can, when, where etc.). In some cases, children use their questions to gain attention 
or to maintain a simple social interaction (Mills & Landrum, 2014), while in most cases 
they use questions to acquire more information about a particular topic (Hickling & 
Wellman, 2001). In developmental research, ‘why’ questions are denoted as the 
quintessential information-seeking question, which are widespread and often used during 
the preschool years (Callanan & Oakes, 1992; Hickling & Wellman, 2001; Wellman, 
Hickling & Schult, 1997). Preschoolers know how to use ‘why’ questions to acquire new 
information (Kemler-Nelson & O’Neil, 2005; Chouinard, 2007; Greif et al. 2006). 
Indeed, Greif et al. (2006) examined preschoolers’ use of questions to acquire conceptual 
knowledge about novel artifacts and animals.  Researchers presented children with a 
series of pictures of novel artifacts and novel animals designed to elicit questions (e.g. 
Tarsier, eats insects; crullet, makes play dough). Children’s questions were recorded and 
coded. Although children asked general questions such as “What is it?” about artifacts 
and animals alike, they were more likely to ask about the functions of artifacts, and about 
category membership, food choices, and habitats of animals. Interestingly, preschoolers 
never asked questions about either the artifacts or animals that would be considered 
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inappropriate by adults (e.g., ‘how does a dog live’), suggesting that children realize that 
in order to understand different entities they must gather different types of information 
that is acquired through the questions they ask.  
 Despite knowing who to ask and what information to ask for, it is not always the 
case that children receive the information they are looking for. There is evidence to 
suggest that when children use questions for learning, they will likely persist and ask 
follow-up questions when they receive an inadequate response. In a recent study Frazier, 
Gelman & Wellman (2009) examined patterns of interactions between children and their 
caregivers around children’s questions. According to Frazier et al. (2009), this pattern of 
interaction encompasses three steps (a) the child’s initial question (b) the response the 
child received and (c) the child’s reaction to this response. When looking at naturalistic 
interactions between caregivers and their children, Frazier et al. (2009) found that when 
children do not receive an explanation in response to an explanatory question, they persist 
and ask follow up questions or they re-ask their original question.  In a follow-up 
experimental study (Frazier et al., 2009), children were presented with situations 
designed to elicit questions (e.g., nest with a turtle in it). Children either received an 
explanatory response or a non-explanatory response. Similar to the findings in Study 1, 
children persisted and re-asked their original question when they received a non-
explanatory response.   
These results can be taken to mean that children actively use questions as a tool 
for learning and are able to distinguish between an adequate response and an inadequate 
response. Despite these results, it is unclear if the strategy of using questions to learn 
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about the world is universal. Indeed, the children used in this study were predominantly 
from white middle-class families. Previous research reveals that patterns of talk differ 
across racial and socioeconomic groups (e.g., Heath, 1983; Hoff, 2006).  Therefore, 
children from diverse racial and socioeconomic groups may have different strategies for 
acquiring new knowledge that do not include question asking. One possible reason for 
this difference is the family values embraced by the caregiver that may influence their 
interactions with their children.  Research supports this claim and it has been found that 
caregiver-child interactions are influenced by the family values embraced by the 
caregiver (e.g., imagination, education, religion etc.), as well as the caregiver’s access to 
resources. For example, caregivers who embrace imagination might engage in more 
pretend play (de Rosnay & Hughes, 2006), whereas those who emphasize religion might 
spend time with their children participating in religious services (Evans, 2001).  Research 
focused on recent immigrants found that a student’s achievement was related to the 
emphasis on education shared by the student, their parents, and their peers (Fulingi, 
1997). I further explore other potential causes for differences in patterns in caregiver-
child interactions later in this review. Before turning to this discussion, I will focus on the 
responses children receive to the questions that they ask.  
Taken together, the aforementioned studies provide evidence that young children 
not only ask questions, but are also capable of asking appropriately situated questions 
across a variety of domains. This early emerging and sophisticated skill is a potentially 
powerful tool for acquiring new knowledge when learning from others. Indeed, it is 
through these questions that children gain the information that is often used to evaluate an 
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informant’s credibility. Despite this fact, children’s questions may not always function as 
the powerful tool that they have the potential to be. In large part, this is due to the 
responses they receive from adults and other interlocutors. Below I discuss adult 
explanations and the implications for learning from others.   
Explanations 
 To begin to understand how children use explanations when learning from others 
I must first describe what is meant by explanations. Researchers have posited an array of 
criteria to define explanations. For instance, Barbieri, Colavita, and Scheuer (1990) write 
that "an explanation is offered to a partner to clarify something which might be obscure 
or ambiguous" (p. 246). They include "what" explanations (i.e., the meanings of words, 
naming of objects), "why" explanations (i.e., causal and purposive expressions), and 
"how" explanations (i.e., descriptions of processes), whether or not they are explicitly 
marked. In contrast, Donaldson and Elliot (1990) define explanations as “something that 
extends our understandings of the world, by moving beyond simple observation of events 
to the causal links underpinning them” (p. 26), whereas Draper (1988) suggests that 
“….in everyday life, almost anything may, in the right circumstances, count as an 
explanation (p. 16). Because I am interested in how explanations are used for learning 
from others, I adopt Barbieri et al.’s (1990) classification of explanations in the studies 
presented here. 
In the current set of studies, I am interested in questions that require explanations 
that extend beyond simple responses. As they develop and begin to generate theories 
about the world, children require more complex explanations (usually in response to their 
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‘why’ and ‘how’ questions; Chouinard, 2007; Frazier, Gelman & Wellman, 2009; Isaacs, 
1930). These explanations are often used by children to understand phenomena that 
cannot be learned through first-hand experience. Callanan and Oakes (1992) and 
Chouinard (2007), both investigated explanations caregivers’ offered in response to their 
children’s questions. Using a diary method, Callanan and Oakes (1992) asked parents to 
record their children’s questions about “how things work” and “why things happen” and 
the subsequent explanations provided by the parent. Findings revealed, that when asked a 
causal question, the majority of parents responded with causal explanations.  More often 
than not, these explanations focused on prior causal factors (e.g., previous events that led 
to a specific phenomenon) on causal consequences (e.g., events that occurred due to a 
specific phenomenon). Although these findings provide compelling evidence to suggest 
that children’s questions are often met with appropriate responses (e.g., causal questions 
receive an explanatory response), they should be interpreted with caution given that 
parents were asked to self-report and it is likely that parents are less apt to report 
providing low-quality explanations than high-quality explanations.  
To date, research has linked the complexity and quality of explanations that adults 
offer to a variety of factors including the gender of the child; finding that parents 
typically offer more explanations to boys when learning about science than to girls 
(Crowley, Callanan, Tenenbaum, & Allen, 2001) and parental education level; finding 
that parents with higher levels of education offer more causal explanations than parents 
with basic levels of education (Tenenbaum & Callanan, 2008). Although no studies to 
date have explicitly explored how differences in these interactions are linked to learning 
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outcomes, researchers have argued that these interactions potentially influence later 
science learning (e.g., Siegel, Esterly & Callanan, 2007; Tenenbaum, Snow, Roach & 
Kurland, 2005). Therefore, it is important to consider how children use explanations 
when learning from others.  In Studies 2, 3 & 4 of this dissertation I explore how children 
use explanations when learning from others (Chapter 3).  
Learning from Explanations. To evaluate a speaker’s credibility, not only do 
children rely on social cues (e.g., race, accent etc.), but it is likely they evaluate the 
quality of the speaker’s explanation itself.  The task of evaluating explanations to 
determine informant credibility is more complex than evaluating single-word utterances.  
Not only do children need to compare the speaker’s utterance to their own background 
knowledge to determine any inaccuracies, which varies greatly depending on children’s 
experiences, they also need to evaluate the internal coherence of the statement to ensure 
that there are no inconsistencies.  These tasks are difficult even for adults and older 
children.  Indeed, adults are often influenced by social factors such as confidence, 
attractiveness, or assertiveness (Todorov, Gobbini, Evans & Haxby, 2007; Todorov & 
Uleman, 2003), ignoring blatant inconsistencies within an informant’s explanation. 
 Very little research has systematically explored children’s ability to evaluate 
arguments and explanations.  In one study, Markman (1979) presented 8- and 11-year-
olds with a passage that had an inconsistency in it.  An example of such a passage might 
be, “Fish need light in order to see. There is absolutely no light at the bottom of the 
ocean…Some fish that live at the bottom of the ocean can see the color of their food.”  
Only the 11-year-olds noticed the inconsistency – and even they required probes before 
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they would mention it.  Similarly, Baum, Danovitch & Keil (2008) presented 5- to 10-
year-olds with two types of explanations: a circular explanation, and a noncircular 
explanation. Circular explanations were those that reiterated the question that was asked 
(e.g., polar bears have white fur because their fur is white, not black or another color) 
while non-circular explanations were those that provided more information (e.g., a polar 
bear has white fur because they live in snowy places. Since the snow is white, it’s hard 
for the bears’ enemies to find it and hurt it).  Whereas 5-year-olds had only a fragile 
preference for the noncircular explanation, 10-year-olds displayed a robust preference for 
the noncircular explanations.  An open question from both of these studies is how 
children evaluate the explanations provided by particular informants.  For example, even 
if young children had difficulty explicitly expressing a preference for the noncircular 
explanation, it is plausible that they might evaluate the source of the noncircular 
explanation as more credible.  Specifically, would they prefer to learn future information 
from the source using better arguments and explanations?  I explore this question in 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
Some recent evidence supports the possibility that young children attend to a 
speaker’s explanatory sentence structure when deciding whom to selectively learn from 
(Bernard, Mercier & Clément, 2012).  Specifically, 3- year-olds, 5-year-olds and adults 
were presented with two speakers who provided explanations for the location of a hidden 
object.  One speaker used a causal connective (i.e. “The ball is in the green box because 
Camille always puts her ball in the green box.”) whereas the other speaker used a phatic 
term (i.e., “The ball is in the blue box, well, Camille always puts her ball in the blue 
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box.”).  Four- and 5-year-olds selectively preferred to search in the location identified by 
the speaker using causal connectives.  Moreover, Mercier, Bernard and Clément (2014) 
demonstrated that children’s ability to monitor the quality of explanations develops over 
the preschool years.  
Despite the compelling evidence that children do monitor explanation quality, 
studies to date that look at explanation quality have been relatively controlled. If 
exposure to high-quality explanations does have an impact on children’s learning and 
how they perceive informants, then it is important to consider the factors that influence 
the quality of the explanations children might hear.  
Moderating Factors that influence parent-child interactions 
Children’s first learning partners are often their caregivers. From the early 
strategy of using imitation to learn (e.g., Meltzoff, 1999; Stewart & Hamilton, 1976) to 
later asking questions and using adult explanations/responses to learn (e.g., Callanan & 
Oakes, 1992; Chouinard, 2007) there are many different factors that influence these 
interaction patterns. In the current dissertation, I am interested in (1) demographic 
background:  socioeconomic status (SES) and race, and (2) the caregiver’s 
epistemological stance (Kuhn, 2001). I focus on these two variables because previous 
work indicates that children from mid-SES families prefer explanations with greater 
syntactic complexity than children from low-SES families (Corriveau & Kurkul, in 
prep.). By implication, children from low-SES families may be exposed to less 
syntactically complex explanations. Moreover, recent work indicates that children’s 
evidence-based talk is based on the epistemological stance of their mother (Luce, 
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Callanan & Smilovic, 2013). Thus, it is plausible that both informant-level variables may 
influence children’s learning from explanations. Below, I provide a more systematic 
review of the possible influence of SES and epistemological stance for children’s 
learning from explanations. 
Socioeconomic Status (SES).  Socioeconomic status (SES) is a powerful variable 
that is often considered in developmental research. Many aspects of child development 
have been linked to SES. Indeed, a large body of work has documented individual 
differences in children’s linguistic environment as a function of the mother’s 
socioeconomic status (SES) and education level (Hart & Risley, 1995; Hoff & Tian 2005; 
Tizard & Hughes, 1984; Snow, 1991). Lower SES mothers have consistently been found 
to talk less, to use a smaller vocabulary, to be more directive, to use prohibitory language 
(e.g., ‘shut up,’ ‘be quiet,’ ‘not now’) and to ask fewer questions of their children than 
higher SES mothers (Hoff, Laursen, & Tardif, 2002). In turn, children from lower SES 
families have been found to have discrepancies in language development (Bornstein, 
Haynes, & Painter, 1998; Hart & Risley, 1995; Hoff & Naigles, 2002; Huttenlocher, 
Haight, Bryk, Seltzer, & Lyons, 1991; Weizman & Snow, 2001). For example, individual 
differences in early exposure to complex language are related to differences in the 
complexity of children’s language production (Huttenlocher et al., 2002; Huttenlocher, 
Vasilyeva, & Shimpi, 2004), as well as differences in syntactic comprehension and verbal 
growth by the child (Huttenlocher et al., 2002). These differences in language 
development may influence the quality of the question/explanation pattern of interaction 
and how children use questions and evaluate the explanations they receive when learning 
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from others.  
When considering these differences it is important to consider the environmental 
factors that may cause them. For example, mid/high-SES children have greater exposure 
to books and literacy activities (Payne, Whitehurst & Angell, 1994; Scarborough & 
Dobrich, 1994) that may result in exposure to more vocabulary and more complex 
explanations. Thus, mid-SES patterns of parent talk may include more explanations by 
nature, making mid-SES children more likely to use questions and evaluations of 
explanations as a tool for acquiring new knowledge. In Study 1 (Chapter 2), I look at 
individual differences in the questions children ask, the explanations they receive and 
their reactions to explanations.  
Epistemic Stance.  I anticipate differences in how children across diverse 
backgrounds use questions and explanations when learning from others. Given the 
previous literature (e.g., Corriveau & Kurkul, in prep; Hart & Risley, 1995), I expect that 
children from low-SES backgrounds will be less likely to use question asking and the 
explanations they hear as a default mechanism for learning from others. Therefore, in 
Study 5 (Chapter 4), I will begin by exploring what children learn from the explanations 
they hear in mid/high-SES children and a moderating variable that may contribute to 
within group differences.  
The second moderating variable I consider in this dissertation is individual 
differences in learning from explanations based on caregivers’ epistemic stances. Broadly 
speaking, epistemological stance refers to one’s own beliefs about the nature of knowing 
(Bang & Medin, 2010; King & Kitchener, 2004; Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000; 
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Sandoval, 2005). Research indicates that when deciding who to learn from, children 
attend to epistemic characteristics; features that relate to the quality of what the 
informant is saying (e.g., accuracy; Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 2008; Clément, Koenig & 
Harris, 2004; Corriveau, Meints & Harris, 2009; Corriveau, Pickard & Harris, 2011; 
Koenig & Harris, 2005; Koenig & Woodward, 2010; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001; Scofield 
& Behrend, 2007). As previously noted, the majority of these studies have explored 
children’s single-word learning from blatantly inaccurate or accurate informants. 
Needless to say, it is difficult to extend these findings to children’s everyday learning, 
where they are more likely to be faced longer with longer utterances that are less 
blatantly inaccurate. Surprisingly, few studies have focused on the patterns of 
information that children will likely encounter in everyday interactions (Callanan & 
Valle, 2008; Gelman, 2009). These patterns are likely altered by some characteristic of 
the interlocutor’s own beliefs about how knowledge is constructed (their epistemic 
stance).  
Epistemological stances have been divided into several categories (Kuhn, 2001).  
An absolutist stance, according to Kuhn, is one that makes assertions that are seen as 
right or wrong, and is perceived as fixed truth (Kuhn, 2001).  For example, seeing science 
as merely a set of facts or statements such as “Girls are just born sweeter than boys” 
might imply an absolutist stance. In contrast, a multiplist stance assumes that knowledge 
comes from humans, beliefs are uncertain, and reasoning can be relativistic. Indeed, a 
person who adopts a multiplist stance will likely not use evidence to support one side of 
an argument, but rather; perceive both sides of an argument to have some truth. For 
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example, when talking about social issues (e.g. prayer in school, school start-time etc.), 
multiplists will present both sides of the issue and likely find truth in both. Finally, an 
evaluativist stance recognizes knowledge as originating from humans and therefore as 
uncertain, but it posits that beliefs are constructed based on evidence and that judgments 
are made by testing hypotheses or finding disconfirming evidence (e.g., learning about 
gravity by dropping a ball). Arguably, these stances influence the way adults construct 
knowledge, which alters the responses they provide to their children in learning scenarios 
where children use questions to acquire knowledge. That is, if an individual perceives 
knowledge as a set of facts and constructs their understanding of the world by viewing 
facts as absolute truth, then he will likely use facts when responding to his child’s 
questions.  
Although no studies to date have looked at the direct effects of epistemological 
stance on adult’s responses to children’s questions and its impact on children’s learning; 
several studies have examined how caregivers’ epistemological stances relate to 
children’s reasoning and children’s evidence talk. For example, Valle (2009) presented 8 
and 11-year-olds and their parents with a series of conflicting scenarios (e.g., Did the 
Egyptians build the pyramids?). Each scenario consisted of two different claims (e.g., 
‘Most historians claim that Egyptians built the pyramids as tombs for their kings’; ‘Other 
historians claim that most Egyptians did not have the mathematical experience to build 
the pyramids’). Parents and children were asked a series of questions to elicit their 
opinions about the topic. Parent-child conversations were recorded and coded for the use 
of evidence to support the claims. Researchers were interested in to what extent 
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caregivers voluntarily used evidence to support their reasoning. In an additional task, 
children and caregivers were presented with the opportunity to identify a hypothesis for a 
given problem and identify a way to test the hypothesis. The reasoning strategies used by 
the parent to deduce a hypothesis were coded. In addition to these tasks, parents were 
given two questionnaires to measure their epistemological stances (Value of Scientific 
Reasoning Scale and Ideas about Science questionnaire). Results indicated that 98% of 
highly-educated parents encouraged the use of evidence to support conclusions (Valle, 
2009). In addition, the use of evidence was connected to epistemological beliefs, in that 
parents who subscribed to a non-absolutist stance, were more likely to use evidence to 
support their claims. Although Valle (2009) did not look directly at how caregiver’s 
evidence talk and epistemic stances were related to children’s reasoning, these findings 
provide important insight for how children’s conversations with their caregivers might 
contribute to children’s development of reasoning strategies. These findings have 
important implications for learning because regular participation in discussions in which 
critical thinking and the use of evidence to support ideas are encouraged may relate to 
development of formal deductive reasoning in children (Chappell & Overton, 1998).  
In a subsequent study, Luce, Callanan & Smilovic (2013), looked at the link 
between parent’s epistemological stance and preschoolers’ evidence talk. Similar to Valle 
(2009), Luce et al. (2013), presented children and their caregivers with a book that 
contained several science-related topics that would likely come up in everyday 
conversation (e.g., global warming, Pluto no longer being a planet). Each page of the 
book consisted of a question that related to epistemic stance (e.g., a page on global 
31	  
warming, briefly describing multiple perspectives about global warming and then asking 
the question “How could someone figure out why the earth is getting warmer?”). 
Responses to these questions were recorded and coded for the epistemological stance 
they exhibited (e.g., absolutist, multiplist, evaluativist). Utterances were coded as 
absolutist if a parent provided evidence “only for their own position, if one side of the 
argument was dismissed or easily explained away, or if only one side was explicitly 
described as correct” (Luce et al., p. 456). An utterance received a multiplist code if 
parents “described both sides of an argument as equally correct, declined to discuss the 
topic by saying there is no way to tell the answer, or stated that the situation is too 
complex or uncertain to know” (Luce et al., p. 456). Finally, an evaluativist code was 
assigned when a parent “actively integrated evidence from multiple experts/sources to 
reach an answer, suggested a way to collect evidence to help decide, or focused on the 
complexity of the issue while valuing evidence as part of the evaluation” (Luce et al., p. 
456).  In addition to coding parent-talk, Luce et al. (2013) coded children’s evidence talk 
in their discussions about angels, germs and mammoths. Both children’s use of evidence 
and their questions looking for evidence were coded. Results indicated that parents’ 
expressions of absolutist and evaluativist stances to their children varied depending on 
the topic under discussion, with more evaluativist talk apparent in science related 
discussions (e.g., what makes Pluto a planet) than in value-based discussions (e.g., 
whether it is okay to steal). Indeed, parents’ science backgrounds, as well as the age of 
the child influenced the stances exhibited by parents, with parents of younger children (4- 
to 6-year-olds) exhibiting an absolutist stance more frequently (Luce et al., 2013). When 
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looking at the children’s evidence talk and its link to epistemic stance, findings indicated 
that children’s ability to use evidence and to ask questions related to evidence were 
significantly related to parents’ expressions of an evaluativist stance. 
Taken together, the emerging literature on the effects of epistemic stance in adult-
child interactions suggests that one’s epistemological stance does influence caregivers’ 
interactions with their children. Of interest is whether differences in epistemological 
stances also influence children’s decisions about the credibility of their learning partner. 
Thus, an open question from these studies remains: does one type of epistemological 
stance lead to differences in the types of answers children seek to their questions and in 
turn differences in their ability to acquire conceptual knowledge? In Study 5 (Chapter 4), 
I compare the effects of an absolutist stance to the effects of an evaluativist stance on the 
explanations caregiver’s provide in response to their children’s questions to aid in the 
process of learning conceptual knowledge. I focus on the evaluativist and absolutist 
stance because the content children will be learning falls in the science domain and 
previous work suggests that two types of epistemic stances are employed when talking 
about science: the evaluativist stance and the absolutist stance.  
 This dissertation suggests that there might be differences in how children use their 
questions and explanations to learn from others. This is potentially problematic given that 
the Western school system relies on children to ask questions and use the explanations 
provided by teachers for learning. Across 2 studies, I highlight individual differences. In 
Studies 1 through 4, I examine SES based differences. Given that the findings from 
Studies 1 through 4  (Chapters 2 and 3) demonstrated that children from mid/high SES 
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most readily use the question, explanation, follow-up pattern for interaction, I explore if 
these children learn from the explanations they hear in Study 5 (Chapter 4). In future 
work I intend to look more closely at interactions between caregivers and children from 
low SES families during learning scenarios.   
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Chapter 2: The questions they ask, the explanations they hear and children’s follow-up: 
Differences in interaction patterns for learning from others across SES and racial 
backgrounds  
 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 highlighted several studies that looked at two different aspects of an 
interaction pattern that children might use when learning from others: children’s 
questions and caregivers responses (explanations). It is clear from the aforementioned 
studies that question-asking involves a complex set of cognitive processes (e.g., 
Landrum, Mills & Johnston, 2013; Mills, Legare, Grant & Landrum, 2011; Mills & 
Landrum, 2014) and at surprisingly young ages children can distinguish between high 
quality and low quality 
explanations (e.g., Baum, 
Danovitch & Keil, 2008; 
Bernard, Mercier & Clément, 
2012). Nevertheless, few 
studies have explored how children use their questions to search for explanations and 
how they respond to the information they obtain. Indeed, if children use their questions 
for learning and receive an unsatisfactory response, they will likely follow-up until they 
receive the information they desire. In the current study I focus on this entire pattern of 
interaction as a mechanism for learning from others (see Fig. 2.1) 
As previously noted, Frazier, Gelman and Wellman (2009) found that when 
 Child's 
Question  
Adult 
Explanation 
Child's 
Follow-up 
Figure 2.1 Research model. Study 2 explores the entire 
interaction pattern. 
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seeking causal information children are likely to re-ask their original question if they do 
not receive an explanatory response. Here, they focused only on children’s ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions. Indeed, these are two types of questions that children use for learning, 
but it is likely children use other types of questions (e.g., ‘what,’ ‘where,’ etc.). 
Therefore, in the current study I focus on all types of questions used for learning (causal 
questions and fact-based questions). Moreover, Frazier Gelman and Wellman (2009) only 
focused on mid-SES white children. This is potentially problematic given that differences 
in interaction patterns have been found to exist across children from diverse backgrounds 
and they may not rely on the same conversational strategies when learning from others. 
An open question remains, are there differences across sociocultural contexts in the 
conversational strategies children use to learn from others? 
During the preschool years children generate many theories about the world 
(Carey, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1998) and ask many questions (Chouinard, 2007; 
Hickling & Wellman, 2001) that are motivated by an innate human curiosity about the 
world (Simon, 2001). Children seek to acquire knowledge to better understand their 
world, often turning to adult informants when the information they desire cannot be 
learned through first-hand observations or exploration (e.g., ‘what happens to a balloon 
when it flies into the sky?’). Children seek a diverse range of information when learning 
about the world, from simple concepts like the names of objects to more complex 
concepts like causal mechanisms (Callanan, 1990, 1991; Jipson & Callanan 2003; 
Callanan et al., 1995; Crowley et al., 2001). By the time children are 4-years-old they 
know what type of questions to ask to obtain the information they desire (Kemler, Nelson 
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& O’Neil, 2005; Chouinard, 2007; Greif et al. 2006).  
When seeking fact-based information (‘where do bees live?’) children rely on 
‘what,’ ‘where,’ and ‘who’ questions. These types of questions are the first to be acquired 
(Tyak & Ingram, 1977; Cairns & Hsu, 1978; Bloom, Merkin, & Wootten, 1982) while 
children do not use ‘how,’ ‘why; and ‘when,’ questions until much later. The emergence 
of questions to acquire facts occurs around 2-years-old, a time in development where 
children begin to understand that words can be mapped onto objects to give them 
meaning. At around 2 ½ years, children begin to string together words to make meaning 
and their understanding of differences among various syntactic constructions emerges 
(Siegler & Alibali, 2005). Given this developing understanding of the function of 
language, it makes sense that children begin to use fact-based questions at this age, as 
they likely use them as a tool to label objects (e.g., ‘What’s that?’).  To demonstrate the 
frequency with which children use fact-based questions, in Study 1 of Chouinard’s 
(2007) monograph, she examined the transcripts of 4 preschool-aged children from the 
CHILDES database. Using a tally method, she found that the majority of questions asked 
by children were information seeking (as opposed to attention-seeking, action-seeking, or 
permission-seeking). At all ages Chouinard (2007) found that children most frequently 
asked fact-based questions. However, she did find that children’s use of causal questions 
increased with age (only 4% of total question at age 2 to 30% at age 5). Interestingly, 
Chouinard (2007) found that each child demonstrated a significant increase in the 
proportion of causal questions they asked around age 3, suggesting this may be around 
the time they begin to actively seek and understand not only fact-based but also causal 
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information.  
When trying to understand causal information (e.g., ‘why does an object sink?’) 
children are likely to use ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. Although there is a large body of 
literature to confirm that children’s understanding of causality emerges around age 3 
(Bullock & Gelman, 1979; Shultz & Mendelson, 1975), more recent literature suggests 
that even infants can make causal inferences (Gopnik & Schulz, 2004; Sobel & Kirkham, 
2006). Given these findings, it is somewhat surprising that few studies have considered if 
and how children seek causal information. Indeed, many of the concepts children learn 
that cannot be observed through first-hand observations consider cause and effect 
relationships and causal mechanisms. Thus, to learn this information children seemingly 
have one of two options a) wait for an interlocutor to spontaneously provide an 
explanation or b) actively seek the information by posing a causal question. Few studies 
to date have examined the former, however, studies exploring children’s questions have 
found that children as young as 3 actively ask causal questions (‘why?’ and ‘how come’) 
about a variety of phenomena in their everyday lives (Callanan & Oakes, 1992). Using a 
diary method Callanan & Oakes (1992) asked mothers of 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds to record 
children’s questions for 2 weeks. Analysis revealed that children asked causal questions 
for a variety of natural, mechanical and social phenomenon, suggesting that children seek 
explanations across a variety of domains. These findings were replicated in a high- and 
low- SES sample of Mexican descent families (Callanan, Perez-Garnados, Barajas, & 
Goldberg, 1999). No comparisons were made across groups (white mid-SES, Mexican-
mid-SES, Mexican-low-SES) in terms of the frequency with which children asked causal 
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questions. Therefore, it is unclear from these studies if children across diverse racial 
groups ask causal questions with the same frequency. Indeed, several studies exploring 
adolescence and adult-learners show significant differences across cultural groups in the 
frequency with which students ask questions in classroom settings, (e.g., Morris & 
Frazier, 2013) suggesting that question-asking may not be a default mechanism for 
learning across all cultures. In the current study I explore how socioeconomic and racial 
backgrounds contribute to the frequency with which children ask causal and fact-based 
information seeking questions for learning. I expect that children who ask fact-based and 
causal information seeking questions more frequently are more likely to use them as a 
strategy for learning from others.  
The responses children receive to the questions they ask are as critical for learning 
as the questions themselves. Several studies have explored adult responses to children’s 
questions and found that mothers of 3-year-olds report responding less with causal 
explanations (32% of the time) than mothers of 5-year-olds (approx. 50% to 60% of the 
time) (Callanan & Oakes, 1992). Chouinard (2007; Studies 1 and 3) found similar results 
in her monograph when collapsing across children’s fact-seeking and explanation-
seeking questions. When looking at the responses to children’s questions across 4 
longitudinal transcripts, caregivers offered an informative reply either immediately 
following the child’s question or after the child re-asked his original question 
approximately 64%–79% of the time depending on the child’s age. This result was 
replicated in an experimental study, where adults offered informative responses 78–86% 
of the time. Chouinard (2007) argues that the variability in responses due to children’s 
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age is likely due to parents’ perceptions of their children’s abilities and readiness to learn 
a new concept. Indeed it has been found that because of children’s special relationship 
with their parents, parents are particularly sensitive to their children’s knowledge states 
and are much better at scaffolding learning situations for their children than peers 
(Cicirelli, 1976; Perez-Granados & Callanan, 1997). Therefore, parents of younger 
children may be less apt to offer explanations to their children if they do not feel as 
though their child has the appropriate prior knowledge to make sense of the new 
knowledge. The current study focuses on caregivers as the source children direct their 
questions to. 
Although the variability in the frequency of explanations parents provide based on 
their children’s age is well-documented, less is known about variability in explanation 
quality and potential reasons for this variability. Children are exposed to a range of 
explanations, some high-quality and some low-quality. An early study from the field of 
Sociology revealed that social class (SES) was the most predictive index (over 
caregiver’s IQ and child’s sex) of the quality of responses mothers gave to their 
children’s questions (Robinson & Rackstraw, 1967). Here, mothers were presented with 6 
hypothetical questions (2 ‘where’ questions; 4 ‘why’ questions) and asked how they 
would respond if their child asked the question. In comparison to the low-SES mothers, 
mid-SES mothers were more likely to provide more accurate information that was 
embedded in less ‘noisy linguistic’ contexts than low-SES mothers (Robinson & 
Rackstraw, 1967). Moreover, when looking at mother’s responses to ‘why’ questions, 
mid-SES mothers were more likely to use complex explanatory structures, analogies and 
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were less likely to repeat the question as the answer (circular response). Although these 
findings provide an important first step for understanding caregiver’s responses to their 
children’s questions, they are somewhat limited because the questions were hypothetical 
and asked by an experimenter. Somewhat surprisingly, to my knowledge, no study to date 
has explored the variability in the types of explanations and quality of responses children 
receive to the questions they ask in naturalistic settings. In the current study I examine the 
explanations caregiver’s across racial and socioeconomic groups provide to their children 
in naturalistic settings. In addition, I look at the quality of the responses children receive. 
Here I focus on explanation circularity as a marker of explanation quality. Circular 
explanations refer to statements that reiterate the information from the original question 
without adding new information. By contrast, non-circular explanations provide more 
information than was provided in the original question – by definition making them more 
high quality than circular explanations. Therefore, when considering the implications for 
children’s learning, it can be argued that non-circular explanations teach new information 
whereas circular explanations do not expose children to new information for learning.  
The aforementioned work clearly indicates that children’s questions are often an 
effective tool for learning information from adults; providing that adults provide high-
quality responses. What is not clear however, is what children do if they do not receive an 
appropriate response. Arguably, if children are using their questions as a tool for 
learning, then they would likely persist until they receive a satisfactory response. Thus, 
the nature of children’s responses (e.g., re-asking their original question, dropping the 
topic, accepting what the adult says etc.) provides critically important information about 
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the purpose of the initial question that was asked. For example, if a child is using 
questions as a tool to engage an interlocutor, then he will likely be satisfied with any 
response. However, if a child is using his questions to learn new knowledge, then he will 
likely persist until he receives a satisfactory response. Chouinard (2007) provided an 
initial look at this hypothesis by examining cases when children re-asked their original 
question. Chouinard (2007) found that cases when children repeated their original 
question were more frequent following a non-informative response to a factual question 
than informative responses.  More recently, Frazier, Gelman and Wellman (2009) 
investigated this hypothesis in the context of children’s natural conversations with their 
caregivers and in an experimental setting. Frazier et al. (2009) investigated children’s 
causal questions across 6 transcripts taken from the CHILDES database (MacWhinney & 
Snow, 2000). When looking at the pattern of child responses in relation to the type of 
explanation that an adult offered (non-explanatory vs. explanatory), Frazier et al. (2009) 
found that children’s responses were determined by whether or not they received an 
explanatory response to causal questions. When a non-explanatory response was 
received, children were more likely to re-ask their original question or to provide their 
own explanation, suggesting that children are not simply trying to extend conversations 
with follow-up, but are systematic in their responses. Frazier et al. (2009) replicated these 
findings in a follow-up experiment where they presented children with objects, 
storybooks, pictures, and short videos. Each item contained an unusual aspect (e.g., a hat 
with a hole in the top) that was designed to elicit questions from the child. If the child 
asked a causal why or how question, the researcher responded by providing an 
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explanatory (e.g., ‘It’s to put a pony tail in’) or non-explanatory response (e.g., ‘Hats 
don’t usually have holes in them’). Similar to their previous findings, children were more 
likely to re-ask their original question or provide their own explanation in response to 
non-explanatory responses than to explanatory responses (Frazier et al., 2009). These 
findings further suggest that children are systematic in how they react to the responses 
they receive to the questions they ask, and that they appear to use the question, 
explanation, follow-up pattern of interaction as a mechanism for learning from others.  
Although these findings provide compelling evidence to suggest that children 
engage in a systematic pattern of interaction when seeking knowledge from others, it is 
unclear if this pattern is privileged across children from diverse backgrounds. Indeed, 
there is evidence to suggest that differences may exist in the patterns of interactions 
between children and caregivers (e.g., Hart & Risley, 1995; Heath, 1983; Hoff, 2006). In 
particular, if the evidence from Robinson and Rackstraw (1967) extends to naturalistic 
conversations, I expect that there will be considerable variability in the explanations 
children from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds are exposed to, potentially altering 
children’s reactions. That is if a child receives no responses or a limited response to a 
causal or fact-based information seeking question, they may develop different strategies 
for reacting to caregivers. Understanding the nature of this pattern of interaction across 
diverse groups has important implications for classroom practice, where this pattern of 
interaction is privileged (Schultz, 2009). I discuss the implications of these findings in the 
discussion section of this chapter and further in chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
These issues led me to explore whether or not children from diverse backgrounds 
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show different question-asking behaviors, receive different quality responses and react 
differently to caregiver’s responses. Given the compelling evidence to suggest 
differences in caregiver-child interactions across socioeconomic groups and the early and 
wide vocabulary gaps by SES (Fernald et al., 2013; Hart & Risley, 1992; Hart & Risely, 
1995), I chose to focus specifically on differences in the question, explanation, follow-up 
pattern of interaction by SES. Specifically, this study was designed to address the 
following questions: 
1.) Are there sociocultural differences in the proportion of causal and fact-based 
information seeking questions children ask? 
2.) Are there sociocultural differences in the proportion of explanations caregivers 
offer to questions that require explanatory responses? 
3.) Are there sociocultural differences in the proportion of high-quality responses 
children are exposed to? 
4.) Are there sociocultural differences in children’s reactions to their caregivers’ 
responses? 
Method  
Participants.  Thirty-seven transcripts of caregiver-child conversations taken from the 
Hall (1984) corpus in the CHILDES database (18-mid-SES; 19-low-SES) (MacWhinney, 
2000) were used. Socioeconomic status was marked by the professional status of the 
caregiver. The CHILDES database consists of samples of children’s conversations with 
parents, siblings, and occasional visitors during everyday activities in the home setting. 
Forty-three percent of the transcripts came from white families, while the remaining 57% 
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were from black families. All of the transcripts consisted of everyday conversations 
between native-English-speaking 4-year-olds and their caregivers.	  Ninety percent of the 
caregivers were the children’s mothers, while the remaining 10% were fathers. 
Procedure.  I began by conducting a computerized search for child utterances that 
included question words (e.g., ‘how’, ‘what’, ‘why’, ‘where’) across all 37 transcripts. I 
then eliminated utterances that were not initiated by the child, yielding 1,072 child-
initiated questions. Child initiated questions were marked as the beginning of a new 
exchange. An exchange consisted of three components: child’s question, caregiver’s 
response, and the child’s reaction. In some instances, the exchange continued when the 
caregiver responded to the child’s reaction. An exchange was marked as complete when a 
child asked a new question pertaining to a new topic.  
Example of exchange pattern 
CHILD (question): Why is it wrapped up? (P# 25, L: 3792) 
CAREGIVER (response): That’s the way it came from Florida. Sometimes when 
they ship fruit they put it in tissue paper. (P # 25, L: 3793) 
CHILD (reaction): Oh (P # 25, L: 3794) 
 Additionally, all incomplete questions and unintelligible utterances were removed. If the 
unintelligible utterance was in any other part of the exchange (e.g., caregiver’s response) 
the entire exchange was removed. Next, a 3-part coding scheme was applied that 
consisted of (1) the child’s initial question, (2) the caregiver’s response, and (3) the 
child’s reaction to the caregiver’s response. This pattern of discourse has been 
documented as an exchange pattern that is used for acquiring new knowledge (e.g., 
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Chouinard, 2007; Frazier et al., 2009). When coding the caregiver’s responses and child’s 
reaction, only the two utterances immediately following the child’s question were coded. 
All coding was conducted by examining exchanges in the context of the entire transcript. 
This allowed coders to read as much of the previous conversation as needed to help them 
situate each utterance in the appropriate context.  
Children’s questions. The coding scheme used for questions was designed to 
isolate questions that were potentially useful for acquiring new knowledge (information-
seeking), as opposed to questions that were clearly less useful (non-information seeking). 
Information-seeking questions included two different types of questions: fact-based 
questions and causal questions. A question was coded as fact-based when a child asked a 
‘what,’ ‘when,’ ‘where’ or ‘who’ question (see example below) that was used to acquire 
knowledge. A question was coded as causal when a child asked a ‘how’ or ‘why’ 
question (see example below) to acquire knowledge. 
Examples: Information-Seeking Questions 
Fact-based information (what/where/who/when): ‘Are there elephants in the 
circus?’ (P #1, L: 3652) 
Causal (how/why/ how come): ‘How do you talk through this?’ (P #24, L: 173) 
Non-information seeking questions included two distinct types: Permission-seeking and 
action-seeking. Questions were coded as permission-seeking when a child asked a 
caregiver for approval to complete an action (see example below). Questions were coded 
as action seeking when a child asked a question (‘can’, ‘want to’) that required the 
caregiver to respond with an action.  
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Examples: Non-Information Seeking Questions 
Permission-seeking (can): ‘Ma, can I go in the hallway and play football?’(P #17, 
L: 130) 
Action-seeking (can/ want to): ‘Can you get my slipper?’(P # 36, L: 5079). 
Recall that the purpose of the dissertation is to explore the role of question-explanation 
interactions as a mechanism for knowledge acquisition.  Thus, all additional analyses 
(caregiver’s response, children’s follow-up) were conducted with respect to responses to 
information-seeking questions only. 
Caregiver’s responses. Caregiver’s responses to information-seeking questions 
were coded across 6 categories. Categories included (a) response on topic, no explanation 
needed (b) response on topic with explanation (c) response on topic no explanation (d) 
response unrelated (e) turns the question back (Chouinard, 2007) (f) no response. 
Response on topic, no explanation needed was assigned when a child asked an 
information seeking question (fact-based or causal) that did not need an explanation and 
the caregiver provided an on-topic response. Because causal questions typically require 
explanations, this category was removed from analysis when looking specifically at 
responses to causal questions.  
Example:  Response on-topic no explanation needed 
CHILD: ‘What’s in here?’(P #22, L: 278) 
CAREGIVER RESPONSE: ‘Coffee’ (P# 22, L: 279) 
Response on topic with explanation was applied when a child asked a question and 
received an explanation (e.g., how, why).  
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Example: Response on-topic with an explanation 
CHILD: ‘Why do we always take the car on Monday?’ (P # 31, L: 153) 
CAREGIVER RESPONSE: ‘Because I have nine o’clock class.’ (P # 31, L: 154)  
Response on topic no explanation was assigned when a caregiver gave an appropriate 
response, however an explanation was not given. This category is different from on-
topic-no explanation needed because many causal questions needed explanations, 
however the caregiver only provided a brief responses without an explanation. 
Example: Response on-topic no explanation 
CHILD: ‘Daddy why are you tearing off the directions?’(P3, L: 3196) 
CAREGIVER RESPONSE: ‘Yeah’ (P3, L: 3197)  
Response unrelated was assigned when caregivers responded with information that was 
not related to the question the child asked.   
Example: Response unrelated  
CHILD: ‘What? Did you say it’s a chair?’(P # 24, L: 3556) 
CAREGIVER RESPONSE: ‘No, it’s good’ (P # 24, L: 3557) 
Turns the question back was assigned when a caregiver attempted to get the child to 
answer his own question. 
Example: Turns question back  
CHILD: ‘How come you keep coughing?’(P # 22, L: 402) 
CAREGIVER RESPONSE: ‘What happens when water goes down your throat 
the wrong way?’(P # 22, L: 403) 
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Quality of caregiver responses. The quality of caregiver’s responses were coded 
as circular or non-circular. After coding caregiver’s responses, researchers selected all 
cases that included a response on topic with explanation and coded the explanation. An 
explanation was coded as circular if it repeated the question as an explanation (see 
example below). 
Example: Circular response 
CHILD: ‘Why didn’t you like them?’ (P # 24, L: 4995) 
CAREGIVER RESPONSE: ‘Because I decided I didn’t like them when I go 
home’ (P # 24, L: 4997) 
Explanations were coded as non-circular if it provided additional information from the 
question that was asked.  
Example: Non-circular response 
CHILD: ‘What kind of tickets are these?’(P: #1, L: 2034) 
CAREGIVER RESPONSE: ‘Well when you go to the circus you have to buy 
tickets, you know, so you can get inside.’(P # 1, L: 2047) 
Child’s reactions. The child’s reactions were initially coded into one of seven 
categories, including: (a) agrees with caregiver response, (b) asks a follow-up question, 
(c) re-asks original question, (d) provides own explanation, (e) disagrees with caregiver 
response, (f) provides additional on-topic details and (g) no response. 
Agrees with caregiver response was coded when the caregiver provided a response and 
the child responded by saying ‘yes/yeah,’ ‘oh,’ or repeated the caregiver’s response.  
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Example: Agrees with caregiver response 
CAREGIVER RESPONSE: ‘I don’t want to ask her in front of the others kids, so 
we will ask her quietly’ (P #25, L: 851) 
CHILD REACTION: ‘Okay, quietly’ (P #25, L: 852) 
I coded responses as asks a follow-up question when the child responded by asking a 
question that was on the same general topic as the original question, but requested 
different information than was requested in the original question. 
Example: Asks a follow-up question for elaboration 
CHILD QUESTION: ‘Giving him seeds?’(P # 25, L: 125) 
CAREGIVER RESPONSE: ‘Yes, Daddy is feeding him gerbil seeds.’(P # 25, L: 
127) 
CHILD REACTION: ‘What kind of seeds?’(P # 25, L: 128) 
I coded responses as re-asks the original question when a child repeated their original 
question or some variation of the question that request the same information.  
Example: Re-asks original question 
CHILD QUESTION: ‘What’s cooking in there?’(P # 29, L: 2770) 
CAREGIVER RESPONSE: ‘Todd, listen, do you want your burger?’ (P # 29, L: 
2771) 
CHILD REACTION: ‘What’s cooking in there?’(P # 29, L: 2772) 
The provides own explanation code was assigned when a child offered an alternative 
explanation to the one the caregiver provided or when the child provided his own 
explanation when the caregiver had not given one.   
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Example: Provides own explanation 
CHILD QUESTION: ‘How come?’(P # 8, L: 4301) 
CAREGIVER RESPONSE: no response (P # 8, no line)  
CHILD REACTION: ‘It’s because he didn’t want to get it dirty’ (P # 8, L: 4302) 
I coded children’s follow-up as disagrees with caregiver’s response when the child 
responded by saying ‘no,’ or ‘that’s not right.’ 
Example: Disagrees with caregiver’s response 
CHILD QUESTION: ‘How come we are walking down Madison St.?’(P # 32, L: 
1233) 
CAREGIVER RESPONSE: ‘We’re not walking Madison’ (P # 32, L: 1234) 
CHILD REACTION: ‘Well we are. That is Madison St.’ (P # 32, L: 1263)  
Provides additional on-topic details was coded when a child provided additional details 
to the caregiver’s response or provided additional details about the original question.  
Example: Provides additional on-topic details 
CHILD QUESTION: ‘Is he coming over by bus?’ (P # 11, L: 392) 
CAREGIVER RESPONSE: ‘He's goin(g) on the bus with us an(d) he's gonna 
walk to school with us.’ (P #11, L: 393) 
CHILD REACTION: ‘And he is gonna go into our class.’ (P #11, L: 394) 
Inter-rater reliability was established using a randomly selected sample of 20% of 
the transcripts. A research assistant and I independently coded the transcripts (one 
researcher coded 100% of the transcripts, while the other coded 20% of transcripts that 
were randomly selected). Coders were blind to the SES of the family. Overall agreement 
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was 90% (Cohen’s Kappa .84), which according to Landis & Koch (1977) is a ‘near 
perfect’ (0.81 or above) level of reliability. Discrepancies were resolved through 
discussion.  
Results 
For all phases of the exchange, the data set was split by group (mid-SES and low-
SES).  In keeping with Child Language data analytic techniques, the data was pooled 
across children in each group, making the utterance instead of the child the basic unit of 
analysis.  This strategy has been used in several studies (Batsch, Horvath & Estes, 2003; 
Frazier, Gelman and Welman 2009; Sobel, Li & Corriveau, 2007) and meets the 
requirement of independence needed to conduct statistical analyses as defined by 
Bakeman and Gottman (1997) who suggest that consecutive events (e.g., multiple 
utterances from the same child) measured in naturalistic settings are considered 
independent as long as (a) observers make separate (and presumably independent) 
decisions when coding each event, and (b) the coding system consists of mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive categories. Both of these conditions applied to the coding 
scheme that was used.  
Children’s questions.  Children from mid-SES families asked a total of 684 
questions, while children from low-SES families asked a total of 388 questions. To 
examine differences in the types of questions children ask across the two groups, I first 
calculated the proportion of each types of question asked by children in each group. 
Proportions were found by dividing the frequency of the type of question asked by the 
total number of questions asked by children within the group (shown in parentheses in 
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Table 2.1). Calculating these proportions controls for any differences observed due to the 
number of questions asked by children in each group.  When comparing the two groups, 
an omnibus chi-square revealed no significant differences in the types of questions 
children ask χ2 (2, N=1,071) = 0.132, n.s. A similar proportion of fact-based, causal and 
action-seeking questions were asked by children from mid-SES and low-SES families.  
 
Table 2.1. Frequency of question type asked by each group 
 
Initially, I planned to use a similar approach as Chouinard (2007) and collapse 
across fact-based and causal questions to create an information seeking questions 
category. However, upon further inspection of Table 2.1 and follow-up McNemar’s tests, 
it became clear that within each group (mid-SES and low-SES) there was a significant 
difference in the proportion of causal and fact-based questions (Mid-SES, χ2 (1, N = 684) 
= 7.1, p <. 01; Low-SES, χ2 (1, N = 388) = 6.5, p <.01). Both mid-SES and low-SES 
 Mid-SES Low-SES Total 
Information seeking    
Fact-based 503 (73.5%) 283 (72.9%) 786 
Causal 86 (12.6%) 48 (12.4%) 134 
Non-information seeking    
Permission seeking  27 (3.9%) 25 (6.4%) 52 
Action Seeking 68 (9.9%) 32 (8.2%) 100 
Total  684 388 1,072 
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children asked significantly more fact-based questions than causal questions, therefore 
collapsing across these categories would cause considerable differences in further 
analyses of adult responses and children’s follow-up to be lost. Therefore, in all 
subsequent analyses, responses to fact-based questions and to causal questions will be 
considered separately.  
Caregiver’s responses to information-seeking questions. To explore one of the 
primary hypotheses that differences would exist between mid-SES and low-SES families 
in the types of explanations children receive to their information-seeking questions, I 
compared caregiver’s responses to information seeking questions. Because the aims of 
this study are to explore how children use questions for learning, action-seeking 
questions were excluded from analyses. Moreover, because different types of questions 
likely required different types of responses, I first explored caregivers’ responses to fact-
based questions, those that required less sophisticated responses, before turning to 
responses to causal questions. Given that previous work exploring children’s question 
asking behaviors has found that there are no significant differences in the number of fact-
based questions children ask across diverse groups (children across diverse backgrounds 
have been found to ask an average of 76 information seeking questions per hour 
(Chouinard, 2007), here I predicted that no differences would exist between mid-SES and 
low-SES caregivers’ responses to fact-based questions.  
Responses to fact-based questions 
 I began by exploring responses to fact-based questions, which typically require 
less sophisticated responses. Inspection of Table 2.2 reveals no differences in the types of 
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responses caregivers’ offered. Indeed, a similar proportion of each type of response was 
offered by mid-SES and low-SES families. To confirm this, an omnibus chi-square was 
performed (χ2 (3, N=881) = 6.9, n.s.). Both Mid-SES and Low-SES caregivers provided a 
similar proportion of on topic responses, when no explanation was needed (48.9% and 
45.6% respectively). This is likely because fact-based questions (e.g., ‘what is that?’) do 
not require extensive explanations and therefore on topic responses with no explanation 
are the most appropriate type of response for these types of questions. Similarly, when 
looking at on topic responses with explanations, both mid-SES and low-SES caregivers 
provided a similar proportion of responses (4.2% and 2.8% respectively). This was the 
lowest proportion of responses given by low-SES caregivers and second lowest offered 
by mid-SES caregivers. This response pattern looked similar when looking at the on topic 
no explanation given category. Indeed, only 3.7% of mid-SES caregivers’ responses 
comprised on topic no explanation given whereas 4.4% of low-SES caregiver responses 
were on no topic no explanation given. Both of the two aforementioned categories on 
topic with explanation; on topic no explanation given) look at whether an explanation 
was included in the response that was given. It seems likely that the low proportion seen 
across groups in these two categories is likely due to the fact that fact-based questions do 
not require extensive explanations and therefore there were not many opportunities for 
caregivers to provide explanations. When looking at the remaining three categories 
(unrelated, turns question back and no responses) slightly more variation was observed 
between the two groups. Note, these differences were not significant.  Indeed, 9.7% of 
mid-SES caregiver responses were unrelated compared to 11.7% of low-SES caregivers’ 
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responses. Turns question back comprised 16.6% of responses offered by mid-SES 
caregivers and only 13.3% of responses offered by low-SES caregivers. Lastly, 16.7% of 
mid-SES caregivers provided no response when asked a fact-based question, compared to 
21.8% of low-SES caregivers.  
Table 2.2. Caregivers’ responses to fact-based questions  
 Mid-SES Low-SES Total 
Response to fact questions     
On topic no explanation needed 277 (48.9%) 144 (45.6%) 421 
On topic with explanation 24 (4.2%) 9 (2.8%) 33 
On topic no explanation given 21 (3.7%) 14 (4.4%) 35 
Unrelated 55 (9.7%) 37 (11.7%) 92 
Turns question back 94 (16.6%) 42 (13.3%) 137 
No response  95 (16.7%) 69 (21.8%) 27 
Total  566 316 881 
 
In order to look at children’s follow-up to caregivers’ responses to fact-based 
questions, response types were collapsed across four categories:  a) exemplary b) 
satisfactory c) unsatisfactory d) turns question back. These groups were created to make 
subsequent analyses of children’s follow-up more interpretable. Exemplary comprised 
on-topic with explanation responses, satisfactory consisted of response on topic with no 
explanation and response on topic no explanation needed, while unsatisfactory 
comprised unrelated and no response.  Turns question back was retained as a distinct 
category because these responses may be interpreted as unsatisfactory or satisfactory by 
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children. Figure 2.2 displays the proportion of response types offered by mid-SES and 
low-SES caregivers. When exploring these four categories, no significant differences 
were found between mid-SES and low-SES families (χ2 (3, N=881) = 6.57, n.s.). The 
most typical response type offered by both groups were satisfactory responses (52% and 
50% respectively). Given that no significant differences were found, these data suggest 
that caregivers across groups typically provide satisfactory responses to less complex 
questions.  
 
Figure 2.2. Proportion of caregivers’ responses to fact-based questions  
Responses to Causal Questions 
 To explore caregiver’s responses to causal questions, I began by exploring the 
different types of responses and comparing them across groups (Table 2.3). An omnibus 
chi square revealed significant differences in the types of responses offered by mid-SES 
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and low-SES caregiver’s (χ2 (5, N=155) = 13.08, p < .05). 
 
Table 2.3. Caregivers’ responses to causal questions  
 Mid-SES Low-SES Total 
Response to causal questions     
On topic no explanation needed 11 (10.67%) 1 (2.1%) 12 
On topic with explanation 32 (31.1%) 11 (21.2%) 43 
On topic no explanation given 13 (12.6%) 17 (32.7%) 30 
Unrelated 16 (15.5%) 6 (11.5%) 22 
Turns question back 15 (14.2%) 6 (11.5%) 21 
No response  16 (15.5%) 11 (21.2%) 27 
Total  103 52 155 
 
To better understand the difference in responses to causal questions, post-hoc analyses 
were conducted. Using an approach first described by Beasley & Schumaker (1995), z-
scores were calculated and compared to chance. Post-hoc analyses revealed statistically 
significant differences in the proportion of on-topic no explanation given (12.6% vs. 
32.7%, z= 3.0, p<.05). All other post-hoc tests were not significant.  
 Next, I collapsed the responses across four categories. The same four categories 
used for responses to fact-based questions were retained (exemplary, satisfactory, 
unsatisfactory and turns question back). The only exception was that in the case of fact-
based questions, the no explanation needed category was considered a satisfactory 
response and included in all analyses. 
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Here, because I was interested in causal questions, which typically require longer 
explanations, the no explanation needed category was removed from the following 
analyses. When comparing differences by SES in the proportion of responses across these 
four categories an omnibus chi-square revealed significant differences (χ2 (3, N=143) = 
8.15, p < .05) (See Figure 2.3.) Post hoc analyses revealed that mid-SES caregiver’s 
provided a significantly higher proportion of exemplary responses (34.7% vs. 21.6%, z= 
1.98, p<.05) to children’s causal questions, whereas low-SES caregiver’s provided a 
significantly higher proportion of satisfactory responses (33.33% vs. 14.13%, z=2.7, 
p<.05). No other significant differences were found. One plausible explanation for the 
difference in satisfactory responses is that these responses did not contain an explanation 
and therefore were more direct. Indeed, previous research has found that caregivers’ from 
low-SES families use more directive speech than mid-SES caregivers. I discuss this 
explanation further later in the discussion section.  
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Figure 2.3. Percentage of caregivers’ responses to causal questions by SES	  
Circularity of caregivers’ responses 
 Before investigating children’s reactions to caregivers’ responses, I examined the 
quality of caregivers’ responses. Specifically, I explored the quality of responses that 
included an explanation (56 mid-SES responses included explanations; 20 low-SES 
responses included explanations). Although explanations are generally perceived as a 
more sophisticated response, the quality of the explanation may impact how much 
knowledge the child acquires. It may also influence the child’s perception of the 
interlocutor (see Studies 2, 3 & 4, Chapter 3). As previously noted, I chose to look at 
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explanation circularity as a measure of explanation quality. Circular explanations, those 
that reiterate the question that was asked and do not provide additional information, are 
less ideal for learning. In contrast, non-circular explanations provide children with an 
elaborate response that are often used for the acquisition of new knowledge. Given 
Robinson and Rackstraw’s (1967) previous findings that suggest low-SES mothers 
provide circular responses, I predicted that when caregivers’ did provide an explanation, 
low-SES caregiver’s would use more circular explanations, whereas mid-SES caregiver’s 
would use more non-circular explanations. As predicted, mid-SES caregivers provided a 
significantly greater proportion of non-circular explanations than low-SES caregivers 
(77.5% of 56 mid-SES responses vs. 54% of 20 low-SES responses, χ2 (1, N=124) = 6.59, 
p=.01) (See Fig. 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4. Quality of caregivers’ responses by SES 
Children’s reactions. Arguably, if children use their questions for learning, they 
will not be satisfied with an inadequate response, and will persist until they receive a 
satisfactory answer. Indeed, Frazier, Gelman and Wellman (2009) proposed a similar 
hypothesis about children’s reactions to caregiver’s explanatory responses. Frazier et al. 
(2009) found that when children receive a non-explanatory response to a causal question, 
they are likely to re-ask their original question or provide their own explanation. In the 
current study I explored differences in patterns of children’s reactions to unsatisfactory 
responses to their information-seeking questions. When children receive answers that 
they consider satisfactory, one would expect them to react in systematically different 
ways than when they receive answers that they consider less than satisfactory. I first 
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began by exploring children’s reactions to responses given to their fact based questions, 
where there was little variability in the quality and types of responses they received.  
Children’s Reactions to Fact-Based Responses 
I explored children’s reactions to the four categories that were created from 
caregivers’ responses (exemplary, satisfactory, unsatisfactory and turns questions back). 
Note, the most typical follow-up responses included repeating the original question, 
following-up for elaboration, providing more details to the adult’s responses, agreeing 
with the adult responses and providing their own explanation. Children seldom disagreed 
with the caregiver. There was a lot of variability in the types of reactions mid-SES 
children had to exemplary responses.  For example, 33% of their responses included 
providing their own details.  Both mid-SES and low-SES children appeared to ask 
follow-up questions for elaboration most often (mid-SES, 33% vs. low-SES, 100%).  
Note that the low-SES percentage should be interpreted with caution, given that there was 
only 1 follow-up to an exemplary response. Given the small sample size, analyses were 
not performed.  
Next, I looked at children’s reactions to satisfactory responses. Again, no 
significant differences were found between the two groups (χ2 (6, N= 101) = 6.1, n.s.). 
Both mid-SES and low-SES children had a range of reactions. The most common 
reaction to satisfactory responses from both groups was to ask a follow up question for 
elaboration (mid-SES, 51.6% vs. low-SES, 59%). This reaction is similar to exemplary 
responses. It is likely because children look to continue the conversation after receiving a 
satisfactory response.   
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Next, I explored children’s reactions to unsatisfactory responses.  There were also 
no significant differences when looking at reactions to unsatisfactory responses (χ2 (6, 
N=154) = 5.32, n.s.).  In both groups, when children received an unsatisfactory response, 
they were likely to re-ask their original question (mid-SES, 43% vs. low-SES, 37.7%).  
Finally, I explored children’s reactions when the adult turns the question back.  
There were no significant differences by SES group (χ2 (5, N=80) = 3.62, n.s.).  Similar to 
children’s reactions to exemplary and satisfactory responses, when caregiver’s turned the 
question back, children across both groups were most likely to ask a follow-up question 
for elaboration (mid-SES, 32.2% vs. low-SES, 28.6%), indicating engagement in the 
conversation.   
Table 2.4. Frequency and within group percentage of types of child reactions following 
adult responses to fact-based questions  
 Agrees Follow-up elaboration 
Repeats 
Question 
Own-
explanation 
Provides 
more 
details 
No 
Response Disagrees 
Mid-SES        
Exemplary 1 (16.7%) 2 (33.3%) 1 (16.7%) 0 (0%) 2 (33.3%) 0 (0%) 0 (%) 
 
Satisfactory 
 
4 (6.5%) 
 
32 (51.6%) 
 
13 (21%) 
 
2 (3.2%) 
 
9 (14.5%) 
 
1 (1.6%) 
 
1 (1.6%) 
 
Unsatisfactory 
 
1 (1.2%) 
 
33 (35.5%) 
 
40 (43%) 
 
12 (12.9%) 
 
3 (3.2%) 
 
3 (3.2%) 
 
1 (1.6%) 
 
Turns question 
back  
 
9 (15.3%) 
 
19 (32.2%) 
 
7 (11.9%) 
 
4 (6.8%) 
 
13 (22%) 
 
7 (11.9%) 
 
0 (0%) 
Low-SES        
Exemplary 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
 
Satisfactory 
 
3 (7.7%) 
 
23 (59%) 
 
2 (5.1%) 
 
1 (2.6%) 
 
9 (23%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
1 (2.6%) 
 
Unsatisfactory  
 
1 (1.6%) 
 
21 (34.4%) 
 
23(37.7%) 
 
13(21.3%) 
 
3 (4.9%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
Turns question 
back 
 
2 (9.5%) 
 
6 (28.6%) 
 
3 (14.3%) 
 
1 (4.8%) 
 
4 (19%) 
 
5 (23.8%) 
 
0 (0%) 
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Children’s Reactions to Causal Responses 
 Children’s reactions to causal responses were coded in a similar manner using 
four response-type categories (exemplary, satisfactory, unsatisfactory and turns question 
back). Recall that the no explanation needed category was not included in the 
composition of satisfactory responses for causal questions. I anticipated that there would 
be more variability in these types of reactions because causal questions are more complex 
and thus children likely anticipate more complex responses. Indeed, children’s follow-up 
to caregivers’ responses to causal questions varied across groups. Inspection of Table 2.5 
reveals that children from mid-SES caregivers provided more details following 
exemplary responses (66.7%) than low-SES caregiver’s (50%), although when looking at 
reactions to exemplary responses, no significant differences were found (p = 0.2, 
Fischer’s exact test). Again, this lack of a difference between groups should be 
interpreted with caution due to the low number of follow-up responses in both groups.  In 
the low-SES group there were only 2 instances of follow-up after an adult’s exemplary 
responses, whereas mid-SES children followed up 6 times.  
When looking at reactions to satisfactory responses, mid-SES children repeated 
their original question most frequently (100%) whereas low-SES children showed a range 
of responses (33% follow-up for elaboration; 33% provided their own explanation, 33% 
provided more details). Recall that satisfactory responses included a response that was on 
topic that did not include an explanation. Given that causal explanations likely require an 
explanation, this type of response may be perceived by the child as satisfactory, because 
it provides on-topic information, or unsatisfactory, because it does not include an 
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explanation. Children’s responses indicate that children from mid-SES families clearly 
viewed these responses as unsatisfactory by consistently repeating their original 
questions, whereas children from low-SES families had more variability in their 
responses, suggesting they may be more willing to accept these responses as satisfactory. 
Nevertheless, there was no significant difference between the two group’s reactions to 
satisfactory responses to causal questions (p = 0.6, Fischer’s exact test).  
Significant differences emerged when exploring reactions to unsatisfactory 
responses (χ2 (4, N=41) = 10.45, p<.05). Post-hoc analyses revealed that children from 
mid-SES families provided their own explanations significantly more than children from 
low-SES families (39.1% vs. 0%, z= 3.0, p<.05). One plausible explanation for this 
difference is that children from mid-SES families have a more advanced understanding of 
causality and are therefore able to provide explanations. I explore this explanation further 
in later in the discussion.  
 Lastly, I had anticipated there would be differences in children’s reactions when 
the adult turns the original question back to the child responses, however, no significant 
differences were found (χ2 (3, N=11) = 3.79, n.s.). Note, because 0% of children’s follow-
up consisted of the disagrees category, this category was removed from analyses. 
Inspection of table 2.5 reveals that both mid-SES children and low-SES children often 
reacted to these types of responses by providing additional on topic details (62.5% vs. 
66.7%). 
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Table 2.5. Frequency and within group percentage of types of child reactions following 
adult responses to causal questions 
 
Discussion 
The results of this study reveal that children across diverse backgrounds ask a 
similar proportion of questions for knowledge acquisition. Indeed, children from mid-
SES and low-SES families asked a comparable proportion of fact-based questions and 
causal questions. This finding is consistent with previous work that demonstrates children 
across diverse backgrounds ask a similar proportion of information-seeking questions per 
hour (Chouinard, 2007). Chouinard (2007) coded information-seeking as both fact-based 
and explanatory questions (in the present study these were coded as causal questions). 
Although Chouinard (2007) did not explicitly look at differences by socioeconomic 
 
 Agrees Follow-up elaboration 
Repeats 
Question 
Own-
explanation 
Provides 
more 
details 
No 
Response 
Mid SES       
Exemplary 0 (0%) 2 (33.3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (66.7%) 0 (0%) 
 
Satisfactory 
 
0 (0%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
3 (100%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
Unsatisfactory 
 
0 (0%) 
 
4 (17.4%) 
 
9 (39.1%) 
 
9 (39.1%) 
 
1 (4.3%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
Turns question 
back  
 
2 (25%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
5 (62.5%) 
 
1 (12.5%) 
Low-SES       
Exemplary 0 (0%) 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (50%) 0 (0%) 
 
Satisfactory 
 
0 (0%) 
 
1 (33.3%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
1 (33.3%) 
 
1 (33.3%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
Unsatisfactory  
 
0 (0%) 
 
3 (16.7%) 
 
12 (66.7%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
2 (11.1%) 
 
1 (5.6%) 
 
Turns question 
back 
 
0 (0%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
1 (33.3%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
2 (66.7%) 
 
0 (0%) 
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background, her sample comprised a diverse range of individuals (working class and 
middle class families). This study confirms Chouinard’s (2007) findings and suggests that 
children across diverse backgrounds use questions as a mechanism for acquiring 
information from others. Below, I review the findings from the question, response, 
follow-up pattern for fact-based questions, and for causal questions.  Next, I offer several 
explanations for some of these differences.  I conclude by discussing the relationship 
between these differences in conversation style, knowledge acquisition, and school 
readiness in low-SES and mid-SES children. 
When looking at caregivers’ responses to fact-based questions, no significant 
differences were found between the types of responses offered by mid-SES and low-SES 
caregivers. Indeed, both mid-SES and low-SES caregivers offered a similar proportion of 
exemplary, satisfactory, unsatisfactory and turns question back responses. The most 
typical response for each group was satisfactory. Recall, this category collapsed response 
on topic no explanation needed, with responses on topic no explanation. In contrast, the 
lowest proportion of responses offered by each group were exemplary.  Given the nature 
of fact-based questions, it makes sense that satisfactory responses were offered most 
frequently to fact-based questions.  
Given the lack of variability in caregivers’ responses to fact-based questions and 
that the majority of responses were satisfactory, I did not anticipate that there would be 
significant differences in children’s follow-up to caregivers’ responses. Indeed, no 
significant differences were found. Children across both groups expressed a range of 
responses. When presented with satisfactory responses, children across both groups 
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responded most frequently by asking a follow up question for elaboration, as if to keep 
the conversation going. When children received an unsatisfactory response, mid-SES and 
low-SES children both repeated their original question. These responses appear to 
indicate that children knowingly use their questions to acquire knowledge and expect a 
particular type of response. Thus when a satisfactory response is not given, children are 
more likely to re-ask their original question. Given that fact-based questions are less 
complex than other types of questions (e.g., causal) satisfactory responses are more 
obvious than unsatisfactory responses, making it clear to children how they should 
respond. 
In contrast, causal questions are more complex, and therefore one might expect to 
see more variability in caregiver’s responses and children’s follow-up. Indeed, when 
comparing caregiver responses to causal questions, mid-SES caregivers provided 
significantly more exemplary responses. Somewhat surprisingly, low-SES caregivers 
provided more satisfactory responses. Recall, satisfactory responses for causal questions 
only included responses where an on-topic answer was given but no explanation was 
provided, which likely explains the difference observed between mid-SES and low-SES 
caregivers in the proportion of satisfactory responses they offered.  Not only did mid-SES 
caregivers provide responses that included more explanations, it appeared as though 
instead of offering responses that did not contain an explanation, caregivers responded 
more frequently by turning the question back to the child. This response type was not as 
common with low-SES caregivers. Given these differences with response type, I 
expected to see differences in children’s follow up. 
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When looking at children’s follow-up to the responses given to their causal 
questions, mid-SES children exhibited a similar pattern to those found by Frazier, 
Gelman and Wellman (2009). Indeed, when looking at children’s responses to 
unsatisfactory responses, mid-SES children frequently responded by repeating their 
original question or by providing their own explanation. Low-SES children also repeated 
their original question, but provided their own explanations significantly less than mid-
SES children. This response indicates that children are not simply trying to extend their 
conversation with adults, but actively seeking the information needed to answer their 
question. Somewhat surprisingly no significant differences were found when looking at 
follow-up to satisfactory responses. Mid-SES children repeated their original question 
100% of the time, whereas low-SES children demonstrated a range of responses. I 
hypothesize that the lack of variability in mid-SES children was likely due to how 
satisfactory responses were grouped. It is plausible that children perceived on topic 
responses without explanations as unsatisfactory, because they have developed a 
sophisticated understanding that causal questions require explanations. To test this 
hypothesis, I re-ran the analysis, including on topic with no explanation in the 
unsatisfactory category. This regrouping yielded significant differences in children’s 
follow-up to unsatisfactory responses (χ2 (3, N=47) = 15.6, p <.01). When looking at 
follow-up to exemplary and turns question back, no significant differences were found. 
Why might these differences exist between mid-SES and low-SES families? 
These findings are consistent with previous work which suggest that in general, low-SES 
families engage in less elaborative discourse and are more directive in their speech 
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patterns (Hart & Risley, 1992 & Hart & Risley, 1995). In the current study, responses 
that included explanations were longer and less direct, while on topic responses with no 
explanation (typically only several words) tended to be more direct. Mid-SES caregivers 
tended to provide explanations more frequently than low-SES caregivers. This difference 
is potentially problematic, especially if children are using the explanations as a tool for 
acquiring new knowledge. It is likely that longer explanations provide children with more 
information and, in turn, more knowledge.  
A second plausible explanation for why low-SES caregivers’ may not provide 
explanations as frequently to their children’s causal questions is the lack of knowledge 
needed to answer their children’s questions. Indeed, some causal questions require 
complex answers that caregivers might not have access to.  In the current study, mid-SES 
caregivers provided significantly more high quality responses (non-circular) than low-
SES caregivers. This difference demonstrates a potential difference in knowledge. Low-
SES caregivers may be more likely to provide circular explanations (those that reiterate 
the question) because they do not know the answer to the question their child asked.  
A third explanation for these differences is that children from mid-SES families 
are exposed to more complex language that likely includes complex explanations (Snow 
& Uccelli, 2009) which may lead to a more developed understanding that causal 
questions require explanatory responses. Indeed, studies looking at children from Mid-
SES families show that beginning around age 4, children begin to provide explanations 
that may help in their understanding of causal mechanisms (Kuhn & Katz, 2009; Legare, 
Wellman & Gelman, 2010; Rittle-Johnson, Saylor, & Swygert, 2008). The current study 
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demonstrates that children from low-SES families may be at a significant disadvantage in 
their understanding of causality and what the appropriate responses are to causal 
questions.  
What does this mean for knowledge acquisition prior to the onset of formal 
schooling?  By implication mid-SES children have more access to causal mechanisms 
and the skills needed to acquire this type of information. This understanding of causal 
mechanisms is likely linked to gains in critical thinking, metalinguistic and metacognitive 
skills that are crucial in today’s classroom (Valle, 2009). Indeed, children who have the 
ability to reason about cause and effect relationships have demonstrated more 
sophisticated critical thinking skills (Kuhn, 2002). Thus, the findings here reveal other 
significant discrepancies between mid-SES and low-SES children aside from vocabulary 
that children face when entering the classroom for the first time. It is important for 
teachers to be sensitive to these differences and to encourage children to follow-up when 
they receive unsatisfactory responses.   
These findings raise a number of important questions for future research. First, 
why do differences exist in the types of explanations caregivers from diverse 
sociocultural backgrounds provide? Can these differences be attributed to the kinds of 
learning opportunities a family provides a child? Indeed, these opportunities have been 
linked to the sociocultural organization of the home and what parents are trying to 
accomplish through their interactions with their child (Durkin, 1987; Heath, 1989). It 
would be interesting to know why these responses are so different.  
 Another open question from these data is how would children’s follow-up change 
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if they consistently received an unsatisfactory response? Children do not begin asking 
complex causal questions until around age 3 (Chouinard, 2007), therefore, their 
understanding of what makes a response satisfactory to these types of questions may also 
be emerging. Previous research suggests that by the age of 7, when children receive 
consistently unsatisfactory responses from an interlocutor (e.g., prohibitions) they are less 
likely to turn to them in the future (Hart & Risely, 1995). I expect that consistently 
receiving unsatisfactory responses will cause children to stop following up, and 
potentially cause them to stop using questions as a tool for learning from others. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that the question, explanation, follow-up 
pattern of interaction that is often privileged in formal schooling might look different in 
children’s early interactions with caregivers.  However because the analyses presented 
here were mostly exploratory, they must be interpreted with caution. Indeed, there are 
other factors that need to be considered. In particular, this sample also comprised children 
from diverse racial backgrounds. Although I chose to focus on SES, other sociocultural 
factors such as race often intersect with SES. Indeed preliminary analyses indicate no 
differences in the types of questions children ask based on race, but show differences in 
the types and quality of caregivers’ responses. Further analyses are needed to better 
understand these differences.  
 These findings add to the growing body of literature on mechanisms children use 
for learning from others (Harris & Koenig, 2006). These data make a novel contribution 
to this literature by demonstrating an important mechanism whereby this learning could 
potentially take place and how this mechanism looks different across diverse 
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sociocultural backgrounds. Although this study does not explicitly measure whether 
children learn from the explanations they receive, the results support the idea that 
children seek adult testimony and find some forms of responses more satisfying than 
others, which is marked by children’s follow-up.  
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Figure 3.1. Research model. Studies 2 through 4 
explore the relationship between children’s questions 
and the explanations they hear 
Chapter 3: Differences in children’s use of explanations for learning from others 
 
Introduction 
The results from Study 1 suggest that children from diverse backgrounds 
purposely use questions as a tool to acquire knowledge from their caregivers. Some 
children ask more 
sophisticated questions  
that require extensive 
explanations while others 
use simple, fact-based, 
questions.  Study 1 reveals significant differences in the types and quality of responses 
children hear in response to their questions.	  The responses children receive often contain 
the information needed to acquire new knowledge, but what else can they tell us about 
children’s learning? 	  To gauge the effectiveness of adult responses one must know how 
the child who asked the question perceived the information they received.	  In Study 1 
(Chapter 2) I explored children’s reactions to caregiver’s responses in every day 
conversations. Similar to previous findings (Frazier et al., 2009), children across diverse 
backgrounds reacted similarly when they received an unsatisfactory response. Yet, it is 
unclear from Study 1 (Chapter 2) if unsatisfactory responses influence children’s 
perceptions of the informant. Specifically, are the types of responses children received 
related to their perceptions of the credibility of an informant? Given previous research on 
children’s willingness to trust the testimony of informants, it is clear that children prefer 
 Child's 
Question  
Adult 
Explanation 
Child's 
Follow-up 
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to learn from an informant who had previously provided accurate information (Clément, 
Koenig & Harris, 2004; Koenig, Clément & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005). 
However, to date these studies have only focused on single-word learning, and not on 
longer explanations which children are likely to hear when using questions to learn about 
the world. In the current study I use experimental methods to explore how children use 
the quality of the responses they hear (specifically explanation circularity) to make 
judgments about an informants’ future credibility and how individual differences might 
contribute to differences in these judgments (See Fig. 3.1).  
One of the primary goals of early childhood education is to provide children with 
the opportunity to acquire new social and epistemic information. When learning new 
information about the world, children have many sources available to them including 
their own, first-hand experiences and information provided to them by other people, 
either spontaneously or as result of inquiry. For example, in a classroom setting children 
are likely to have access to both types of information. In a lesson about gravity, children 
can have both the hands-on experience of dropping manipulatives to discover the effects 
of gravity on falling objects, as well as the experience of hearing scientific information 
about gravity provided by the classroom teacher, a trusted source. 
However, there are many instances when first-hand experiences are either 
inefficient or unavailable. Under these circumstances, children must rely on others to 
learn about the world. Consider, for example, how children learn about the shape of the 
Earth. Although in principle, children could view Earth at a distance from space; this is 
clearly not the most efficient learning method (Harris & Koenig, 2006). Even more 
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challenging is children’s learning of historical information, where children are reliant on 
the oral and written accounts from individuals who experienced the events first-hand 
(Corriveau, Kim, Schwalen & Harris, 2009). To understand these concepts as well as 
unobservable phenomena, children must discover effective and efficient learning 
strategies for evaluating the source providing the information. 
Children are surprisingly selective when deciding from whom to learn. By early 
preschool, children rely on multiple cues when determining informant credibility, such as 
prior accuracy in a particular domain, benevolence, and social group status (e.g., 
Corriveau & Harris, 2009ab; Corriveau, Fusaro & Harris, 2009; Corriveau, Kinzler & 
Harris, 2013; Harris, 2012; Kinzler, Corriveau & Harris, 2011; Koenig & Woodward, 
2010; Mascaro & Sperber, 2009).  
To date, studies on children’s selective learning have largely focused on how 
children use an informant’s accurate or inaccurate labeling of a familiar object when 
subsequently deciding from whom to learn a novel fact: usually a novel object’s name or 
function (e.g., Birch, Vauthier & Bloom, 2008; Koenig & Harris, 2005).  This focus on 
children’s evaluation of single-word utterances is surprising, given that preschoolers shift 
from primarily asking ‘what’ and ‘where’ questions, which can be answered with one-
word responses, to asking ‘why” and “how’ questions, which require longer explanations 
(Isaacs, 1930; Chouinard, 2007; Frazier, Gelman & Wellman, 2009). The use of ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ questions to acquire information is observed across diverse groups in Study 1 
(Chapter 2) of this dissertation. Indeed, not only do preschool children begin to ask 
questions that call for causal explanations, but they also begin to provide explanations 
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that may help in their understanding of causal mechanisms (Kuhn & Katz, 2009; Legare, 
Wellman & Gelman, 2010; Rittle-Johnson, Saylor, & Swygert, 2008).  
Based on preschooler’s developing understanding of the role of explanations in 
learning, it seems likely that children would determine an informant’s future credibility 
by attending not only to her single-word utterances, but also to her explanations.  Indeed, 
recent research indicates that preschoolers can make judgments about the quality of 
explanations. Mercier, Bernard and Clément (2014) demonstrated that children as young 
as 3 weigh the quality of explanations when making subsequent decisions.  Mercier et al. 
(2014) presented 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds with a series of vignettes where two speakers 
offered contradictory arguments (task 1: argument supported by perceptual evidence 
(strong argument) v. circular argument (weak argument); task 2: weak argument v. no 
argument).  Whereas all age groups endorsed the strong argument, only 4- and 5-year-
olds endorsed the weak argument over no argument.  
The data from Mercier et al. (2014) suggest that even young preschoolers can use 
explanation quality to make decisions.  Nevertheless, little is known about the 
developmental origins of children’s use of these evaluations to make inferences about 
source credibility.  Here, I present the first set of studies exploring children’s use of 
explanation quality to evaluate an informant’s credibility.   
The task of evaluating explanations to determine informant credibility is more 
complex than evaluating single utterances.  Children need to compare the speaker’s 
utterance to their own background knowledge, as well as to evaluate the internal 
coherence of the statement (e.g., Harris, Kruithof, Meerum Terwogt & Visser, 1981; 
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Markman, 1979).  These tasks are difficult even for adults and older children (e.g., 
Mercier, 2012).  For example, Baum, Danovitch and Keil (2008) presented 5-10-year-
olds with explanations for why natural phenomena occur (e.g. why polar bears are white): 
a circular explanation, and a noncircular explanation.  Whereas 5-year-olds had a fragile 
preference for noncircular explanations, 10-year-olds displayed a robust preference.  
Similarly, Bernard, Mercier and Clément (2012) presented 3–5-year-olds with two 
speakers who provided differing explanations for the location of a hidden object. One 
explanation included the causal connective because, whereas the other explanation used 
the phatic term well object (e.g. the ball is in “the blue box because Camille always puts 
her ball in the blue box.” and “Well, Camille always puts her ball in the blue box.”) Four- 
and 5-year-olds searched in the location identified by the speaker using causal 
connectives.  Taken together, these studies suggest that children’s evaluation of 
explanatory coherence develops over the preschool and elementary school years.    
Like in Study 1 (Chapter 2) of this dissertation, in the current set of studies, I 
focus on argument circularity as a marker of explanatory coherence (explanation quality). 
As previously noted, circular explanations refer to statements that reiterate the 
information from the original question without adding new information. By contrast, non-
circular explanations provide more information than was provided in the original 
question. I chose to focus on explanation circularity for several reasons.  First, 
manipulating argument circularity allowed me to focus on the abstract structural 
properties of explanations, rather than on the content of the explanation themselves.  
Second, adults and older children selectively prefer non-circular explanations (Baum et 
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al., 2008; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Rips, 2002).  Circular explanations are ubiquitous in 
everyday conversation, suggesting that most preschoolers have been exposed to this type 
of explanatory structure.  Finally, manipulating argument circularity allowed me to hold 
other markers of explanation complexity constant, such as utterance length, reading ease, 
and vocabulary difficulty. 
Even if young children can monitor for argument circularity, do they use this 
information to make evaluations about an informant’s future credibility? On the one 
hand, given that the task of evaluating explanation quality is taxing for young children, it 
is possible that children’s evaluations will not extend to inferences about informant 
credibility.  On the other hand, extensive research suggests that children use an 
informant’s prior behavior to make such inferences at the single-word level (e.g., Harris 
& Corriveau, 2011).  If children use similar mechanisms when evaluating explanations, 
they might also evaluate the source of the non-circular explanation as more credible.  The 
present set of studies aimed to evaluate children’s developing understanding of 
explanatory coherence, as well as to assess children’s preference for learning future 
information from the explanation’s source.  
A second goal of this research was to determine if children’s preference for 
explanatory coherence varied based on environmental factors.  A tremendous amount of 
work has documented individual differences in children’s linguistic environment as a 
function of the mother’s socioeconomic status (SES) and education level (Hart & Risley, 
1995; Hoff, 2003; Tizard & Hughes 1984; Snow, 1991).  Individual differences in early 
exposure to complex language are related to differences in the complexity of language 
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production (Huttenlocher et al., 2002; Huttenlocher, Vasilyeva, & Shimpi, 2004), as well 
as differences in syntactic comprehension and verbal growth (Huttenlocher et al., 2002). 
In Study 1 (Chapter 2) of this dissertation, I found significant variability in the quality of 
explanations children from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds were exposed to. Indeed, 
caregiver’s from low-SES backgrounds provided significantly more circular explanations 
than mid-SES caregivers.  Moreover, in a recent experimental study, I found that children 
from low-SES families prefer explanations that use active voice construction which are 
arguably of lower quality compared to explanations that use passive voice construction 
(Corriveau & Kurkul, in prep). I suggest that these differences might be due to exposure. 
Indeed, mid-SES children have been found to be exposed to more story-books which 
often use the passive-voice construction than low-SES children (Hoff, 2003).  In Study 4 
of the current set of studies, I compared the selective learning preferences of children of 
low-SES (as measured by eligibility for school vouchers) and mid-SES (as measured by 
non-eligibility for school vouchers).  On the one hand, circular explanations are 
ubiquitous in everyday conversations, making it equally as likely that children from low-
SES and mid-SES will be exposed to this pattern of talk. On the other hand, it has been 
well documented that children of mid-SES families have more opportunities to engage 
learning activities that require non-circular explanations (e.g., literacy activities; science 
activities at museums) (Bartin et al., 2001; Callanan, 2012). Given these differences in 
exposure, I asked whether children of mid-SES would privilege an informant who uses 
passive voice more than children of low-SES.  
In Study 2, 3- and 5-year-olds were presented with pictures of two informants and 
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tested in two phases. Note, although the informants were strangers, previous research 
suggests that children are just as likely to direct their questions to strangers as they are to 
caregivers (Chouinard & Imberi-Olivares, 2011), therefore, it is plausible that children 
will likely ask questions to strangers and evaluate the explanations they provide. In the 
training phase, both informants provided explanations for familiar entities. Although the 
entities were familiar to the children, the causal explanations were not. In each of 4 trials, 
one informant consistently provided a non-circular explanation, whereas the other 
informant provided a circular explanation.  Children were invited to endorse one of the 
two explanations. 
In the test phase, the informants provided conflicting information about novel 
entities.  In the novel explanations task, informants provided conflicting non-circular 
explanations about a novel object.  In the novel labels task, informants provided 
conflicting labels for a novel object.  Finally, children were asked to explicitly judge the 
credibility of the two informants.   
Three separate but related predictions were made.  First, if children are able to 
judge the quality of the explanation, they should selectively prefer the non-circular (high-
quality) over the circular (low-quality) explanation in training trials.  Second, if children 
are able to use explanation quality to make inferences about the informants’ future 
credibility, they should prefer to learn from the informant who had previously provided 
non-circular over circular explanations.  Finally, individual differences in children’s 
preference for non-circular explanations during the training trials should be related to 
their selective learning from the two informants in test trials. 
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Study 2 
Method  
Participants. Thirty-three children participated in the study: 17 3-year-olds ( 7 
female, M = 3;7, SD = 5 months; range: 3;2–4;2) and 16 5-year-olds (10 female, M = 5;1, 
SD = 4 months; range: 4;10–6;0). Children spoke English as their first language, and 
were recruited from a local preschool (Apple Orchard in Brookline, MA) and museum 
(Museum of Science, Boston, MA). Ninety-percent were white; 10% were Asian-
American. Although information on socioeconomic status was not collected, the 
preschool and museum serve a predominantly middle and upper-middle class population.  
Materials. Children sat at a small table located in the corner of a quiet room 
where an experimenter presented two pictures of females wearing differently-colored 
shirts (black, green).   The females were matched for attractiveness and displayed neutral 
affect. During the training trials, 4 pictures of familiar entities were used (e.g. polar bear, 
car, rain, plant). During the novel explanations and novel labels tasks, eight pictures of 
novel objects were used (see Table 3.1).  
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Table 3.1 Stimuli Used for Novel Explanations and Novel Labels Trials in Studies 2, 3 
and 4  
 Novel objects Informant 1 
response 
Informant 2 
response 
 
Novel 
Explanations 
 
Plastic hook 
 
It has a triangle in 
the middle so we 
can see through it. 
 
It has a triangle in 
the middle so we 
can put our fingers 
through it. 
 
 Metal hook It has hooks so that 
we can hang scarves 
on it. 
It has hooks so that 
we can hang hats 
on it. 
 
 Sprinkler head It is shiny so that we 
can see it from far 
away. 
It is shiny so that it 
looks bright like 
the sun. 
 
Novel Labels Car Medallion That’s a nez That’s a cray 
 Black door hinge That’s a modi That’s a seebo 
 Citrus juicer That’s a foppick That’s a tillen 
 Red retractable funnel That’s a rossi That’s a bobe 
 
Procedure. All children participated in 4 trial types: (a) training (b) novel 
explanation (c) novel label (d) explicit judgment. Trials were presented in a fixed order, 
with the exception of the novel explanation and novel label trials, which were 
counterbalanced across participants.  
Training. The experimenter began by presented pictures of the two informants 
and said, “Look at these girls. One is wearing a green shirt, and the other is wearing a 
black shirt. They are going to tell us about some things.” For each of four trials, the 
experimenter placed a picture of an entity between the informants and said, “Look, here 
is a picture of (e.g., rain). Now these girls think that they know why it rains. Let’s see 
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what they say.”  In 5 cases, children offered unprompted explanations. No child’s 
explanation was similar to either the circular or non-circular explanation.  
The experimenter pointed to both girls sequentially and stated their explanations.  
One informant always provided a non-circular explanation, whereas the other informant 
always provided a circular explanation (see Table 3.2, top panel, for examples of 
explanations).   
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Table 3.2 Sample Explanations Used in Training in Studies 2, 3 and 4. 
 
Event Statement Circular Explanation Non-Circular Explanation 
Study 2    
Rain These girls think 
they know why it 
rains. Let’s see what 
they think. 
Sometimes it rains 
because it is wet and 
cloudy outside, and 
water falls from the sky. 
When water falls from 
the sky it is called rain 
and it gets us all wet. 
Sometime it rains 
because there are clouds 
in the sky that are filled 
with water. When there 
is too much water in the 
clouds it falls to the 
ground and gets us all 
wet 
Flowers/Trees These girls think 
they know why trees 
and flowers grow. 
Let’s see what they 
think. 
Flowers and trees grow 
because they become 
taller and taller. They 
grow when their stem 
gets long and they get 
more and more leaves. 
Flowers and trees grow 
because we feed them 
water, which keeps 
them healthy and strong. 
The sun also helps them 
grow by giving them 
energy, which keeps 
them healthy and strong. 
Studies 3 & 4    
Rain These girls think 
they know why it 
rains. Let’s see what 
they think 
It rains because water 
falls from the sky and 
gets us wet. 
It rains because the 
clouds fill with water 
and get too heavy. 
 
Flowers/Trees These girls think 
they know why trees 
and flowers grow. 
Let’s see what they 
think. 
They grow because their 
stems get longer and 
longer and they get 
taller. 
They grow because we 
feed them water and the 
sun gives them light. 
 
Explanations were drawn from elementary school science textbooks (Macmillan, 
2006) and were matched for complexity using Flesch Reading Ease Scores (Flesch, 
1948). There were no significant differences between the two types of explanations 
(Mcircular = 87, Mnoncircular = 90.8. t(6) = 1.06, n.s.), indicating that the explanations were of 
equal reading difficulty.  Moreover, explanation difficulty was similar to the average 
86	  
levels of 81.5 and 85.1 used by Baum et al. (2008). After hearing the explanations, the 
experimenter repeated both explanations and asked, “Why do you think (e.g., rain falls)?” 
Both verbal (e.g. “What the girl in the green shirt said”) and nonverbal (e.g., pointing) 
responses were accepted. The order of explanation and the informant providing the 
circular explanation was counterbalanced across participants. 
Novel Explanations. Immediately following the fourth training trial, children 
participated in either the novel explanations or novel labels task.  The experimenter said 
“Here are the same two girls again.  Remember, this one is wearing a green shirt and this 
one is wearing a black shirt. They are going to explain some things that we don’t know 
about.” For each of the four trials, the experimenter placed a picture of a novel object 
between the informants, and said, for example, “Look at this object. Now I wonder why it 
has (e.g., a round thing there). Let’s see what these girls think” (see Table 3.1). 
The experimenter pointed to both girls sequentially and stated their explanations. 
Both explanations were always non-circular and equivalent in plausibility. For example, 
“The girl in the green shirt says it has a round thing there so that we can spin it on the 
table.” and “The girl in the black shirt says it has a round thing there so that we can roll it 
on the table.” Immediately following the explanations, the experimenter repeated the two 
explanations and asked, “Why do you think (e.g., it has a round thing)?” The order of the 
explanations, and the informant offering each explanation was counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Novel Labels. The experimenter began by saying, “Now the girls are going to tell 
us the names of some funny-looking things.” For each of the four trials the experimenter 
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placed a picture of a novel object between the informants and said, for example, “The girl 
in the green shirt says that’s a foppick” and “The girl in the black shirt says that’s a 
tillen.” (see Table 3.1, lower panel).  The experimenter repeated the two labels, and 
asked, “What do you think it’s called?” The order of the labels, and the informant 
offering each label was counterbalanced across participants. 
Explicit Judgment. Finally, the experimenter pointed to the picture of each 
informant and said “Do you remember when the girl in the green shirt was talking about 
some things that we know about like polar bears and rain? Was she very good or not very 
good at explaining those things?” The same question was posed for the girl in the black 
shirt (counterbalanced across participants). Finally, children were asked to judge the 
relative quality of the informants: “Which girl was better at explaining those things?” 
Results 
Training Trials. Table 3.3 displays the children’s mean preference for the 
informant providing non-circular explanations during the training trials along with 
comparisons with 50% chance performance. Responses offered by 5-year-olds were 
significantly different from those offered by 3-year-olds (t (31) = 5.56, p < .001, d = 
0.97). Whereas 5-year-olds were above chance in choosing the non-circular explanations, 
3-year-olds did not systematically choose either explanation.   
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Table 3.3 Mean Scores (Standard Deviations), Comparisons with Chance Performance, 
and Effect Sizes in Study 2  
                                                              3-year-olds 5-year-olds 
Trial Type  Mean T D Mean   T   D 
       
Training score (max=4) 2.17 (.72) 1.00 0.24 3.50 (.63) 9.49*** 2.38 
Novel explanations (max=4) 2.52 (1.0) 2.17* 0.52 2.62 (.95) 2.61* 0.65 
Novel labels (max=4) 1.94 (.75) .32 0.08 2.93 (.93) 4.04** 1.00 
Explicit judgment (max=3) 1.76 (1.25) .78 0.19 2.56 (.63) 3.58** 1.67 
Note. Mean scores indicate the number of trials on which the children preferred the non-circular 
explanation (on training trials) or the non-circular informant on the novel labels, novel 
explanations and explicit judgment tasks. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Novel Explanations and Novel Labels. Table 3.3 also displays children’s mean 
preference for the informant providing non-circular explanations and comparisons to 50% 
chance for both the novel explanations and the novel labels task. In the novel 
explanations task, both 3-year-olds and 5-year-olds performed above 50% chance, 
systematically endorsing explanations from the informant who had provided non-circular 
explanations. In the novel labels task, 5-year-olds were also above chance in privileging 
this informant.  By contrast, 3-year-olds did not systematically choose either informant.  
To confirm these findings, a 2 (Age Group: 3-year-olds, 5-year-olds) X 2 (Trial 
Type: novel explanations, novel labels) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted.  This 
analysis revealed a main effect of Age Group (F(1,31) = 4.75, p < .05, ηp² = .13) and a 
Trial Type X Age Group interaction (F(1,31) = 5.24, p < .05, ηp² = .15).  The main effect 
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of Trial Type was not significant.   
To interpret the interaction, the simple effect of Age Group was calculated for 
each trial type.  On the novel explanations tasks, both 3- and 5-year-olds demonstrated 
similar levels of selectivity, preferring to endorse explanations from the informant who 
had previously offered non-circular explanations (F(1,31) = .11, n.s.).  By contrast, in the 
novel labels task, 5-year-olds were significantly more selective than 3-year-olds (F(1,31) 
= 12.82, p < .001). 
Explicit Judgment. Table 3.3 displays children’s average correct performance 
and comparison to 50% chance for the explicit judgment trials. Five-year-olds were 
significantly more likely than 3-year-olds to judge the non-circular informant as ‘better’ 
(t(31) = 2.29, p < .05, d = 0.43).  Whereas 5-year-olds systematically judged the 
informant giving non-circular explanations as ‘better’, 3-year-olds were at chance in 
judging the informants.  Note that the data are similar when exploring the final forced-
choice question only. 
Discussion 
In Study 2, I examined preschoolers’ developing preference for circular versus 
non-circular explanations.  I also investigated children’s use of explanation type to 
determine an informant’s future credibility across two novel learning tasks. Although the 
explanations provided were not direct responses to children’s naturalistic questions, they 
were placed in the context of a question that child would likely ask (e.g., ‘Why does a 
polar bear have white fur?’).    
First, children’s preference for non-circular explanations develops over the 
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preschool years.  In the training trials, 3-year-olds displayed no systematic preference for 
non-circular explanations, whereas 5-year-olds selectively preferred the non-circular 
explanations.  This finding is consistent with previous research indicating that 5-year-olds 
choose a non-circular explanation as the ‘best’ explanation for why something occurs 
(Baum et al., 2008, Experiment 1).  Note that these data suggest that 5-year-olds’ 
evaluation of explanation quality extends beyond the evaluation of a single word (e.g., a 
causal connective ‘because’, Bernard et al., 2012).  Both the non-circular and circular 
explanations included a causal connective; thus, if children were simply monitoring for 
such target words, they should have been at chance in evaluating the explanations. 
Second, both 3- and 5-year-olds used the quality of an informant’s explanation 
when assessing her subsequent credibility.  When asked to endorse a novel explanation, 
both 3- and 5-year-olds demonstrated a significant preference for learning from the 
informant who had provided non-circular explanations.   Three-year-olds’ preference is 
impressive, given that they did not display a selective preference for either explanation 
type in the training trials.  Nevertheless, children’s preference for learning from the 
informant who provided non-circular explanations is fragile in early preschool.  Whereas 
5-year-olds also preferred to learn novel labels from this informant, and to explicitly 
judge her as ‘better’, 3-year-olds displayed no systematic preference.   
Why would 3-year-olds display selectivity in some test trials, but not in explicit 
judgment trials?   One possibility is that 3-year-olds’ poor performance on the training 
trials, and subsequent fragile preference on test trials, was due to task demands.  The 
explanations used in Study 2 were relatively long (M = 27 words).  Note that I had 
91	  
attempted to decrease memory load by repeating the two explanations prior to inviting 
the child to respond.  Nevertheless, in Study 3, children’s explanation monitoring was 
probed further by decreasing the explanation length in the training trials.   
Study 3 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two different children participated in the study: 16 3-year-
olds (14 female, M = 3;7, SD=  5 months; range: 3;3–4;3 ) and 16 5-year-olds (10 female, 
M = 5;7, SD = 4 months; range: 5;2–6;2 ). Children spoke English as their first language 
and were recruited from local preschools (Riverside in Newton, MA and St. Michael’s 
School in North Andover, MA). Seventy-five-percent were white; 12.5% were Southeast 
Asian-American and 12.5% were East Asian-American. Although information on 
socioeconomic status was not collected, the preschools serve a predominantly middle and 
upper-middle class population.  
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 2, with the exception of the 
explanations in the training trials (see Table 3.2, bottom panel). For all four training trials 
both the circular and non-circular explanations were matched for length (explanation 
length < 13 words), and for readability (Flesch, 1948).  There were no significant 
differences in readability between the two types of explanations (Mcircular = 84.3, 
Mnoncircular = 92.3, t(6) = 1.68, n.s.), suggesting that, as in Study 2, the explanations were 
of equal reading difficulty. Moreover, there were no significant differences in the 
readability, when comparing the explanations from Studies 2 and 3. 
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Results 
Training Trials. Table 3.4 displays mean preference for the non-circular 
explanations and comparisons to 50% chance.  Both 5-year-olds and 3-year-olds were 
above 50% chance in choosing non-circular explanations. There were no significant 
differences between the responses given by 3-year-olds and 5-year-olds (t(30) = 1.79, 
n.s.). 
Table 3.4 Mean Scores (Standard Deviations), Comparisons with Chance Performance, 
and Effect Sizes in Study 3 
                                                                3-year-olds 5-year-olds 
Trial Type Mean  T D Mean T  D 
Training score (max=4) 2.56 (1.03) 2.18* 0.54 3.12 (.72) 6.26*** 1.56 
Novel explanations (max=4) 2.63 (.89) 2.83* 0.71 2.63 (1.02) 2.44* 0.62 
Novel labels (max=4) 2.25 (1.0) 3.87 0.25 2.75 (.77) 3.87** 0.97 
Explicit judgment (max=3) 1.63 (1.1) 0.46 0.34 2.38 (1.02) 3.42** 0.37 
Note. Mean scores indicate the number of trials on which the children preferred the non-circular 
explanation (on training trials) or the non-circular informant on the novel labels, novel 
explanations and explicit judgment tasks. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses.  
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Novel Explanations and Novel Labels. Table 3.4 also displays mean preference 
for endorsing the informant who had previously provided non-circular explanations and 
comparisons to 50% chance for the novel explanations and novel labels tasks. As in 
Study 2, both 3-year-olds and 5-year-olds performed above 50% chance in endorsing the 
novel explanations from the informant who had provided non-circular explanations.  
Whereas 5-year-olds performed above 50% chance in endorsing novel labels, 3-year-olds 
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were unsystematic in endorsing the novel labels provided by either informant.  However, 
these differences in chance-level performance should be interpreted with caution, as a 2 
(Age Group: 3-year-olds, 5-year-olds) X 2 (Trial Type: novel explanations, novel labels) 
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions. 
Explicit Judgment. As in Study 2, 5-year-olds were significantly more likely 
than 3-year-olds to judge the non-circular informant as ‘better’ (t(30) = 2.07, p < .05, d = 
0.34 ).  Whereas 5-year-olds systematically judged the informant giving non-circular 
explanations as ‘better’, 3-year-olds were at chance in judging the informants.  Note that 
the findings are similar when exploring the final forced-choice question only. 
Relationship Between Training Trials and Test Trials. Finally, I assessed the 
relationship between children’s judgment of explanation quality and their preference for 
learning from the informant who had provided non-circular explanations.  I examined 
children’s mean test performance (novel explanations + novel labels, max = 8) as a 
function of the mean number of non-circular explanation choices in the training trials 
(max = 4), collapsed across Studies 2 and 3.  Children displayed a stronger preference for 
the non-circular informant in the test trials if they had shown more sensitivity toward 
non-circular explanations during training trials. Inspection of Figure 3.2 indicates that 
children displayed a stronger preference for the non-circular informant in the test trials if 
they had shown more sensitivity toward non-circular explanations during training trials. 
Indeed, almost two thirds of the children tested (40 out of 65) chose the non-circular 
explanations for at least 3 out of 4 training trials. Of these 40 children, 58% endorsed the 
informant who had provided non-circular explanations on at least 6 of the 8 test 
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questions. By contrast of the 25 children who chose the non-circular informant for less 
than 3 training trials, only 16% endorsed the informant who had provided non-circular 
explanations on at least 6 test questions.  This difference in test performance by training 
performance is significant (χ2(1, N = 65) = 10.91, p < .001, ϕ = .41).  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Scatter plot of individual children’s preference on test trails (novel 
explanations and novel labels) as a function of their preference on training trials, 
across Studies 2 and 3. 
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To further examine these findings, I conducted a multiple linear regression with 
total test score as the dependent variable and age in months, training score and 
experiment as independent variables. The interaction between age and training score and 
age and experiment were also explored. Age was a significant predictor, (β = 0.35, SE = 
0.01, p < .05), accounting for 9% of the variance in test performance. In addition, training 
performance accounted for 28% of the variation in performance on the test trials (β = 
0.79, SE = 0.19, p < .001). No other main effects or interactions were significant.   Thus, 
children’s preference for non-circular explanations during training trials predicted their 
preference for learning from the non-circular informant during test trials even after 
controlling for age in months and experiment. 
Discussion 
Both 3- and 5-year-olds preferred the non-circular explanations during the 
training trials.  Recall that these explanations were shorter than those used in Study 2, 
suggesting that  3-year-olds’ selective preference for non-circular explanations in Study 3 
may be due to the decreased memory load required to make these judgments.   
Taken together, the results from Study 3 provide additional support for the 
findings in Study 2. Both 3- and 5-year-olds monitored the quality of the informants’ 
explanations, and used those explanations to make inferences about the informants’ 
future credibility.  They endorsed novel explanations provided by the informant who 
previously used non-circular explanations.  However, as in Study 2, only 5-year-olds 
selectively endorsed this informant in the novel labels task and explicitly judged her as 
‘better’, a point that I turn to again in the General Discussion.  Moreover, when 
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collapsing across both experiments, children’s preference for the non-circular 
explanations in the training phase accounted for unique variance in their subsequent 
learning from the informant who used non-circular explanations, even after controlling 
for age.  
The findings from Studies 2 and 3 provide compelling evidence to suggest that 
the quality of explanations informants offer in response to children’s questions matter not 
only for the acquisition of knowledge, but also for children’s judgments of informants’ 
credibility. However, these findings are somewhat limited because the sample comprised 
children from mid- to high-SES families. Given the findings in Study 1 (Chapter 2) of 
this dissertation, I expect that because children from low-SES backgrounds are exposed 
to circular explanations more frequently, preschoolers from low-SES backgrounds will 
show a systematic preference for informants who provide circular explanations. To test 
this hypothesis, I conducted a follow-up study.  
Study 4 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-two 5-year-old children (M = 5; 3; 18 female; range: 4; 9–6; 
2). All children were recruited from two local preschools and spoke English as their first 
language.  Half of the children (n = 16; Mage = 5; 3; range: 4; 9–5; 5) received school 
vouchers (low-SES group).  The other half of the children (n = 16; Mage = 5; 7; range: 5; 
2–6; 2) was not eligible to receive school vouchers (mid-SES group). Note, because 3-
year-olds’ preferences were fragile at best in Study 3, in the current experiment I chose to 
only look at 5-year-olds. 
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Materials.	  The same two informants and 4 pictures were used during training 
trials that were used in Studies 2 and 3. The entities and explanations used for the training 
trials, novel explanations and novel labels were identical to those used in Study 3 
(shortened explanations).   
Procedure. All children participated in the same 4 phases as in Studies 2 and 3 
(training, novel labels, novel explanations, explicit judgment).  The phases were 
presented in a fixed order, with the exception of the novel label and novel explanation 
phases which were counterbalanced across children.  
Results  
Training Trials.  Scores on the Training Trials represent the number of trials 
(max = 4) on which children endorsed the sentence provided by the non-circular 
informant. Inspection of Figure 3.3 reveals that mid-SES children showed a significant 
preference for explanations provided by the non-circular informant during training trials 
(M = 3.12, SD = 0.72, t(15) = 6.26, p < .001, d= 1.56).  By contrast, Low-SES children 
displayed a significant preference for sentences provided by the circular informant during 
training trials (M = 1.24, SD = 1.01, t(15) = 3.21, p < .05, d = .68).  
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Figure 3.3. Proportion of trials children chose the non-circular informant by 
socioeconomic background. 
Novel Labels and Novel Explanations Trials.  Mid-SES children selectively 
preferred to endorse novel labels (M = 2.75, SD = 0.77, t(15) = 3.87, p < .001, d = 0.97 ) 
and novel explanations (M = 2.62, SD = 1.02, t(15) = 2.44, p < .05, d = 0.62) from the 
informant who had provided non-circular explanations during training trials. By contrast, 
low-SES children displayed the opposite pattern: selectively preferring to endorse 
information from the informant who had previously used circular explanations (novel 
labels: M = 1.62, SD = 1.02, t(15) = 4.39, p < .05, d = .88; novel explanations: M = 1.31, 
SD = 1.19, t(15) = 2.725, p < .01, d = .79).  
To explore the relationship between children’s selectivity on the novel label and 
the novel explanation task, a repeated-measures ANOVA with trial type (training, novel 
labels, novel explanations) as the within-subjects variables and SES as the between 
subjects variable was conducted.  This analysis produced a main effect of SES (F(1,30) = 
0 
0.5 
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37.69, p < .001, η2p = .92).  No other main effects or interactions were significant. Figure 
3.3 displays the proportion of total choices that children directed at the non-circular 
informant by SES.  Inspection of Figure 3.3 indicates that mid-SES children displayed a 
greater preference for learning novel information from the informant who had previously 
provided non-circular explanations than low-SES children. 
Explicit judgment.  Mid-SES children designated the non-circular informant as 
‘better’ than the circular informant 87.5% of the time. By contrast, only 6% of low-SES 
children designated her as ‘better.’ To determine if children’s explicit judgment of the 
relative accuracy of the two informants was related to their preference for the passive 
informant on novel label, and novel explanations,  a repeated-measures ANOVA with 
trial type (novel label, novel explanations) as a within-subjects variable and explicit 
judgment (non-circular better, circular better) and SES (mid-SES, low-SES) as between-
subjects variables.  This analysis yielded a main effect of SES (F(1,28) = 4.79, p < .05, 
η2p = .15). No other main effects or interactions were found.   
Discussion 
When looking at children’s preferences by SES, only mid-SES children 
demonstrated a systematic preference for learning from the non-circular informant 
whereas low-SES children showed a strong preference for the circular informant across 
training trials and test trials. These results support the findings in Study 1 of this 
dissertation, where I found that caregivers from low-SES families use circular 
explanations more frequently than non-circular explanations. Arguably, because children 
from low-SES families are exposed to circular explanations more frequently, and mid- 
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SES are exposed to non-circular explanations more frequently, one would expect to see 
differences between mid-SES and low-SES. Indeed, not only did low-SES children show 
a systematic preference for circular explanations and extend these preferences to future 
learning scenarios, but they also explicitly judged the circular informant as ‘better.’ These 
findings have important implications when thinking about how children learn from 
others, specifically in the classroom context, where non-circular explanations are 
privileged. 
General Discussion 
Taken together, Studies 2, 3 and 4 support the conclusion that, counter to previous 
findings (Baum et al., 2008), preschoolers can judge the quality of an explanation by 
attending to the circularity of the argument. However, what aspects of the explanation 
children attend to depends on their sociocultural background. Thus, these data extend 
previous work by showing that children’s evaluation of explanation quality develops over 
the preschool years and is relatively robust by age 5 (Frazier et al., 2009; Mercier et al., 
in press). 
To the best of my knowledge, no research has explored how children use 
assessments of explanation quality to judge an informant’s credibility. Instead, previous 
research has focused on children’s judgments of an informant’s expertise at the single-
word level (Sobel & Corriveau, 2010; Koenig & Jaswal, 2011).  Across two experiments, 
I find that both age groups selectively chose the informant who had provided non-circular 
explanations on a near transfer task (novel explanations). Similarly, 5-year-olds preferred 
this same informant when learning novel labels. Children’s endorsement of this informant 
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was also related to their judgment of explanation quality even after controlling for age.  
Note, these preferences were only found in mid-SES children, indeed when looking at 5-
year-old children from low-SES backgrounds in Study 4, a preference for circular 
explanations was found. 
I propose two potential hypotheses to explain these differences. First, as 
previously mentioned, children from mid-SES families are exposed more to activities that 
use explanations. Indeed, documented differences have been shown in literacy activities 
(Payne, Whitehurst & Angell, 1994; Scarborough & Dobrich, 1994). Differences have 
been shown in how caregivers interact with their children while reading books. Indeed, 
caregivers from mid-SES families are more likely to use questions as a tool to engage 
their child with the book which in turn leads to a dialogue that includes explanations 
(Anderson-Yockel & Haynes, 1994; Haynes & Saunders, 1999). It is plausible that this 
type of exposure leads children to become more familiar with high-quality explanations 
and associate them with credibility. Book reading might be an especially powerful 
mechanism to transmit information about a source’s credibility. 
Second, documented differences in patterns of parent talk, indicate that low-SES 
parents use far more directive speech (e.g., ‘do this,’ ‘go sit down’) than mid-SES parents 
who have been shown to use far more democratic speech (e.g., ‘where do you think you 
should be right now?’) (Heath, 1983; Hart & Risley, 1995). Thus, mid-SES patterns of 
parent talk likely include longer explanations. Mid-SES children may be exposed to these 
patterns more regularly and thus privilege them in learning situations. These differences 
are concerning, especially because complex syntactic structures are often used in 
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academic language, putting low-SES children at a significant disadvantage. 
  Taken together, preschoolers are surprisingly selective, not only in using single 
words, but also in using entire utterances to judge an informant’s credibility. Although 
preschoolers selectively endorsed the claims of the informant who had previously used 
non-circular explanations, in Studies 2 and 3, only 5-year-olds explicitly judged this 
informant as ‘better’. For this reason, I chose to only look at 5-year-olds in Study 4. 
There, mid-SES children explicitly judged the non-circular informant as ‘better’ while the 
low-SES children judged the circular informant as ‘better.’ This discrepancy in 
performance between explicit judgment and test performance is in contrast to previous 
findings demonstrating a relationship between performance on these two tasks (e.g., 
Koenig, Clement & Harris, 2004).  One difference between the setup used in the current 
set of studies and previous research was that, although the circular explanation was 
fallacious, it did not have the same degree of blatant inaccuracy as would be seen by an 
informant mislabeling a shoe a ‘car’.  If anything, the difference between a circular and a 
non-circular explanation might be seen as a difference between an accurate explanation, 
and a more neutral one.  Some previous research has compared children’s selective 
preference for an accurate labeler over a neutral labeler (who simply states ‘let me take a 
look at that’; Corriveau, Meints & Harris, 2009).  Although 4-year-olds were able to 
explicitly judge the accurate labeler as ‘better’, 3-year-olds were not, suggesting that 3-
year-olds may struggle when explicitly evaluating two informants who display more 
subtle differences in accuracy. An alternative explanation is that selectivity in explicit 
judgment questions may require more metacognitive abilities than needed for simple 
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endorsement.  Future research should include both endorse and explicit judgment 
questions to explore children’s selective learning in these more complex settings. 
What is developing in the preschool years in children’s learning from 
explanations?  These data suggest that children’s ability to monitor explanations may 
display a similar pattern to their monitoring of single-word utterances (e.g., object labels; 
Jaswal & Neely, 2006; Koenig & Harris, 2005).  Whereas older preschoolers (4- and 5-
year-olds) use multiple strategies to infer informant credibility (e.g., accuracy and 
inaccuracy of object labeling), younger preschoolers use more narrow strategies (e.g., 
inaccuracy only; Pasquini et al., 2007).  Similarly, when monitoring for explanation 
quality, older preschoolers may be more flexible when attending to global strategies (e.g., 
argument circularity).  By contrast, younger preschoolers can use these strategies when 
selectively learning from informants – but only in certain situations and under certain 
conditions.  Future research should explore the developmental sequence of the cues used 
for explanation monitoring. 
What are the limits of children’s explanation monitoring? On the one hand, 
children might endorse all claims from an informant providing high-quality explanations.  
Indeed, research on children’s learning of scientific concepts indicates that young 
preschoolers blindly accept an informant’s explanations without considering how these 
claims match with real-world evidence (e.g. Kuhn et al., 2000).  An alternative possibility 
is that children continue to monitor explanation quality even after determining that an 
informant is credible.  Indeed, in some instances, at least a minority of children and adults 
weight perceptual experience over information from others (Asch, 1956; Corriveau & 
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Harris, 2010).  Future research should examine how children approach novel situations 
when they have access to both high-quality informants and real-world evidence.  
One further question concerns the scope of children’s knowledge about a given 
domain. In the present experiments, the informants supplied information about scientific 
phenomena. Given the influence of context on children’s sensitivity to explanations 
(Kuhn, 2001), it is plausible that children might employ different strategies to evaluate 
explanations across domains.  For example, recent research indicates that adults’ 
explanations influence how children understand non-observables such as religious 
phenomena (Canfield & Ganea, 2013; Woolley, Ma & Lopez-Mobilia, 2011).  
These findings have important implications for classroom learning. Although I 
recognize that experimental designs are not always appropriate representations of what 
occurs in a classroom setting, they provide an important first step in systematically 
identifying the cues children employ when making decisions about which informants 
to turn to in learning situations. Indeed, I argue that although it is unlikely that children 
will be faced with two blatantly different explanations in a classroom setting, it is very 
likely that they will be exposed to multiple teachers within their classroom, and it is 
likely that these teachers will provide explanations that vary in quality.  Moreover, 
children are constantly weighing the explanations they hear from their teachers against 
the explanations they hear from their parents. This could be potentially problematic 
given the findings of Study 4, where low-SES children prefer circular explanations but 
the majority of teachers (84%) are white- middle-SES women, and therefore likely to 
use non-circular explanations (Feistritzer, 2011). As a result, children from low-SES 
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families might not readily view their teachers as credible sources, making it difficult 
for them to fully access the curriculum.  The type of forced-choice experimental 
research highlighted here allowed us to isolate the cues children rely on most heavily 
in learning situations. I examine the implications for classroom learning in more depth 
in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. 
In summary, during the preschool years, children become increasingly 
sophisticated questioners, thereby prompting a rapidly-expanding exposure to multi-word 
explanations.  This research provides evidence that children are capable of assessing an 
entire explanation in judging its quality. Perhaps even more compelling, children not only 
monitor explanations for quality, but they also use this information to make judgments 
about an informant’s future credibility. Nevertheless, it is still unclear from Study 1 and 
the current set of Studies if children actually learn from the explanations they hear. I look 
to explore this question in Study 5 (Chapter 4) of this dissertation.  
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Figure 4.1. Research model. Study 5 explores the 
relationship between adults’ explanations and 
children’s follow-up 
Chapter 4: What children learn from the explanations they hear: Individual differences in 
caregivers’ explanations that impact children’s learning 
Introduction  
Taken together, the results highlighted in chapters 2 and 3 suggest that interaction 
patterns children use as a tool for learning from others vary across sociocultural contexts. 
Although children from low-SES and mid-SES groups appear to ask a similar proportion 
of information-seeking questions, the amount and quality of the explanations they receive 
from their caregivers vary. It is likely that such variation in caregiver explanations 
influences how children perceive different sources as learning partners. Some evidence 
for this conclusion comes from Study 4. Children monitored the quality of explanations 
to make judgments about the informants’ future credibility. Somewhat surprisingly, 
children from low-SES families preferred to learn from an informant who used circular 
explanations (lower quality), whereas children from mid-SES families preferred to learn 
from an informant who used non-circular explanations. One potential hypothesis for this 
difference comes from Study 1, where I found that low-SES families provide circular 
explanations more frequently than non-circular explanations.  
In the current study I continue to focus on the role explanations play in children’s 
learning from others. Here, I examine the second part of the question-explanation-follow-
up interaction pattern, focusing 
specifically on the relationship 
between explanations and 
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children’s follow-up (See Fig 4.1). I focus on one source of individual difference that 
might influence explanation quality and its relationship to children’s follow-up behaviors 
(learning): the caregiver’s epistemic stance.  
Children experience many different types of conversational environments. Few 
studies have actually explored the patterns of information children are exposed to when 
learning from others, and how such patterns are related to the acquisition of conceptual 
knowledge (Callanan & Valle, 2008; Gelman, 2009).   Indeed, to date, the majority of 
research looking at how children learn from others has focused on the cues they use when 
deciding from whom to learn (c.f. testimony) (Harris & Koenig, 2006; Heyman 2008; 
Jaswal, 2010; Koenig & Echols, 2003), with the tacit assumption that such differences in 
selective learning partners would be related to differences in knowledge acquisition. This 
study explores how caregivers’ ways of thinking about knowledge, their epistemological 
stances, influence the types of explanations children hear and their subsequent learning. 
There are many domains where explanations provide children with valuable 
information that children could not otherwise learn through observation or exploration. In 
particular, the science-domain is rich with concepts that cannot be learned through first 
hand experiences (e.g., germs, principles of buoyancy etc.).  In early childhood, children 
often approach science learning through social interactions, primarily with parents, 
teachers, and informal learning partners. Several studies have found that caregivers 
engage children’s scientific thinking in everyday conversations at museum exhibits by 
helping children to notice important causal features of the exhibit, providing them with 
causal explanations and demonstrating how to generate and test a hypothesis (Callanan, 
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2012; Crowley, Callanan, Tenenbaum, & Allen, 2001; Shtulman & Checca, 2012; Valle, 
Tighe, & Hale, 2009).	  Despite this evidence, it most often the case that parents do not 
take opportunities to support their children’s scientific exploration with explanations 
(Gleason & Schauble, 1999; Luce & Callanan, 2011; Shtulman & Checca, 2012), and are 
likely to vary in the extent to which they use empirical evidence to answer their 
children’s questions (Sandoval, 2005; Valle, 2009).	  As a result, children are likely 
exposed to varying types of explanations that may impact their acquisition of conceptual 
knowledge. A more sophisticated explanation – one that uses evidence provides children 
with more information to understand a concept than a less-sophisticated explanation. For 
example, when talking about the process of snow melting, a caregiver might respond with 
a less-sophisticated explanation by saying “the sun is hot and heat melts the snow.”  By 
contrast, a caregiver providing an explanation with evidence would likely use examples 
such as “think about what happens when we take an ice cube out of the freezer or a 
Popsicle on a hot summer day. Those things are really cold and to stay frozen they need 
the cold, but when they are in the sun or out of the freezer, they melt because it is not 
cold anymore.” The latter response provides children with more information that aids in a 
deeper understanding of the concept. Arguably, children who are presented with an 
explanation that provides elaborate evidence and examples will have the ability to extend 
the acquired information to other examples, demonstrating a more complete 
understanding of the concept. In the current study I explore whether the evidence 
caregiver’s provide in their explanations is linked to children’s learning of a new concept.  
The extent to which caregivers use evidence when talking about scientific 
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concepts often varies as a function of their education (Evans, Newstead & Byrne, 1993; 
Valle, 2009) as well as their beliefs about the nature of science (Sandoval, 2005; Valle, 
2009). Indeed, Valle (2009) demonstrated that despite science being revered in western 
cultures, middle-class adults vary in how and the extent to which they engage in scientific 
thinking. This likely causes children to learn different “ways of reasoning” depending on 
the family they grow up in. A child who is exposed to more sophisticated reasoning is 
likely able to reason about events in more sophisticated ways. More sophisticated 
reasoning often leads to increased conceptual understanding, particularly in the science 
domain (Mercer & Howe, 2012). 
Recent research also suggests that caregivers’ use of evidence when talking about 
science is linked to epistemological beliefs (Luce, Callanan & Smilovic, 2013; Kuhn, 
Cheney & Weinstock, 2000; Valle, 2009). According to Kuhn (2001), epistemological 
beliefs can be divided into four categories: realist, absolutist, multiplist and evaluativist. 
Kuhn (2001) defines an individual who adopts a realist stance as seeing assertions as 
copies of an external reality. The explanations they provide are derived from an external 
source and identical to the sources’ explanation.  An individual who adopts an absolutist 
stance is one who makes assertions that are seen as right or wrong, and are perceived as 
fixed truth (Kuhn, 2001).  For example, seeing science as merely a set of facts or 
statements such as “People are just born good or evil” implies an absolutist stance. In 
contrast, a multiplist stance assumes that knowledge comes from humans, and that beliefs 
are uncertain. Reasoning is seen as an act of weighting multiple perspectives.  Indeed, a 
person who adopts a multiplist stance will likely not use evidence to support one side of 
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an argument, but rather; perceive both sides of an argument to have some truth. For 
example, when talking about social issues (e.g. prayer in school, school start-time etc.), 
multiplists will present both sides of the issue and likely find truth in both. Finally, an 
individual with an evaluativist stance perceives knowledge as originating from human 
minds and therefore as uncertain. Beliefs are constructed based on evidence and 
judgments are made by testing hypotheses or finding disconfirming evidence (e.g., 
learning about gravity by dropping a ball). These stances influence the way adults 
construct knowledge, which alters the responses they provide to their children in learning 
scenarios. That is, if an individual perceives knowledge as a set of facts and constructs 
his understanding of the world by viewing facts as absolute truth, then he will likely use 
facts when responding to his child’s questions. This type of response is restrictive and 
does not lead children to think critically. Thinking critically about a concept often leads 
to a more developed understanding of the concept at hand and therefore aids in the 
acquisition of conceptual knowledge.  
To my knowledge, no studies have looked at the direct effects of epistemological 
stance on adult’s responses to children’s questions and its impact on children’s learning.  
However, several studies have examined how caregivers’ epistemological stances relate 
to children’s reasoning and children’s evidence talk. For example, Valle (2009) presented 
8 and 11-year-olds and their parents with a series of conflicting scenarios (e.g., Did the 
Egyptians build the pyramids?). Each scenario consisted of two different claims (e.g., 
‘Most historians claim that Egyptians built the pyramids as tombs for their kings’; ‘Other 
historians claim that most Egyptians did not have the mathematical experience to build 
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the pyramids’). Parents and children were asked a series of questions to elicit their 
opinions about the topic. Parent-child conversations were recorded and coded for the use 
of evidence to support their claims. Results indicated that 98% of highly-educated parents 
encouraged the use of evidence to support conclusions (Valle, 2009). In addition, the use 
of evidence was connected to epistemological beliefs. Parents who subscribed to a non-
absolutist stance, were more likely to use evidence to support their claims. Although 
Valle (2009) did not look directly at how caregiver’s evidence talk and epistemic stances 
were related to children’s reasoning, these findings provide important insight for how 
children’s conversations with their caregivers might contribute to children’s development 
of reasoning strategies. These findings have important implications for learning because 
regular participation in discussions in which critical thinking and the use of evidence to 
support ideas are encouraged may relate to children’s abilities to acquire conceptual 
knowledge (Chappell & Overton, 1998).  
In a subsequent study Luce, Callanan & Smilovic (2013), looked at the link 
between parents’ epistemological stances and preschoolers evidence talk. Similar to Valle 
(2009), Luce et al. (2013), presented children and their caregivers with a book that 
contained several science-related topics that would likely come up in everyday 
conversation (e.g., global warming, Pluto no longer being a planet). Each page of the 
book consisted of a question that related to epistemic stance (e.g., ‘a page on global 
warming, briefly describing multiple perspectives about global warming and then asking 
the question “How could someone figure out why the earth is getting warmer?”). 
Responses to these questions were recorded and coded for the epistemological stance 
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they exhibited (e.g., absolutist, multiplist, evaluativist). Utterances were coded as 
absolutist if a parent provided evidence “only for their own position, if one side of the 
argument was dismissed or easily explained away, or if only one side was explicitly 
described as correct” (Luce et al., p. 456). An utterance received a multiplist code if 
parents “described both sides of an argument as equally correct, declined to discuss the 
topic by saying there is no way to tell the answer, or stated that the situation is too 
complex or uncertain to know” (Luce et al., p. 456). Finally, an evaluativist code was 
assigned when a parent “actively integrated evidence from multiple experts/sources to 
reach an answer, suggested a way to collect evidence to help decide, or focused on the 
complexity of the issue while valuing evidence as part of the evaluation” (Luce et al., p. 
456).  In addition to coding parent-talk, Luce et al. (2013) coded children’s evidence talk 
in their discussions about angels, germs and mammoths. Both children’s use of evidence 
and their questions looking for evidence were coded. Results indicated that parents’ 
expressions of absolutist and evaluativist stances to their children varied depending on 
the topic under discussion, with more evaluativist talk apparent in science related 
discussions (e.g., what makes Pluto a planet) than in value-based discussions (e.g., 
whether it is okay to steal). Indeed, parents’ science backgrounds, as well as the age of 
the child influenced the stances exhibited by parents, with parents of younger children (4- 
to 6-year-olds) exhibiting an absolutist stance more frequently (Luce et al., 2013). When 
looking at the children’s evidence talk and its link to epistemic stance, findings indicated 
that children’s ability to use evidence and ask questions related to evidence were 
significantly related to parents’ expressions of an evaluativist stance. Children who 
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develop the ability to use evidence, develop a more sophisticated way of thinking about 
concepts (Mercer, Wegerif & Dawes, 1999). This sophisticated thinking is important for 
problem solving as well as for the acquisition of conceptual knowledge. Indeed, I propose 
that children who are exposed more to evaluativist stances likely develop more 
sophisticated ways of thinking and therefore acquire conceptual knowledge more readily.  
In the current study I explored individual differences in caregiver’s epistemic 
beliefs and how these differences impact children’s learning.  First I asked whether 
variations in caregivers’ expressions of epistemological beliefs contributed to the types of 
explanations caregivers provide their children. Next, I asked whether caregivers’ 
epistemological beliefs were associated with children’s acquisition of conceptual 
knowledge. I predicted that caregivers’ epistemological stances would influence the 
explanations children hear and subsequently children’s learning because as demonstrated 
by previous research, adults reasoning is often mitigated by epistemological beliefs (e.g., 
Klaczynski, 2000; Klaczynski, 2001; Stanovich West, 1998; Valle, 2009) and children 
are often influenced by the epistemological stance of their caregivers (Luce, et al., 2013).   
Note, because there is a clear dichotomy between evaluativist and absolutist stances, and 
because parents employ these stances most often when talking to their children about 
scientific concepts (Luce et al., 2013), the present study will focus only on these two 
stances. I predict that when caregivers adopt an evaluativist stance, they will provide 
higher quality explanations and children will learn more from them, then when caregivers 
adopt an absolutist stance. 
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Method 
Participants. Forty 4- and 5-year-olds and their caregivers were recruited from a 
local preschool and a local museum (18 female, M = 4; 10, SD = 6.3 months; range: 4; 0–
5; 11).  Five additional children were excluded from analyses because of their familiarity 
with the toy. 
At the museum, research assistants stood in the discovery center and informed 
families that they were collecting data for a research project in collaboration with the 
National Living Laboratory and invited to participate in the study.  At the preschool, the 
director e-mailed parents to advertise the study. Before beginning the study, parents at 
both the museum and the preschool were given details about the protocol and asked to 
sign an informed consent to participate as well as to be videotaped. As a thank you, the 
preschool classrooms were given three sets of the science toy used in the study. No 
compensation was given to museum participants. All children were English speaking and 
came from white-middle-class families. I chose to look at children from white-middle-
class families because of the results from the studies in Chapters 1 and 2 which 
demonstrated that the question, explanation, follow-up pattern of interaction for learning 
might not be privileged by all children; in the current study I focus on the one group in 
which this pattern of interaction is clearly privileged: mid- and high- SES families.   
Materials. Children and their caregivers sat at a small table located in the corner 
of a quiet room. In the museum, the table was located at the back right corner of the 
children’s discovery center. At the preschool, parents and children sat at a table located in 
a small classroom.  A video camera was strategically placed on a tripod so that caregiver-
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child interactions could be seen and heard, but so that the video camera did not distract 
the child.  During all three phases children and their caregivers played with a snap circuit 
toy. Snap circuit is a toy produced by Elenco© that consists of 32 electrical components 
that children assemble on a plastic module to create electric circuits. In the exploration 
phase 7 of the components were used:  a battery pack, a lever switch, a fan and 4 snaps. 
The toy consists of 20 snaps that vary in size. For the exploration phase 2 small snaps 
(marked 2), 1 large snap (marked 5) and 1 medium snap (marked 3) were used.  For the 
learning phase children were presented with 7 identical pieces that were used in the 
exploration phase. In the novel extension phase, 7 novel pieces were used:  a small light 
bulb, a button switch, a battery pack and 4 snaps. The four snaps were different sizes than 
the ones used in the exploration and learning phase. They consisted of 2 medium snaps 
(marked 3), 1 larger snap (marked 4) and a small snap (marked 2).  
Pilot data. To ensure that this toy was appropriate for use with children in this 
age range, the toy was piloted at the museum with 16 typically developing 4-year-olds. A 
research assistant presented children with the toy and provided them with a scripted 
explanation of how the toy works while systematically modeling how to assemble the 
toy. Children were then given the pieces of the toy and asked to assemble it on their own. 
Fifteen of the 16 children tested (93.75%) successfully completed the toy on their own. 
The average time it took to assemble the toy was 2 minutes and 47 seconds. These data 
informed the experimental phases, where children were given 3 minutes to assemble the 
toy on their own before an experimenter provided assistance.  
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Procedure. Children and caregivers participated in 3 phases: (a) exploration 
phase (b) learning phase and (c) novel extension phase. Following the exploration phase, 
caregiver’s were asked four pointed questions that were used to measure the caregiver’s 
epistemological stance. These same four pointed questions were asked to children 
following the novel extension phase. All phases were presented in a fixed order. 
Exploration phase.  Caregivers and children were presented with a pre-assembled 
snap circuit toy and told “Here is a fun toy for you to play with. You can take the pieces 
apart and put them together again” (the experimenter demonstrated how the snaps can be 
taken off and put back on).  The toy was pre-assembled to provide caregivers with a 
model of what the toy looked like when it was put together correctly. After introducing 
the toy, the experimenter removed all 7 pieces from the module and say “Now it is your 
turn to play with the toy. Can you and your [mom] work together to put the pieces 
together to make the fan turn on.” Caregivers and children were given five minutes to 
explore the toy. All interactions were video recorded.    
Learning Phase.  Immediately following the exploration phase, caregivers were 
asked to remove themselves from the table and told that the experimenters were 
interested in seeing what the child did with the toy on his or her own. They were also told 
that if after 3 minutes the child did not assemble the toy, the experimenter would help the 
child.  Next, the experimenter told the child “Now it is time to play with the toy all by 
yourself.” The experimenter placed the plastic module in front of the child as well as a 
battery pack, a switch, a fan, and 4 snaps (the same 7 pieces used during the exploration 
phase) and prompted the child “Can you put this toy together all by yourself, and make 
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the fan turn on?” Because I am interested in if children learned from the explanations 
provided to them by caregivers during the exploration phase, the experimenter reminded 
caregivers not to help their children. Children’s actions were video recorded and 
successful completion of the task was noted. Additionally, the time it took to complete 
the task and the number of pieces the child successfully placed at the end of 3 minutes 
were recorded. 
 Novel Extension Phase. Finally, in the novel extension phase, children were 
presented with a third snap circuit toy.  Recall, this snap circuit contained 4 different 
snaps, a battery pack, a button switch and a light bulb (instead of a fan). Children were 
prompted by the experimenter “I have one more toy for you to play with. But look, there 
is a light bulb. Can you put the toy together to make the light bulb turn on?” Caregivers 
were reminded not to provide any assistance, and that if after 3-minutes the child had not 
successfully completed the toy, the experimenter helped the child. Again, children’s 
actions were video recorded and successful completion of the task as well as the number 
of correctly placed pieces were noted.  
Caregiver’s Epistemological Beliefs. To ensure that all children were exposed to 
explanations and to measure caregiver’s epistemological beliefs, 4 pointed questions 
were asked following the learning task. These questions were designed to resemble 
questions that children would likely ask their caregivers about the toy. Questions 
included: 1) What would happen if we took this snap off? (the experimenter points to a 
snap) 2) Why is there a battery? 3) How does the switch work? 4) What would happen if 
we put on another snap? (the experimenter hands the caregiver a new snap). Responses 
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given to these questions were coded using a similar coding scheme used by Luce et al. 
(2013).  I discuss the coding scheme in more detail later in this section.  
 Children’s explicit questions. Following the novel extension phase, children were 
asked the same 4 questions that caregivers were asked following the exploration phase. 
These questions were asked approximately 6 minutes after caregivers provided their 
responses to the same questions. We were interested in seeing if children provided similar 
responses to their caregivers and how their responses were related to their acquisition of 
conceptual knowledge.  
Coding. Initially I planned to use the same coding scheme that was applied in 
Study 1. However, because few children actually asked questions during the 5 minute 
exploration phase (30 of 40 children, 75% did not ask any questions) opportunities for 
adult explanations children’s follow-up were limited.  Therefore a new coding scheme 
was developed.  
Epistemological beliefs. Using a coding scheme modified from Luce et al. (2013), 
a research assistant and I coded caregiver’s expressions of epistemological stances in 
their responses to the 4 explicit questions. Examples for each category (absolutist and 
evaluativist) are provided in Table 4.1. For each question we assigned only one code that 
represented the epistemological stance that was conveyed by the caregiver’s response 
(evaluativist or absolutist). A score of “0” was assigned to absolutist stances, while “1” 
was assigned to evaluativist stances. A composite score was created for each participant 
(max score= 4). Thus, the two categories listed below were treated as mutually exclusive. 
Inter-rater reliability was established on all 40 participants with 90% agreement (Cohen’s 
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kappa = .87). 
Absolutist. The absolutist code was assigned if a caregiver provided an assertion 
that was a statement of facts, or an explanation that presented evidence as if it 
were a fixed truth and no other possible explanations could exist. 
 
Evaluativist. The evaluativist code was assigned if a caregiver actively provided 
evidence using multiple examples/sources, proposed a hypothesis and suggested a 
way to collect evidence. 
 
Table 4.1. Examples of caregivers’ responses to explicit questions by epistemological 
stance 
 
Question Absolutist Response Evaluativist Response 
What would happen if 
we took this snap off? 
(P# 5) 
“It wouldn’t work” “Well the battery isn’t connected to both 
sides of the fan anymore and it needs to be 
connected to both ends right?  That way it 
makes a whole loop that brings the power 
from the battery to the fan and back to the 
battery.” 
 
Why is there a battery? 
(P# 32) 
“It gives it power to 
make it work.” 
“The battery gives the fan power and fans 
need power to work. It is like your toy car 
at home, in order for it to work we need to 
put in batteries because they give the car 
power.” 
 
How does the switch 
work? (P# 16) 
“You turn it on and 
off. When it is on the 
fan moves, when it is 
off the fan doesn’t 
move.” 
“The switch is like a pipe. If there is a 
hole in the pipe then the water leaks out. 
When the switch is off it makes a hole like 
a pipe and the power leaks out and cannot 
get to the fan.  When the switch is on the 
hole is closed and the power can get 
through and make the fan work.” 
  
What would happen if 
we added this snap? 
(P# 20) 
“It will still work.”  “We add another snap…maybe it would 
take off and start flying…it would pick up 
the speed? Can we try it? Do you want to 
see if it picks up the speed? Let’s see if it 
goes faster. Can it go any faster? It’s hard 
to tell, but it feels like there is more wind 
which means it is moving faster.” 
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Children’s learning. In addition to coding children’s behavior (completion of 
tasks, time to complete talks and number of pieces appropriately placed), I coded 
children’s responses to the explicit questions they were asked after completing the novel 
extension task.  Despite my initial plans to look at children’s epistemological stances, 
there was little variability in the types of responses children offered. Indeed, only 1 child 
provided responses indicative of an evaluativist stance. These data resembled the 
evidence talk of 4- and 5-year-olds in Luce et al.’s (2013) study, where children were 
more likely to provide responses that exhibited an absolutist stance. This is likely because 
4-and 5-year-olds have not yet developed the skills to construct more complex 
explanations that are often synonymous with evaluativist stances.  
As an alternative coding scheme, I coded children’s learning by noting whether or 
not children provided a correct response to the pointed questions. Given that these 
questions were asked approximately 6 minutes after caregivers’ questions, children’s 
responses were more likely related to their conceptual understanding rather than simply 
repeating what their caregiver had said. Incorrect responses were coded as “0,” and 
correct responses were coded as “1.” For examples see Table 4.2.  A composite score was 
calculated for each child (max score= 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
121	  
Table 4.2. Examples of children’s responses to explicit questions 
Question Incorrect Response Correct Response 
“What would happen if you 
took of this snap?”  
“Nothing, it still works” P# 
5 
“It won’t work” P# 16 
“Why is there a battery?”  “So the batteries won’t 
work” P# 6 
“To give it power to make 
it work” P# 17 
“How does the switch 
work?”  
“I don’t know” P# 7 “You move it like this to 
turn it on and off” P# 25 
“What would happen if we 
added this snap?”  
“It makes it bigger” P# 19 “It turns off” P# 37 
 
Caregiver’s Occupation. As another individual difference measure I asked 
caregivers to provide their occupations. Previous research suggests that caregiver’s with 
science backgrounds tend to adopt evaluativist stances when talking about science (Luce 
et al., 2013; Valle 2009), therefore I wanted to control for this in analyses. Science 
related occupations (e.g., engineer, chemist etc.) were coded as “1”, while non-science 
occupations (e.g., social worker, lawyer, stay at home mom) were coded as “0.” Eight of 
the 40 caregiver’s (20%) reported working in a science related field. 
Results 
Caregivers’ Epistemological Stance. For each of the four explicit questions, 
caregivers’ explanations were assigned one stance that best captured their response. A 
composite score of all 4 questions was then created. Higher scores (3 or 4) were labeled 
as evaluativist, while caregivers with low scores (0 or 1) were labeled as absolutist.  
Twenty caregivers (55%) were coded as conveying an absolutist stance, while 16 
caregivers (44%) were coded as conveying an absolutist stance. Four caregivers scored a 
“2” which was neither marked as absolutist nor evaluativist. These four caregivers were 
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excluded from some of the analyses below. 
Links between Caregiver’s Epistemological Stances and Children’s 
Learning. To explore the association between caregivers’ epistemic stances and 
children’s learning, I began by looking at children’s learning behaviors. I first explored 
their behaviors in the learning phase and novel extension phase, before turning to their 
overall performance.  
Learning Phase. I first explored children’s performance in the learning phase. 
Eighteen out of 40 children successfully completed the task (42.9%), whereas 22 children 
did not (52.4%). Recall, successful completion was coded if all 7 pieces were 
appropriately placed. On average, it took children who completed the task 167.7s (SD = 
85s). When looking at the number of pieces correctly placed, on average children placed 
4.78 pieces (SD = 2.56 pieces).  To explore children’s performance in the learning phase, 
a logistic regression was conducted with task completion as the dependent variable and 
age (months) as the predictor variable. Children’s age did not significantly predict 
successful completion of the learning task χ2 (1) = 1.71, p = .19. β = .07, t (39) = 1.64, 
n.s.  
Next, I explored the relationship between caregiver’s epistemic stances and 
children’s performance on the learning task.  To determine if caregivers’ epistemic 
stances predicted children’s completion of the task, I conducted a logistic regression with 
caregivers’ epistemic composite scores as the predictor variable and children’s 
completion of the task (“yes” or “no”) as the dependent variable.  Caregivers’ epistemic 
stances did not significantly predict children’s completion of the learning task, χ2 (1) = 
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2.94, p = .08. β = .44, t (39) = 2.8, p <.01. Recall that in addition to measuring children’s 
completion of the task, I also measured the number of pieces children correctly placed at 
the end of the allotted 3 minutes. Indeed, there were many instances where children did 
not successfully complete the task, but successfully placed the majority of the pieces (5 
or more pieces), indicating an emerging understanding of how the toy worked. To 
explore these subtle differences and the extent to which caregiver’s epistemic stance was 
associated with the number of pieces children placed, a simple linear regression using 
caregivers’ epistemic stance composite scores  (max=4) as the predictor variable and 
number of pieces placed in the learning phase (max=7 ) as the dependent variable was 
conducted. As was the case when looking at successful completion of the task, the overall 
model of caregiver’s epistemic stance trended towards significance F (1, 38) = 3.24, p = 
.08, R2 = 0.08. 
Novel Extension Phase.  Subsequently, I explored children’s performance on the 
novel extension phase. Given that this phase was different from the exploration and 
learning phase, I predicted that fewer children would successfully complete the task. 
Somewhat surprisingly, a similar proportion of children successfully completed the task 
as in the learning phase (42.9%), 52.4% did not complete the task. However, it took 
significantly longer for children to complete the novel extension phase (M = 213.4, SD = 
88.13), compared to the learning phase (M = 167.6, SD = 85.6) t (39) = 3.34, p <.05, d = 
0.52. When looking at average number of pieces that were appropriately placed, only 
4.37 pieces were placed (SD = 2.7). This was not significantly different than the number 
of pieces placed during the learning phase. To explore children’s performance in the 
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novel extension phase, a logistic regression was conducted with task completion as the 
dependent variable and age (months) as the predictor variable. Children’s age trended 
towards, but did not significantly predict successful completion of the learning task χ2 (1) 
= 2.99, p = .08. β = .09, t (39) = 2.77, n.s.  
Next, a logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of caregiver’s 
epistemic stance on the likelihood that participants completed the novel extension phase. 
The logistic regression model was statistically significant, χ2 (1) = 5.78, p < .05.  The 
model explained 13.5% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in children’s completion of the 
novel extension task. Caregivers’ epistemic stances were associated with an increased 
likelihood of completing the task.   
In addition to exploring completion of the task, I examined the relationship 
between caregiver’s epistemic stance and the number of pieces children correctly placed. 
As was the case with the learning phase, there were many instances where children did 
not successfully complete the task, but successfully placed the majority of the pieces (5 
or more pieces), indicating an emerging understanding of how the toy worked. A simple 
linear regression was conducted using epistemic stance composite scores (max =4) as the 
predictor variable and number of pieces placed in the novel extension phase (max=7) as 
the dependent variable.  The overall fit of the model was statistically significant, F (1, 38) 
= 9.73, p < .01, R2 = 0.20 and epistemic stance significantly predicted the number of 
pieces children successfully placed in the novel extension phase (β = .45, t (38) = 3.1, p 
<.01). Indeed, as caregivers’ epistemic stance composite scores increased, (indicating an 
evaluativist perspective) children successfully placed more pieces.  
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Overall Learning. To test the link between caregivers’ epistemological stances 
and children’s learning I ran a multiple linear regression, using children’s total pieces 
(number of pieces assembled during the learning phase + number of pieces assembled 
during the novel extension phase) as the dependent variable and composite epistemic 
stance score  and caregiver’s occupation as predictor variables. Together, the overall 
model of caregivers’ epistemological stance and caregivers’ occupation significantly 
predicted the number of pieces children successfully placed (max score =14) F (2, 37) = 
3.93, p < .05, R2 = 0.18. When holding caregivers’ occupation constant (scientists vs. 
non-scientists), caregivers’ epistemic stances significantly predicted the number of pieces 
children successfully placed, (β = .44, t (39) = 2.8, p <.01) suggesting that irrespective of 
a caregivers’ occupation, epistemological stances was associated with children’s overall 
learning.   
Note, that although I chose to treat epistemic stance as a continuous variable in 
order to capture more of the subtle differences, I could have also looked at these data by 
binning caregivers by epistemic stance (absolutist and evaluativist) and comparing 
children’s performance between the two groups1.  First, when looking at children’s 
performance on the learning phase, children of caregivers who exhibited an absolutist 
stance successfully placed fewer pieces (M = 3.9, SD = 2.5) than children of caregivers 
who exhibited an evaluativist stance (M = 5.7, SD = 2.4). The difference was significant t 
(34) = -2.25, p < .05, d = -0.73 (See Fig X.). A similar pattern was found when looking at 
performance on the novel extension phase (absolutist caregiver: M= 3.2, SD = 2.7; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Recall 4 caregivers were removed from these analyses because they received a score of “2” 
which was neither absolutist nor evaluativist.  
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evaluativist caregiver: M = 5.8, SD = 2.1; t (34) = -3.25, p < .01, d = -1.01) (See Fig X.) 
When looking at children’s overall learning, an independent samples t-test 
revealed significant differences in the number of pieces children successfully placed. On 
average, children of caregivers who exhibited an absolutist stance successfully placed 
fewer pieces (M = 7.1, SD = 5) than children of caregivers who exhibited an evaluativist 
stance (M = 11.6, SD = 4.1). This difference was significant t (34) = -2.87, p < .05, d = -
0.98 (See Fig, 4.2).  These findings further confirm that differences do exist in children’s 
learning based on the epistemic stance of their caregivers and its influence on the 
explanations they provide their children.   
 
 
Figure 4.2.  Proportion of pieces children correctly placed by task by caregivers’ 
epistemological stance 
Children’s Explicit Questions. In addition to looking at behavioral follow-up, I 
also looked at verbal follow-up by exploring the answers to the follow-up questions. I 
hypothesized that children who heard explanations provided by a caregiver who adopted 
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a more evaluativist stance would provide correct answers to the explicit questions that 
followed the novel extension phase more frequently.  To test this hypothesis, I conducted 
a linear regression with child’s response total (max =4) as the dependent variable and 
caregiver’s composite epistemic stance score as the predictor variable. The overall fit of 
the model was significant F (1, 38) = 7.55, p < .01, R2 = 0.17, and caregiver’s epistemic 
stance significantly predicted children’s responses to the pointed questions, β = .41, t (39) 
= 2.7, p <.01.  
When looking at these data by binning caregivers by epistemic stance, a similar 
pattern emerged. On average, children of caregivers who exhibited an absolutist stance 
provided fewer correct responses (M = 1.75, SD = 1.25) than children of caregivers who 
exhibited an evaluativist stance (M = 2.7, SD = 0.9). This difference was significant t(34) 
= -2.48, p < .05, d = -0.87 (See Fig, 4.3). To confirm that children were not simply 
repeating exactly what their caregiver said, I looked at the percent of questions in which 
children provided an identical response to their caregivers. Only 1 case was found where 
a child repeated the answers to all four questions using the same responses as his 
caregiver.  
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Figure 4.3. Number of children’s correct responses to explicit questions by caregivers’ 
epistemic stance 
Discussion 
Taken together, the results of Study 4 support 3 main conclusions.  First, the 
quality of parent explanations varied widely, and varied based on parental 
epistemological stance.  Second, parental epistemological stance was related to 
differences in child-level behavior, both on a learning task, and on a novel extension task.  
Finally, parental epistemological stance was related to differences in child-level verbal 
responses.  Children were more likely to respond to follow-up questions correctly if they 
had received evaluativist explanations.  I discuss each of these conclusions below, before 
turning to how these findings are related to children’s selective learning from others. 
First, I found significant variability in the quality of the explanations provided by 
caregivers. Indeed, inspection of the interaction during the learning phase revealed that 
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only 8 caregivers provided explanations to their children, 3 of these caregivers provided 
spontaneous explanations, while 5 of them provided explanations in responses to their 
children’s questions. These data are similar to findings by Shtulman and Checca (2012) 
who found that caregivers even when presented with the opportunity to provide 
explanations about science, caregivers do not almost 80% of the time. Because of how 
few caregivers offered explanations, I did not consider these in analyses. Instead, I looked 
at caregivers responses to explicit questions to measure the variability in explanation 
quality.   When looking at caregivers’ responses to explicit questions, many caregivers 
used evidence to support their claims, while others simply provided fact-based assertions. 
The claims that included evidence were often longer and more sophisticated than those 
that did not, suggesting that the use of evidence and examples is important to providing 
children with the information they need to acquire conceptual knowledge.   
Second, these data provide compelling evidence to suggest that children do use 
the explanations they hear to acquire conceptual knowledge. The content of these 
explanations was influenced by caregivers’ epistemological beliefs. Children of 
caregivers who adopted an evaluativist stance learned more than children of caregivers 
who adopted an absolutist stance. Indeed, caregivers’ epistemic stance significantly 
predicted children’s overall performance (how many pieces children correctly placed), 
even after controlling for caregivers occupation. Children of caregivers who adopted an 
evaluativist stance successfully placed more pieces than children of caregivers who 
adopted an absolutist stance, suggesting that they had developed a more sophisticated 
understanding of how circuits work.  
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Third, not only did children physically display their understanding of the concept, 
but when asked explicit questions about how circuits work, caregivers’ epistemic stances 
were also associated with children’s responses. Children of caregivers who adopted an 
evaluativist stance provided correct answers more often than children of caregivers who 
adopted an evaluativist stance. The ability to verbalize their understanding of how 
circuits work, demonstrates the use of a complex set of cognitive processes that are only 
beginning to emerge around age 4 (Kuhn & Katz, 2009).  It is around this age that 
children begin to produce their own explanations (Legare, Wellman & Gelman, 2010; 
Rittle-Johnson, Saylor, & Swygert, 2008). Note, although these questions were identical 
to the ones that parents heard, approximately 6 minutes elapsed before children were 
asked the questions. Given this time lapse, it is unlikely that children’s responses were 
simply an imitation of what their caregiver’s said.  Indeed, when measuring the epistemic 
stance exhibited by the responses provided by children, no variability was found. If 
children were imitating their parents, then one would expect children of parents who 
exhibited an evaluativist stance to convey a similar stance in their responses, however 
this was not the case.  
One might contend that children’s performance was simply due to exposure in the 
exploration phase. However, when looking at the learning phase and novel extension 
phase separately, more of the variability in children’s performance could be explained by 
the novel extension phase. This is important to highlight, because unlike in the learning 
phase, where children repeated the task from the exploration phase, in the novel 
extension phase children could not simply imitate what they had previously seen. Instead, 
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children were required to extend their understanding of how circuits work to successfully 
complete the task.  
 Why do children appear to learn more from caregivers who exhibit an evaluativist 
stance? Two explanations seem feasible. As suggested by Luce et al. (2013) caregiver’s 
reasoning about evidence is linked to how children reason about evidence. Although this 
pattern was only found in older children, it is possible that children’s reasoning skills are 
developing at younger ages and being informed by their caregiver’s epistemological 
beliefs. Thus, exposure to more complex reasoning may lead children to more 
sophisticated types of reasoning that aid in their acquisition of conceptual knowledge. A 
second plausible explanation for why caregivers’ epistemological beliefs may predict 
children’s learning is the overall length and content of the explanations provided by these 
caregivers. On average, caregivers with evaluativist stances provide longer explanations, 
often including more content that children might need to help them acquire a concept. 
These caregivers frequently provide evidence from familiar experiences, so children can 
easily situate the content of the explanation. Additionally, longer responses also suggest 
that the caregiver is spending more time engaging with their child about the concept, 
giving the child an opportunity to think more deeply about the concept. Likewise, 
caregivers’ responses might be influenced by the joint knowledge they think they have 
with their children. Because the current study focused on naturalistic interactions, the 
length of explanations was not controlled for. Therefore, in future studies it will be 
important to consider how the length of the explanation contributes to children’s 
acquisition of conceptual knowledge. 
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 One limitation of these findings is that they are somewhat limited to the science 
domain. The task used to explore children’s conceptual knowledge was a science task. 
Therefore, caregivers’ responses were likely constrained to one of two categories 
(absolutist vs. evaluativist). In future work it will be important to consider the breadth of 
epistemological categories and how they contribute to children’s acquisition of 
conceptual knowledge across domains. 
 Despite these limitations, the findings from this study have important implications 
for school readiness. The previous studies presented in this dissertation highlighted 
significant differences in how children learn from others across socioeconomic groups. 
Here, I highlight within group differences. Indeed, it is not always the case that children 
from mid-SES families learn from the explanations they hear. The extent to which 
children learn is predicted by the epistemic stance of the informant. Therefore, there may 
be a discrepancy in children’s understanding of specific concepts by the time they reach 
formal schooling. Teachers should be aware of this discrepancy and adopt an evaluativist 
stance (whenever possible) when providing children with explanations to aid in the 
acquisition of conceptual knowledge.  
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Chapter 5:  General Discussion 
 Children rely on many different strategies when learning about the world. Some 
of these strategies are more effective than others. For instance, when learning about 
unobservable referents, it is more effective for children to seek information from another 
individual than trying to learn through first-hand observation or exploration. There are 
many different patterns of interaction children engage in to acquire this information. In 
Chapter 1, I highlighted three aspects of an interaction pattern that is often privileged in 
formal schooling: children’s questions, caregiver responses to children’s questions and 
children’s follow-up. I proposed two factors that might influence this pattern: 
socioeconomic status and caregivers’ epistemological stances. The goal of this 
dissertation was to explore how children use the question, explanation, follow-up pattern 
of discourse as a mechanism for learning from others and potential individual differences 
that might change how this pattern is used for learning. Given the documented 
differences in patterns of parent talk, I proposed that this pattern would be influenced by 
families’ socioeconomic status and caregivers’ epistemological stances. Chapter 2 (Study 
1) explored the entire question, explanation, follow-up pattern across children from 
diverse socioeconomic backgrounds. In Chapter 3 (Studies 2, 3 & 4), I explored the 
relationship between children’s questions and the explanations they hear. Specifically, I 
focused on how children use explanation quality as a tool to make judgments about an 
informant’s credibility.  I explored how children across diverse backgrounds might judge 
explanation quality differently, thereby impacting their judgments about an informant. 
Finally, in Chapter 4 (Study 5) I explored the relationship between caregivers’ 
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explanations and children’s behavioral follow-up. Here I focused on individual 
differences in caregivers’ epistemological stances and how these differences contribute to 
children’s learning. 
 Chapter 2 (Study 1) presented, to my knowledge, the first study that explored the 
question, explanation, follow-up pattern of interaction across diverse backgrounds. Based 
on the work by Frazier, Welman and Gellman (2009), there was reason to believe that 
children’s follow-up might be different in children from diverse racial groups. Indeed, 
Frazier, Welman and Gelman (2009) recognized that a major limitation of their study was 
that children all came from white-mid/high-SES families and previous research on 
patterns of talk reveals differences in this group compared to low-SES families (Tizard & 
Hughes, 1984; Hart & Risley, 1992). The Study presented in Chapter 2 was designed to 
explore potential differences in this interaction pattern as a mechanism for learning from 
others.  
 In Study 1 (Chapter 2), I applied a 3-part coding scheme to 37 transcripts taken 
from the CHILDES database (Mcwhinney & Snow, 2000). When looking at the types of 
questions children asked, both mid-SES and low-SES children asked a similar proportion 
of information seeking questions. Information-seeking questions included fact-based 
questions and causal questions. In contrast, when looking at caregiver’s responses, 
significant differences were found between mid-SES and low-SES families. In particular, 
when looking at responses to causal questions, mid-SES caregivers provided significantly 
more exemplary responses (responses that included explanations) compared to low-SES 
caregivers and when looking at responses that included explanations in general mid-SES 
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caregivers provided more non-circular explanations (high-quality) whereas low-SES 
caregivers provided more circular explanations. Thus, not only do the types of responses 
children receive vary, but the quality of these responses varies as well. Of course, these 
differences may be due to the knowledge base of the caregiver that is needed to provide 
high-quality explanations and therefore, these differences might not exist if children 
asked more questions in a domain the caregiver is comfortable with.  
 Study 1 (Chapter 2) also revealed significant differences in children’s follow-up. 
Although children’s follow-up to adult responses to their fact-based questions was 
consistent across low-SES and mid-SES groups, children’s reactions to caregivers’ 
responses to causal questions varied. Mid-SES children provided their own explanations 
more frequently than low-SES children when they received unsatisfactory responses. 
This finding was consistent with Frazier, Gelman and Welman’s (2009) work exploring 
children’s follow-up. Moreover, both mid-SES and low-SES caregivers repeated their 
original question a similar proportion of times when receiving unsatisfactory responses. 
As previously noted, this response indicates that children are not simply trying to extend 
their conversation with adults, but actively seeking the information needed to answer 
their question.  These findings highlight important differences in the overall pattern of 
interaction children use when learning from others. The main differences in this 
interaction pattern centered on caregivers’ explanations. Therefore, in Chapters 3 and 4, I 
highlighted two different parts of the interaction pattern that included caregivers’ 
explanations.  
In Chapter 3 (Studies 2, 3 & 4) I investigated the explanations caregivers provide 
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to questions and how these explanations are evaluated by children to make judgments 
about the informants’ credibility (c.f., testimony).  Although no work to my knowledge 
has considered cues children use when evaluating explanations to learn from others, 
many studies have explored the cues children use when monitoring single words to make 
judgments about an informant decades (for reviews see Harris, 2012; Sobel & Kushnir, 
2013; Gelman, 2009). To explore children’s selective trust, experimenters have employed 
the selective trust paradigm (e.g., Corriveau & Harris 2009a; Harris, 2012; Koenig, 2012; 
Koenig & Woodward, 2010). Across three studies I used the selective trust paradigm to 
investigate how children monitor explanations to make judgments about an informant.  In 
the first study (Study 2 of this dissertation), children were presented with two different 
informants who provided two different explanations to a question. One explanation was 
always circular (low-quality), while the other explanation was always non-circular (high-
quality). Whereas 5-year-olds demonstrated a selective preference for non-circular over 
circular explanations, 3-year-olds did not. In two subsequent phases (novel labels and 
novel explanations) 5-year-olds evaluations of explanations extended to their inferences 
about the informants’ future credibility and they systematically preferred learning from 
the informant who had previously provided non-circular explanations.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, 3-year-olds also showed a selective preference for learning from informants 
who had previously provided non-circular informants during the novel explanations 
phase.  
To explore why 3-year-olds showed a preference for learning from non-circular 
informants, but not a preference for non-circular explanations, a follow up study was 
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conducted. When the explanations were shortened in Study 3, both 3- and 5-year-olds 
demonstrated a preference for non-circular explanations and extended this preference 
when deciding from whom to learn in the novel explanations task. As in Study 2, only 5-
year-olds showed a systematic preference for learning novel labels from the non-circular 
informant. I argued that this was likely because the novel explanations task was more 
closely related to the training trials where informants provided explanations about 
familiar entities.  
Given the results from Study 1 (Chapter 2) I had reason to believe that if children 
use explanations to make judgments about an informant’s credibility, then individual 
differences would exist in what children from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds attend 
to. Specifically, I predicted that children would prefer circular explanations because that 
is what they were most frequently exposed to. Indeed, Study 4 confirmed this hypothesis 
and children from low-SES families systematically preferred circular explanations and 
extended this preference when deciding from whom to learn. In contrast, mid-SES 
children selectively preferred non-circular explanations and preferred to learn from an 
informant who had previously provided a non-circular explanation.  Future studies may 
consider looking at other cues children attend to when monitoring caregiver’s responses 
to their questions and how this influences their perceptions of an informant as a credible 
source for learning.  
In Chapter 4 (Study 5), I explored the second half of the interaction pattern: 
caregivers’ explanations and children’s follow-up. I looked at whether children actually 
learned from the explanations they heard and individual differences that may have 
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influenced caregivers’ explanations and children’s subsequent learning. I focused on the 
epistemological beliefs of the caregiver, because as previous research suggests, these 
beliefs influence caregivers’ explanations (Luce et al., 2013; Valle 2009). In the first 
phase, caregivers and their children played with a novel toy (snap circuits) and caregivers 
were asked four explicit questions. Forty-four percent of caregivers adopted an 
evaluativist stance when answering these questions, while the remaining 55% adopted an 
absolutist stance. Children’s performance on subsequent learning tasks was impacted by 
their caregiver’s epistemological beliefs. Children of caregivers who adopted an 
evaluativist stance learned more than children of caregivers who adopted an absolutist 
stance. Caregivers’ epistemic stance significantly predicted children’s overall 
performance (how many pieces children correctly placed), even after controlling for 
caregivers occupation. Children of caregivers who adopted an evaluativist stance 
successfully placed more pieces than children of caregivers who adopted an absolutist 
stance, suggesting that they had developed a more sophisticated understanding of how 
circuits work.  
Taken together the results from Chapters 2, 3 and 4 indicate that the question, 
explanation, follow-up pattern of interaction may not be a universal mechanism used by 
children when learning from others. In this chapter I attempt to explain why these 
differences exist and how they contribute to cognitive differences in children from low-
SES and mid-SES families.  
In Chapter 1, I highlighted two individual differences that may contribute to 
variability in the question, explanation, follow-up pattern of interaction: socioeconomic 
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status and caregivers’ epistemological stances. A large number of studies have 
documented differences in patterns of caregiver talk across diverse backgrounds. From 
the complexity and amount of language caregivers’ use, to the directedness of their 
speech, it is well established that socioeconomic status contributes to differences in the 
linguistic nature of a child’s environment (Tizard & Hughes, 1983; Tizard & Hughes, 
1984; Hart & Risley, 1992; Hart & Riseley, 1995; Robinson & Rackstraw, 1967). In 
Chapter 2 of the current dissertation I extended these findings to demonstrate that 
differences also exist in the types and quality of responses caregivers use to respond to 
their children’s questions.  Although one plausible explanation for these differences is 
due to the cultural differences in patterns of speech, it is also possible that the quality of 
responses might be due to differences in knowledge. Caregivers from low-SES families 
provided more circular explanations. Recall these explanations reiterate children’s 
questions and therefore no new information is provided. It is probable that caregivers 
from low-SES families simply do not have the knowledge needed to provide non-circular 
explanations. This difference in exposure to explanations is linked to how children 
perceive informants. As seen in Chapter 3 (Studies 2, 3& 4), children use explanation 
quality to make judgments about an informant’s credibility. Mid-SES children prefer 
caregivers who use non-circular explanations, whereas children from low-SES families 
prefer informants who use circular explanations. Hence, the findings from Chapters 2 and 
3 reveal that not only are there differences in patterns of discourse used by children 
across socioeconomic backgrounds, but these differences are linked to how children 
perceive informants. Stated more broadly and provocatively, it is possible that children 
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from low-SES families might not view teachers who use non-circular explanations as 
credible and therefore not turn to these types of teachers in learning situations.  
Indeed, explanations not only provide children with the opportunity to engage in a 
linguistically rich discourse, but the results from Study 5 (Chapter 4) show that children 
do learn from the explanations they hear. The extent to which children learn is influenced 
by caregivers’ epistemological beliefs. When children are presented with explanations 
that use evidence and examples, they learn more. It is not surprising that children learn 
from the explanations they hear given the results from Study 1 (Chapter 2) which show 
children follow-up when they receive an unsatisfactory response. For instance, when 
looking at follow-up to causal questions, children follow-up when they did not receive an 
explanation. These data suggest that children seek specific types of responses to the 
questions they ask in order to acquire new information.  
What do these findings mean for child development? Broadly speaking, children 
use a range of interactions when learning from others. Certain interaction patterns are 
more ideal for acquiring conceptual knowledge than others. In the current set of studies I 
demonstrated that one tool children use to acquire conceptual knowledge is questions. 
Children’s conceptual knowledge develops during the preschool years (Spelke & Carey, 
1994) Conceptual knowledge is characterized most clearly as knowledge that is rich in 
relationships. It can be thought of as an interconnected web of knowledge in which the 
linking relationships are as important as the discrete pieces of information (Hiebert & 
Lefevre, 1986). The development of conceptual knowledge parallels the development of 
children’s questions. Beginning with ‘what’ questions which yield information that 
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provides children with discrete information and then moving to ‘why’ questions, which 
provide children with causal connections, one would expect to see a shift in children’s 
understanding of conceptual knowledge around age 3 or 4 (when they shift to asking 
causal questions).  In the current set of studies, I demonstrated that children use questions 
to acquire conceptual knowledge and understand that specific types of questions (e.g., 
‘why’, ‘how’) require explanatory responses. These findings are consistent with previous 
work showing that children expect explanatory responses to their causal questions 
(Frazier, Gelman & Welman, 2009).  However, this previous work did not consider 
individual differences and how this pattern of interaction may not be an optimal tool for 
acquiring conceptual knowledge for all children. Indeed, in the current set of studies, I 
showed how individual differences specifically socioeconomic status and epistemological 
beliefs impact the effectiveness of this interaction pattern. 
The variability observed across the 5 studies presented in the current dissertation 
can be linked to differences in cognitive development. Children who are exposed to high-
quality explanations that include evidence not only acquire more knowledge, but are also 
exposed to more sophisticated ways of thinking about the world. These children will 
likely enter formal schooling with a more extensive knowledge base and ability to use 
evidence to reason about problems. This ability can be linked to the development of 
critical thinking skills (Kuhn, 2002). As children reason about the world, those who have 
the ability to use evidence to support their claims will be likely be better prepared to 
navigate novel learning scenarios (I explore the implications for children’s learning 
further in Chapter 6). These data support the initial hypothesis that vocabulary 
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differences are not the only cognitive disadvantage that children from low-SES families 
face when they enter formal schooling. Additionally, these findings suggest children from 
low-SES families may not be the only ones who are at a cognitive disadvantage when 
entering formal schooling. Children from mid-SES families who are not exposed to high 
quality explanations that use evidence and examples may be at a disadvantage compared 
to their peers who are exposed to explanations that use examples, likely causing 
discrepancies in children’s critical thinking skills, which are crucial for the development 
of today’s learner.  
Despite these findings, it is important to note that there were several limitations to 
the methods used. First, in Study 1, it is important to note that the corpus was from 1984. 
Given the influence of social context on children’s development (Bronfenbrenner, 1979), 
it is plausible that the nature of everyday conversations has changed over the past twenty 
years. Thus, these results should be interpreted with caution when thinking about today’s 
child, yet they provide an important first step at looking at differences in these patterns of 
interaction. In future research I plan to look at this interaction pattern in a more modern 
sample. Moreover, when looking at children’s follow-up in Study 1, it is important to 
interpret these results with caution as there were few cases for each type of follow-up. In 
future studies, where this coding scheme is applied, I plan to group follow-up in a similar 
way to how I grouped adult responses.  
Second, as previously noted, when interpreting the results from Studies 2, 3 and 4, 
it is important to exercise caution when considering real world implications, as these 
studies were highly controlled and only accounted for one expression of explanation 
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quality (argument circularity).  Indeed, future research is needed to look at other cues that 
children might monitor when using explanations as a tool to learn from others.  
Lastly, in Study 5, it is important to highlight that this study was conducted in a 
naturalistic context. Therefore, it is difficult to make causal inferences. Although it is 
clear the caregivers’ epistemological stances are associated with the explanations they 
provide, it is unclear if these explanations cause children to learn more. In future 
research, I plan to conduct an experimental study where I control the explanations 
children hear in order to systematically explore if children actually learn from the 
explanations they hear.  
 In conclusion, the question, explanation, follow-up pattern of interaction does not 
look the same for all children. Indeed, all children ask questions, but the quality and types 
of responses they hear differs; impacting both their verbal and behavioral follow up. 
Understanding the interaction patterns children use as a tool for learning from others is 
critical to thinking about best teaching practices and creating culturally responsive 
classrooms. I consider how these early learning experiences may impact formal schooling 
in the following Chapter (Chapter 6).  
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Chapter 6: Significance and Implications 
Children’s conversations with others facilitate the exchange of knowledge. In 
the current dissertation I used naturalistic observations and experimental methods to 
investigate one pattern of interaction that children use as a tool to learn from others. By 
using experimental methods, I was able to further support the findings from the 
naturalistic observations (Chapter 2). The findings from the 5 studies presented here 
have important implications for children’s learning. Indeed, children’s early 
interactions often influence their behaviors and interactions in the context of formal 
schooling.  
The findings from Study 1 (Chapter 2) highlight the frequency with which 
children across diverse backgrounds ask information-seeking questions as a tool to learn 
from others. It is important for teachers to be mindful that children ask questions to 
acquire new knowledge and not simply to maintain attention (Chouinard, 2007). 
However, there is significant variability in how children respond when they receive 
unsatisfactory responses to their questions. Specifically, when children hear 
unsatisfactory responses to causal questions, mid-SES children provide their own 
explanations more frequently, indicating an understanding that these types of questions 
require explanations. In contrast, low-SES children do not follow-up as frequently and 
are more likely to drop their original question. Thus, they are less likely to be exposed to 
the explanations needed to make gains in the acquisition of conceptual knowledge. It is 
important for teachers to note that not all children will follow-up if the receive an 
unsatisfactory response. Therefore, teachers should not expect that the question, 
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explanation, follow-up pattern of interaction is privileged across all children. 
Accordingly, teachers need to be sensitive to this realization and adjust their pedagogy to 
reflect the interaction-patterns that children are exposed to in their early learning 
experiences with their caregivers.  The data presented here suggest that teachers should 
not always wait for children to ask questions, instead they should work to spontaneously 
provide high quality explanations, especially when children are exploring entities that 
include causal mechanisms. These explanations are not only used for the acquisition of 
knowledge but also for children to build relationships with their teachers. 
As demonstrated in Studies 3, 4 and 5, (Chapter 3) children use explanations to 
judge the credibility of an informant. In classroom settings the informant children most 
likely turn to is their teacher. Contrary to what one might expect, children do not blindly 
learn from their teachers.  
Although experimental designs like those used in Chapter 3 are not always 
appropriate representations of what occurs in a classroom setting, they provide an 
important first step in systematically identifying the cues children employ when 
making decisions about which informants to turn to in learning situations. Indeed, 
although it is unlikely that children will be faced with two blatantly different 
explanations in a classroom setting, it is very likely that they will be exposed to 
multiple teachers within their classroom, and it is likely that these teachers will provide 
explanations that vary in quality.  Moreover, children are constantly weighing the 
explanations they hear from their teachers against the explanations they hear from their 
parents. The type of forced-choice experimental research highlighted in Chapter 3 
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allowed me to isolate the cues children rely on most heavily in learning situations.  The 
next step for future research is to ask how children weight multiple cues, which would 
be more analogous to a classroom situation. 
Indeed, this recent set of studies, combined with the previous research looking at 
children’s evaluations of informants for single-word learning indicate that as children 
develop, they attend to epistemic cues more readily when deciding from whom to learn 
(Koenig, 2012).   One important implication based on these findings is that teachers 
must be especially vigilant to avoid using circularity when answering questions. Our 
work and others suggest that by the time children enter formal schooling, children 
prefer high quality, non-circular explanations – at least in the case of mid-SES children 
(Authors, Baum, Danovitch & Keil, 2008; Mercier et al., 2014) – and selectively prefer 
to learn new information from someone who provides high-quality explanations.  By 
implication, children may selectively avoid learning from someone who provides a 
lower-quality explanation – or a circular one. This is not to say that teachers ever 
willingly provide poor quality explanations. Yet recall the data highlighted in Chapter 
1, that even well-meaning preschool teachers do not provide high-quality explanations 
for all of their students’ questions.  After being barraged with questions, a teacher is apt 
to say something like “It is that way, because I said so.” It is important for teachers to 
note that children use these responses to make inferences about their future credibility. 
Note, Study 4 demonstrated that low-SES children prefer to learn from an informant 
who provides circular explanations. This poses a potential conflict for teachers because 
circular explanations are not ideal for providing children with the information needed 
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to acquire conceptual knowledge, but it is also important for their students to perceive 
them as a credible source. I propose that instead of teachers changing their 
explanations to be lower-quality (circular), that researchers consider an intervention 
that targets the quality of explanations caregivers offer their children so that children 
are exposed to non-circular explanations early on. It is important to note that I am not 
suggesting that children will not trust their teacher if she does not always provide high-
quality explanations. Instead, teachers should view explanations as a tool to further 
developing their students’ epistemic trust in them as well as their emotional trust.  
Furthermore, in the classroom context, I suggest that when teachers are asked 
questions that they do not know how to answer that they use a KWL chart (Carr & 
Ogle, 1987). That is, they help children to identify what information they already know 
about the topic, “K,” what they want to know about the topic (their question) “W,” and, 
after the teacher helps the student to locate the answer, what they learned, “L.” I 
recommend that teachers allocate a chart in their classroom for students’ questions. 
Teachers should find the appropriate answers to these questions and formulate a high 
quality explanation to report during a designated time. Note that children’s 
understanding of causality emerges around age 4; thus, prior to age 4, I suggest that 
teachers do not include causal language in their explanations, as children may not be 
able to accurately interpret these explanations (for a review on the development of 
causal understanding, see Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). Teachers should use their 
epistemological beliefs to facilitate the development of these explanations. As 
demonstrated in Study 5, teachers with evaluativist stances will likely use explanations 
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that provide evidence and example causing children to learn more. When a teacher 
does not have an evaluativist stance, she might not draw on previous examples or she 
might not be aware of the child’s previous experiences to build on. Therefore, it is 
important for early childhood educators to connect with caregivers to understand 
experiences that a child has had that a teacher might use to build knowledge from. For 
example, a teacher might consider sending home a survey at the beginning of each unit 
that asks caregivers if their child has visited specific places or have relatives who have 
specific jobs (e.g., a unit on farms, the teacher might ask parents if their child has ever 
visited a farm). 
I believe children’s learning from explanations is important across multiple 
learning contexts. For example, in today’s math curricula, children are often presented 
with multiple explanations of how to solve a problem. If children rely on one 
explanation over the other and are unsuccessful, they may use that unsuccessful 
explanation to make an (incorrect) inference about the credibility of their teacher in the 
domain of math. Moreover, understanding how children learn from explanations might 
be especially important in the case of science learning.  This is because the majority of 
phenomena can only be learned through the explanations provided to children by 
adults (e.g. what are germs? why is the sky blue?).  Indeed, in recent years the 
educational framework used to promote science has been largely based on the premise 
of science as an argument (Kuhn, 2009).  That is, scientific thinking can be viewed as 
a social activity that involves “defending” or “arguing” certain theories through 
explanation (Kuhn, 1991). With a new emphasis placed on Science curriculum and the 
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emergence of the Common Core Standards (2010), the Next Generation Science 
Standards (2013), and the Framework for K–12 Science Education (NRC, 2012), it is 
especially crucial that children are exposed to high quality explanations and arguments 
for scientific phenomena during the preschool years. Study 5 has important 
implications for science learning. Indeed, when a teacher adopts an evaluativist stance, 
they provide explanations that use more evidence and examples, leading children to 
learn from the explanations they hear. Teacher trainings, particularly in the preschool 
years, should target the epistemological beliefs of teachers. Indeed, if an expression of 
an evaluativist stance in explanations leads to greater learning, then teacher trainers 
should provide teachers with explanations that move beyond facts and use examples 
and multiple sources of evidence. 
In addition, curricular materials should provide guidance not only on the 
content of the taught domain but also on the explanatory language to be used by the 
teacher. To my knowledge, few standardized curricula exist that provide useful 
explanations for teachers to use when teaching science during the preschool years. In 
fact the majority of curricula focus on science activities and content, but provide little 
guidance to teachers about the explanations to use when explaining the HOW and 
WHY specific phenomena exist (e.g., Dispezio, 2012; Macmillan, 2006,). This lack of 
curricular materials on explanatory structure is surprising, given the large body of 
literature focused on how classroom discourse – especially teacher discourse – plays a 
significant role in children’s acquisition of new knowledge (Cazden, 2001; O’Connor 
& Michaels 1996). When learning from explanations, children as young as 3 
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distinguish “good” reasons from “bad” reasons and prefer to learn from informant’s 
who “use” good reasons to support their beliefs (Koenig, 2012), thus demonstrating 
that children not only attend to the semantic structure of responses, but also to the 
quality of the explanation. Together, these cues contribute greatly to a child’s 
willingness to learn new information from an informant. Given these findings, policy 
makers might consider including benchmarks for pre-service around the quality of the 
explanations they provide. Indeed, early childhood teacher certification standards 
continue to remain an open question as they vary from state to state (doe.gov, 2015). 
As policy makers continue to refine these standards, it is important for them to 
consider the emphasis on teacher’s abilities to provide exemplary responses to 
children’s questions as a tool for developing conceptual and procedural knowledge in 
even the youngest of learners.  
Finally, I believe the findings across these 5 studies highlight the importance of 
explicit interaction across teaching teams. Learning is a highly social experience, 
especially during the early years. Indeed, it is not the goal of education for children to 
blindly accept information from a trusted source without evaluation. Instead, 
educators aim to promote children’s ability to think critically about the information 
they receive from others (Heyman, 2008). This is especially true when children are in 
learning situations with multiple sources. As previously mentioned, it is common in 
preschool and early elementary classrooms to work in teaching “teams” (e.g., 
teachers, assistant teachers, aids, paraprofessionals, etc.). As a result, children have 
access to many different sources when learning about the world. The data from 
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Studies 2, 3 and 4 (Chapter 3) suggest that children might readily accept one teacher 
as more credible than another teacher based on the quality of explanations she 
provides and that the quality of explanations is directly linked to how much children 
learn (Study 5). To prevent such selective preferences for learning from one teacher 
over another, I urge teachers to be mindful not only about the content of their 
explanations, but on the linguistic context under which the explanation is provided.  
The ideal is for all teachers to provide high quality, and consistent, explanations. 
Thus, taking the time to discuss lesson plans and activities with all teachers in the 
classroom is crucial to promoting a community of learners. Despite this ideal, it may 
not always be attainable. Indeed, there is considerable variability in the training of 
preschool teachers (Heisner & Lederberg, 2011). Consequently, children from low-
SES families are likely to be exposed to teachers who do not have as much training as 
those who teach in areas that service mid/high-SES children (Bradley & Corwyn, 
2002). Although no research has systematically explored the link between teachers’ 
explanations and their training, one might hypothesize that teachers with less training 
are less apt to provide high quality explanations. This poses a potential challenge as 
preschool is an opportunity for children to become exposed to interaction patterns that 
are privileged in formal schooling, like the question, explanation, follow-up discussed 
in this dissertation. If classroom teachers have similar backgrounds to their students 
(e.g., they both come from low-SES families), then interaction patterns that are 
privileged in the home, might be perpetuated in the classroom and therefore children 
from low-SES families might not have the opportunity to be exposed to the question, 
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explanation follow-up pattern of interaction that is privileged in formal schooling. On 
the other hand, this might lead children to perceive their teachers as more credible 
learning partners as evidenced by Study 4. 
Despite these important implications, I remain cautious about the implications of 
these findings for children’s use of explanations when learning across domains. Four of 
the five studies here present information specific to the science domain. Therefore, it is 
unclear whether or not children will extend their preferences for an informant (Chapter 2; 
Studies 2, 3 and 4) from one domain (e.g., science) to another domain (e.g., math). 
Likewise, because the evaluativist stance lends itself to the science domain (Chapter 4; 
Study 5), it is not clear if this would be the preferred expression to be used in 
explanations across other domains. More research is needed to determine if the findings I 
expect generalize to other domains.  
In summary, I believe the results from this dissertation provide important 
implications for classroom teaching and learning. Children across diverse backgrounds 
use questions to acquire knowledge. The pattern of discourse that follows children’s 
initial questions varies as a function of the caregivers’ responses.  When focusing on 
these responses influence children’s learning, it is clear that children not only monitor 
what is said, but how it is said. The current set of studies reveal that children do in fact 
learn from the explanations they hear and they also use explanations to make judgments 
about an informant’s credibility Thus, it is particularly important that teachers 
consistently provide children with high quality explanations across all learning domains. 
By doing so, teachers will not only enhance children’s conceptual knowledge, but they 
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will also build children’s epistemic trust, making their students more willing to learn 
from them in future learning tasks. Understanding the pattern of interaction that 
necessitates learning and whether or not children actually learn from the explanations 
they hear will further support the development of curriculum, pedagogical approaches, 
and culturally responsive practices. 
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